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I. Introduction
Before the Bates' decision by the United States Supreme Court
in 1977, lawyers "marketed" their practices only in informal ways.
Lawyers increased their "visibility" among those who may have
needed legal services by obtaining memberships in social clubs and
business and civic organizations. 2 Despite these and many other
subtle and not-so-subtle business-getting activities, the profession's
official party line was that a lawyer's good reputation should be the
primary source of his business. 3 Any overt effort toward promoting
publicity or other ways of getting business was viewed by the bar as
beneath the standards of the profession.4 The recent inclusion of
advertising by lawyers within the protections of the first amend-
ment,5 however, has brought law firm marketing practices out of
the closet.
Today the public relations and advertising experts are preach-
ing the advantages of the planned marketing of legal services. 6
However, their recommended marketing strategies do not focus
only or even primarily upon advertising per se.7 The "PR" experts
1 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
2 See, e.g., J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN 126 (1962); V. MORIN, HOW TO MAKE
MONEY PRACTICING LAW 24-25 (6th ed. 1977);J. TRACY, THE SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF LAW
5-7 (1947).
3 The original American Bar Association (ABA) Canon 27 began: "The most worthy
and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer .... is the establishment of a
well-merited reputation .... " See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-
6 (1982) [hereinafter cited as MODEL CODE]; Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and
Cures?, in 5 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 104, 115 (1938).
4 CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 27 (1908). See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL
ETHICS ch. 8 (1953).
5 Bates, 433 U.S. 350.
6 The American Bar Association Journal reported that almost one out of five of its
members contacted in a poll engaged in internal public relations activity such as issuing
news releases. The number of members who had used an outside public relations consult-
ant more than doubled over the previous year's 6%. Reskin, Lawyer Advertising Levels O
P.R. Use Growing, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 48.
7 See, e.g., Foonberg, How a Small Firm Can Get and Keep Clients, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at
50; Kaufman, The Firm Brochure, 28 PRAC. LAW. 79 (1982); Madory, Marketing as a Problem-
Solving Technique, 26 LAw OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 208 (1985); Morgan, How Small Firms Can
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realize that while advertising in newspapers, magazines, and the
Yellow Pages may be advantageous for the marketers of standard
products and routine services, it is less effective for sellers of indi-
vidualized personal services.8 Consequently, the PR consultants
are pushing marketing programs which instead emphasize strate-
gies such as seeking referrals from "business forwarders," receiving
greater media exposure through news releases, authoring feature
articles and newsletters, and touting one's expertise by sponsoring
seminars on current legal topics.9
However, while listening to this pitch, one cannot help but
wonder whether these lay PR experts understand the nature of the
restrictions that the legal profession continues to place on the get-
ting of business by lawyers,' 0 notwithstanding Bates and its prog-
eny.1 ' Many of the articles written on law practice marketing pay
only lip service at best to the American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 12 The tacit assumption
seems to be that after the PR people propose marketing strategies,
it is up to the lawyers to determine whether they are permissible.
Attract Corporate Litigation, A.B.A.J. Oct. 1984, at 59; Santangelo, Marketingfor Small Firms-A
Myth or a Reality?, 56 N.Y. ST. B.J. 42 (1984); Smock & Heintz, Attracting Clients With Market-
ing, 69 A.B.A.J. 1432 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Smock]; Winter, The Fine Art of Rainmak-
ing, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1984, at 54. See also Goldstein, Marketing Lawyer's Services Into the 1980's,
24 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 87 (1983).
8 See Goldstein, supra note 7, at 99; Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, Why Lawyers Should Be
Allowed To Advertise: A Marketing Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084, 1105
(1983) [hereinafter cited as Hazard]; Morgan, supra note 7, at 60-6 1; Santangelo, supra note
7, at 44; Smock, supra note 7, at 1434-36.
9 See note 7 supra.
10 The Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar apparently felt compelled to
issue an ethics opinion sua sponte concerning some law practice marketing advice given by
a nonlawyer in a local bar journal. Opinion 84-98 (1984), summarized in ABA/BNA LAW-
YER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 801:4346 [hereinafter cited as LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL]. The nonlawyer suggested that lawyers should train and give incentives to their staff
to solicit business for their employers. The ethics committee's caveat cited provisions of
the ethics code prohibiting solicitation. In Goldstein, supra note 7, at 102, a New York City
practitioner is quoted as having said, "You have to bear in mind that the [advertising] agen-
cies don't have the foggiest notion about the Canons of Ethics and what you can and cannot
do."
11 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455
U.S. 191 (1982); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980); Consolidated Edison v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 430 (1980); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
12 Santangelo, supra note 7, at 44: "Then there are the ethical considerations-what
are they (consult the Bar Association)?" Morgan, supra note 7, at 60, discusses "getting in
the door" of targeted potential clients via the "cold call" method. (Apparently, this method
involves an in-person or telephone contact with the prospective client.) However, he dis-
courages this practice as ineffective without ever considering its ethical propriety. See text
accompanying notes 392-94 infra. In Winter, supra note 7, at 58, there is one reference to
the potential ethical problem involved with the direct solicitation aspects of "cold calling"
prospective clients. In Smock, supra note 7, at 1434, only one sentence is devoted to possi-
ble ethical restrictions upon the authors' suggested marketing strategies.
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Perhaps this is a legitimate assumption. It may be unreasonable to
assume that the lay PR specialist can master the intricacies of the
Code of Professional Responsibility-especially when the sands of
legal ethics continue to shift as much as they have in recent years.
It is difficult enough for attorneys, even law professors, to keep
abreast of the latest revisions and interpretations.
In the end, the responsibility for keeping marketing activities
by lawyers in line with the profession's ethical13 restrictions rests
solely with the lawyers.14 Recognizing this, this article will outline
the ethical problems inherent in several of the marketing strategies
commonly recommended to lawyers and law firms. It will focus
upon the United States Supreme Court's analysis of the commercial
speech doctrine as applied to lawyer advertising,' 5 only to the ex-
tent necessary to explain the present state of affairs, and in an at-
tempt to discern the path ahead when traversing the murkier
regions of this developing landscape.
In discussing the ethical aspects of these marketing activities,
frequent reference will be made to the now superseded ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. 16 It was the model for almost
all of the state disciplinary codes in effect today. Furthermore, it is
not manageable in an article of reasonable proportions to measure
each marketing strategy against the codes of fifty-one jurisdictions.
Reference will be made from time to time, however, to specific state
code provisions as examples of common variations on the ABA
Code. The recently adopted ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct' 7 will also be examined throughout this analysis in order
to throw some light on how Code restrictions are changed, if at all,
by the Rules. Recent decisions in both the federal and state courts
have necessitated a rethinking and redrafting of the states' rules
governing lawyer advertising and solicitation.' 8 Nearly all of the
13 Of course, the term "ethical" by no means implies "moral." Clearly, there are many
violations of the legal profession's ethical proscriptions which do not impugn the violator's
moral worth. The rules against advertising are a good example.
14 Committee on Professional Ethics, Conn. Bar Ass'n Informal Op. 82-17 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as Conn. Informal Op.]. In this article, the first ethics opinions from a
state will be cited fully. Subsequent citation to any opinions from that state will be cited in a
shortened form by state, opinion number, and year, and will include a reference to the note
in which that state's opinions are fully cited. When available, the citation of any opinion
will include a reference to a summary of that opinion contained in either the Lawyer's Man-
ual, supra note 10, or the Current Reports Volume of the Lawyer's Manual on Professional
Conduct [hereinafter cited as CURRENT REPORTS]. For a summary of the Connecticut opin-
ion cited in this note, see LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2057.
15 See notes 1 and I 1 supra.
16 MODEL CODE, supra note 3.
17 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULES].
The Model Rules were adopted by the ABA effective August 2, 1983.
18 See note 11 supra. See also Spencer v. Honorable Justices of Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (holding invalid some aspects of the state rules
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states are now considering whether to adopt the Model Rules with a
few having already done so. 19 But regardless of whether they em-
brace the Rules, the states surely will use the ABA's new Rules as a
guide.
Much of this area is currently in a state of flux. Therefore, it
will be difficult to say what the law is in certain instances. The best
example, perhaps, is direct mail advertising. Courts and ethics
committees are struggling to devise distinctions between mailings
which are prohibited solicitations and those which are not. The is-
sue is in the balance at this moment. Nevertheless, certain ethical
restrictions and guideposts remain constant. There is little contro-
versy within the legal profession about such matters as interference
with the lawyer's independence by lay intermediaries, conflicts of
interest, and aiding the unauthorized practice of law. Law market-
ing activities can run afoul of these ethical restrictions even though
the rules regarding advertising and solicitation are diligently
followed.
governing advertising), aff'd without opinion, 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985); Lovett and Linder,
Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903 (D.R.I. 1981) (invalidating restriction on where lawyer
advertising may be placed in publications); Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics and
Conduct of Iowa State Bar Ass'n, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa. 1981) (invalidating restric-
tions on placement of lawyer advertising and on the inclusion of the attorney's race in the
advertisement), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982); Durham v. Brock, 498 F.
Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd without opinion, 698 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1980); Lyon v.
Alabama State Bar, 451 So. 2d 1367 (Ala. 1984); Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn.
27, 470 A.2d 235 (1984); Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 420 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1982), vacating and
withdrawing earlier opinion, 407 So. 2d 595 (1981); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d
933 (Ky. 1978); State Bar Grievance Adm'r v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469
(1979); Woll v. Kelly, 116 Mich. App. 791, 323 N.W.2d 560 (1982); Johnson v. Director of
Professional Responsibility, 341 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983); In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204
(Minn. 1981); Walls v. Mississippi State Bar, 437 So. 2d 30 (Miss. 1983); McLellan v. Missis-
sippi State Bar Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982); In re von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470
N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985); In re Greene, 54
N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035 (1982); In
re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638 (Tenn. 1978);
In re Utah State Bar Petition for Approval of Changes in Disciplinary Rules on Advertising,
647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
19 As of early March 1986, the Model Rules had been adopted with some changes by
eleven states: Arizona (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 445); Arkansas (1 CURRENT
REPORTS, supra note 14, at 1126); Delaware (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 961);
Minnesota (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 855, 882); Missouri (1 CURRENT REPORTS,
supra note 14, at 924); Montana (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 855); Nevada (2
CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 14, 37); New Hampshire (2 CURRENT REPORTS, supra
note 14, at 14); NewJersey (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 334); North Carolina (1
CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 1026); and Washington (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra
note 14, at 961). The bars of New York (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 1047),
Oregon (1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 1048), and Vermont (1 CURRENT REPORTS,
supra note 14, at 855) have rejected the Model Rules. See Falsgraf, Quo Vadis Model Rules?,
A.B.A.J., Apr. 1986, at 8.
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II. Advertising
Having just noted that the restrictions on advertising and solic-
itation are not the only rules governing law practice marketing, we
must begin with advertising nevertheless. Under modern ethical
rules, all public and semi-public communications (mailings, for ex-
ample) made by lawyers about themselves, their firm, or the law are
subject, at a minimum, to the rules governing advertising.
In the very recent past, and according to many current but now
obsolete state ethical codes, public communications by lawyers
about themselves were not permitted, except in a few limited situa-
tions. Even after Bates,20 some jurisdictions permitted advertising
only in print media of general circulation and severely restricted
the information which could be disseminated.2 1 Otherwise, a law-
yer could not pay or even request another to recommend her
services to others except in a few narrow circumstances. One ex-
ception permitted the mailing of "professional announcements" to
other lawyers, relatives, friends, and past and present clients.2 2 An-
other rule allowed recommendation of the lawyer either by bar-
approved lawyer referral services or by qualified legal assistance
organizations .23
Presently, however, it is clear that the first amendment protects
a lawyer's commercial speech, where she offers to provide legal
services of a certain nature at a price.2 4 This means that state ad-
vertising restrictions must change radically. The states can no
longer generally prohibit public and semi-public commercial com-
munications by lawyers, subject to a few permitted exceptions.
Rather, they must generally permit such communications, and any
exceptions must delineate the circumstances under which they will
be either proscribed altogether or restricted to some lesser
20 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
21 Before Bates, the Model Code provided that "a lawyer shall not prepare... [or] use
any form of public communication.., to attract lay clients." MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR
2-101(A) (1976). In 1977, DR 2-201(B) was amended to permit a lawyer to "publish or
broadcast.., in print media.., or over radio broadcast" twenty-five categories of informa-
tion. Several states modified their rules to permit only the Bates advertisement and nothing
more. "For example, Alabama and North Carolina allow[ed] the advertisement of only
services such as the four listed in the Bates ad, while Ohio prohibit[ed] the use of all draw-
ings except the scales ofjustice used in the Bates ad." L. ANDREWS, BIRTH OF A SALESMAN:
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLIcrrATION 71 (1980). See also id. at 43-57. Mississippi prohib-
ited all lawyer advertising except in newspapers. See McLellan v. Mississippi State Bar Ass'n,
413 So. 2d 705 (Miss. 1982).
22 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-102(A)(2). See generally H. DRINKER, supra note 4, at
232-42.
23 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(D).
24 Bates, 433 U.S. 350. The percentage of lawyers who have advertised was estimated to





Essentially, the Supreme Court has held that commercial
speech loses its protected status, and thus may be prohibited, when
its content is false, misleading, or relates to an illegal transaction, 26
or when the form or method of the communication is inherently
misleading 27 or inherently conducive to causing harm to the pub-
lic. 2 8 Therefore, any commercial communication by a lawyer to the
public may not be false or misleading, regardless of the manner in
which the communication is distributed or to whom it is sent.29
This includes letters, firm brochures, news letters, and press re-
leases, as well as advertising copy.
As a consequence, those who have responsibility for the draft-
ing of such communications must be particularly aware of how the
new ethics rules, as construed by the bar ethics committees and the
courts, define misleading statements. It is here-in the sweep of
the term "misleading"-that the severest (and arguably the most
unreasonable) restrictions on lawyer marketing are found.
A. What is Misleading?
Many of the states' post-Bates ethics codes dealing with adver-
tising are still quite restrictive. Their narrowness is based upon the
acceptance by the profession of several untested and questionable
assumptions. Many of these assumptions can be found in the cau-
tionary language of the early Supreme Court decisions dealing with
constitutionally protected advertising. In lowering the restraints
upon advertising by some professions, it is clear that the Court
wished to go slow when it came to other professionals, especially
lawyers, who were sure to challenge the restrictions to which they
were then subjected. One assumption underlying this caution was
noted in the final footnote to Justice Blackmun's opinion for the
Court in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
25 This conclusion is practically compelled by the United States Supreme Court's hold-
ings in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1983), and Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985), which in effect told the states that they may not prohibit lawyer
advertising that is not false or misleading. The new ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct adopted this approach in Rule 7.1.
26 See Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2275; R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203; Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
27 See Friedman, 440 U.S. at 12-17 (prohibition of trade names by optometrists upheld).
28 Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (in-person solicitation prohibitable).
29 DR 2-101(A) in the Model Code refers to "public" communications by lawyers. This
is not to say that lawyers may make false and misleading private communications. DR 1-
102(A)(4) prohibited a lawyer from engaging "in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation." MODEL CODE, supra note 3. The analogue to DR 2-102(A) in
the Model Rules, Rule 7.1, forbids any "false or misleading communication about the law-
yer or the lawyer's services." MODEL RULES, supra note 17. Model Rule 8.4(c) is identical to
DR 1-102(A)(4).
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Council.30 After holding that it was unconstitutional to prohibit
pharmacists from advertising the price of prescription drugs, Jus-
tice Blackmun noted:
[T]he distinctions, historical and functional, between profes-
sions, may require consideration of quite different factors. Phy-
sicians and lawyers, for example, do not dispense standardized
products; they render professional services of almost infinite va-
riety and nature, with the consequent enhanced possibility for
confusion and deception if they were to undertake certain kinds
of advertising. 3
1
In his opinion for the Court in Bates, Justice Blackmun contin-
ued the notion that many legal services are unique and, perhaps,
not advertisable. 32 However, in doing so, Justice Blackmun ac-
cepted an assumption that he had rejected earlier when it was of-
fered as an argument against all advertising by lawyers; that is, that
the public "lacks sophistication concerning legal services." 33 Black-
mun went on to say that as a consequence of this assumed "fact,"
34
Misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimpor-
tant in other advertising may be found quite inappropriate in
legal advertising. For example, advertising claims as to the
quality of services-a matter we do not address today-are not
susceptible of measurement or verification; accordingly, such
claims may be so likely to be misleading as to warrant
restriction.
3 5
Again in In re R.M.J. ,36 the majority opinion by Justice Powell
reiterated the fundamental assumption that lawyer advertising pos-
sesses a greater potential for deception than product advertising.
Indeed, the Court [in Bates] recognized the special possibilities
for deception presented by advertising for professional services.
The public's comparative lack of knowledge .... and the ab-
sence of any standardization in the "product" renders advertis-
ing for professional services especially susceptible to abuses that
the States have a legitimate interest in controlling .... [T]he
potential for deception and confusion is particularly strong in
the context of advertising professional services .... 37
Thus, the Court validated by fiat two basic assumptions: that
professional services are largely unique, and that the public is pecu-
30 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court held for the
first time that commercial speech, that is, advertising, was protected by the first
amendment.
31 Id. at 773 n.25.
32 Bates, 433 U.S. at 383.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 383-84 (footnote omitted).
36 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
37 Id. at 202-03.
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liarly unable to evaluate claims about them. These assumptions
form the colored lenses through which many courts and state ethics
committees look at lawyer advertising when they draft their adver-
tising rules and assess whether a particular ad is "misleading." Ap-
preciation of this perspective is essential to understanding the
restrictiveness of much of the current regulation of attorney
advertising.
3 8
The post-Bates ABA Model Code prohibited a lawyer from us-
ing "any form of public communication containing a false, fraudu-
lent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim."3 9 The Code did not define these terms or distinguish be-
tween them in any way. Nor did the Disciplinary Rules (DRs) con-
tain examples to illustrate the meanings of these terms. 40 Indeed, it
is difficult to discern any difference in meaning between "false" and
"fraudulent" on one hand, and "misleading" and "deceptive" on
the other. A material statement or claim that is false is thereby
fraudulent. A fraudulent statement or claim must mislead, as does
a deceptive one. And all of the above are certainly unfair.41
Granted, a statement may be literally true but misleading neverthe-
less.42 Therefore, it would seem that these prohibitions boil down
to two: false statements and misleading statements. This is how
38 It will be argued, see note 71 infra, that the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer
signals a major change in the Court's view toward the nature of lawyer advertising. The
Court now appears to be unwilling to accept at face value the assumption that there is
something unique about the advertising of professional services which justifies an enhanced
level of scrutiny and regulation. If this change in attitude persists, then many states' cur-
rent advertising restrictions are constitutionally untenable.
39 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(A).
40 However, Ethical Consideration (EC) 2-9 did state:
[E]xamples of information in lawyer advertising that would be deceptive include
misstatements of fact, suggestions that the ingenuity or prior record of a lawyer
rather than the justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to determine the
result, inclusion of information irrelevant to selecting a lawyer, and representa-
tions concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured or verified.
MODEL CODE, supra note 3.
41 In considering whether a particular business activity is "unfair" within the meaning
of § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (Supp. 1984), the Supreme
Court has listed several factors which the Commission might consider: (1) regardless of
whether the activity has been considered unlawful, whether it offends public policy; "in
other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other
established concept of unfairness"; (2) "whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or
unscrupulous"; or (3) "whether it causes substantial injury to consumers." FTC v. Sperry
& Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 244-45 n.5 (1972). Former FTC Commissioner Robert Pitof-
sky, in Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L REv. 661,
680-87 (1977), suggests three types of nondeceptive advertisements which may be "un-
fair": "first, claims published without reasonable prior substantiation; second, claims which
tend to overreach or exploit particularly vulnerable groups; and third, instances in which
sellers fail to provide consumers with information necessary to make choices among com-
peting products." Id. at 681.
42 For example, a lawyer who has never handled a drunk driving case could say that he
has never lost such a case in court.
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the ABA Model Rules are formulated. 43
Most of us would have little trouble understanding what is cov-
ered by the term "false." "Misleading," on the other hand, may be
subject to some debate because the concept involves several as-
pects, including not only the content of the statement, but also
how, when, where, and to whom it is made. It is common for the
drafters of more recent disciplinary rules to include definitional il-
lustrations or examples of what is considered "misleading" and
thus prohibited. These examples are often stated in the broadest
possible terms. For instance, Model Rule 7.1 states in part:
A communication is false or misleading if it:
(a) contains a material misrepresentation of fact or law, or
omits a fact necessary to make the statement considered as a
whole not materially misleading;
(b) is likely to create an unjustified expectation about re-
sults the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer
can achieve results by means that violate the rules of profes-
sional conduct or other law; or
(c) compares the lawyer's services with other lawyers' serv-
ices, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.
44
The comment to Rule 7.1 is more specific: "The prohibition in par-
agraph (b) ... would ordinarily preclude advertisements about re-
sults obtained on behalf of a client, such as the amount of a damage
award or the lawyer's record in obtaining favorable verdicts, and
advertisements containing client endorsements." 45 The comment
also makes clear that "[t]his Rule governs all communications
about a lawyer's services," not just public advertisements.
46
Several states' advertising regulations are modeled after Pro-
posal "B," one of two proposed revisions of the ABA Model Code
which were circulated by the ABA's Task Force on Lawyer Advertis-
ing in 1977 following the Bates decision. 47 Proposal B contained
43 See note 29 supra. In light of the comments by Pitofsky, see note 41 supra, it could be
argued that the Model Rules do not cover all of the possible abuses of lawyer advertising by
prohibiting only false and misleading ads.
44 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3.
45 See text accompanying notes 91-106 infra for a discussion of endorsements.
46 The Preamble to the Model Rules states that: "Comments do not add obligations to
the Rules but provide guidance for practicing in compliance with the Rules." This would
make the comments in the Rules functionally equivalent to the Ethical Considerations of
the Model Code, which were described in its "Preliminary Statement" as "a body of princi-
ples upon which the lawyer can rely for guidance in many specific situations." It remains to
be seen whether courts and ethics committees will cite the comments to the Rules as if they
were rules themselves.
47 Proposal B is reproduced in full in L. ANDREWS, supra note 2 1, at app. II. According
to Andrews, Proposal B was adopted by at least 19 states: California, the District of Colum-
bia, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota,
Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id. at app. III.
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further examples of misleading or otherwise prohibited "public
communications." These included "statement[s] of opinion as to
the quality of the [legal] services"; 48 "[a]ppeals primarily to a
layperson's fear, greed, desire for revenge, or similar emotion";49
and statements "intended or ... likely to attract clients by use of
showmanship, puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism, including the
use of slogans, jingles or garish or sensational language or
format."50
Other states have adopted selected parts of these various
Model Code provisions. For example, Texas recently amended its
version of DR 2-101 (A) to prohibit any "statements of opinion as to
the quality of legal services," "predictions of success," testimonials
or endorsements, and "statistical data or information about past
performances not susceptible to reasonable verification by the pub-
lic." 5' In short, specific restrictions on the content of lawyer adver-
tising may vary greatly from state to state. Most, however, seem to
be based on the assumption mentioned earlier: that lawyer adver-
tising should be held to a higher standard than ordinary product
and nonprofessional services advertising because it is inherently
more likely to mislead or seduce an overly gullible and naive public.
1. Record of Past Performances
Some states have prohibited all information regarding past
performance regardless of its verifiability.52 Even when such infor-
mation is permitted on the condition that it be capable of "reason-
able verification by the public," as under the Texas rule, most
claims based upon past performance will be prohibited. While it
may be true, for example, that Lawyer X's clients have recovered on
the average of $100,000 over the last five years, the public would
have great difficulty verifying this statistic. Many recoveries are by
way of settlement, which are usually not a matter of public record,
48 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-I01(C)(4) (Draft Proposal B
1977).
49 Id. at DR 2-101(C)(5).
50 Id. at DR 2-101(C)(6).
51 Supreme Court of Texas, Rules Governing the State Bar of Texas art. XII, § 8a
(CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1)-(8) (1973)) [hereinafter cited as
TEXAS CODE]. In 1977, the Supreme Court of Texas suspended the state disciplinary code
insofar as it was inconsistent with the Bates holding. After two referenda in 1978 and 1980
failed to achieve the majority vote necessary to amend the advertising rules, the court is-
sued new rules by court order, effective September 1, 1982. 45 TEx. BJ. (Sept. 1982) (spe-
cial insert).
52 For example, Florida's DR 2-101(C)(2) prohibits "any form of communication
which: ... (2) Contains statistical data or other information based on past performance."
The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1983). Idaho, NewJersey, and New Mexico all
either have or had identical code provisions. NATIONAL CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILrrY, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE 72L, 107L, 108L (1980) [herein-
after cited as STATE CODES].
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and Lawyer X's client files are not open to public inspection. A
lawyer who advertises truthfully, for example, that she has ap-
peared in the tax or bankruptcy court 275 times, could argue that
her appearances are a matter of public record. Whether this fact is
"susceptible to reasonable verification" is doubtful.53
What may be allowed by provisions similar to Texas' is a state-
ment by Lawyer X which refers to a widely publicized fact that she
represented a client who recovered a large settlement or award, or
was acquitted of a crime. 54 However, such an advertisement is very
close to listing "clients regularly represented," and under the
Model Code would require written consent from the named
client.
55
But even with such written consent, jurisdictions which adopt
some form of the Model Rules' prohibition against statements
"likely to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer
can achieve," 56 may deem any recitation of past victories, individual
or otherwise, misleading. The comment to Model Rule 7.1 con-
demns these kinds of statements because they "may create the un-
justified expectation that similar results can be obtained for others
without reference to the specific factual and legal circumstances [of
their cases]." 57 In states like Texas, which offer a hope of reciting
some information about past cases as long as it is reasonably verifia-
53 Such a claim also may run afoul of prohibitions against holding oneself out as a
specialist. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-105; MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.4.
These prohibitions generally prevent a lawyer from implying that she is a specialist unless
she has been officially certified as such by the state bar. See text accompanying notes 135-36
infra. But cf. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985) (lawyer's
advertisement that he was handling a particular kind of case for several clients was not an
impermissible claim of expertise).
54 Imagine a television advertisement featuring an attorney who says: "Hi! Do you
know me? I represented John DeLorean at his drug smuggling trial and won."
55 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(B)(16). The Model Code is biased in favor of
practitioners who represent institutions or persons on a continuing basis. The defenders of
those accused of crimes and plaintiffs' personal injury attorneys do not usually "regularly"
represent most of their clients. Therefore, they could not take advantage of this kind of
advertising information, whereas firms which represent banks and insurance companies
could. Ironically, perhaps, the latter lawyers are less likely to want or need to advertise than
the former. I am indebted to my colleague Walter Steele for this observation.
56 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.1(b).
57 The comment to New Jersey Rule 7.1, effective September 10, 1984, adopted the
identical language of the Model Rules comment. NEWJERSEY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 7.1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as N.J. RULES]. The parent of this comment, Model
Code EC 2-9, stated that "suggestions that the ... prior record of a lawyer rather than the
justice of the claim are the principal factors likely to determine the result" would be decep-
tive. MODEL CODE, supra note 3. See also Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of
the State Bar of Mich. Op. CI-830 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Mich. Op.], summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4851 (sending a newsletter to present and past
clients containing news clippings about out-of-state verdicts in personal injury cases is mis-
leading unless accompanied by a disclaimer that similar results may not be possible in Mich-
igan); Committee on Professional Ethics of the N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Op. 539 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as N.Y. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6106
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ble by the public, that hope may be all but snatched away by the ban
on all "predictions of future success," 58 and the raising of "unjusti-
fied expectations about results." 59
In sum, it would seem that in most states public and semi-pub-
lic communications by lawyers about themselves which specify past
accomplishments face a clear risk of being deemed unethical.
2. Reputation
Although lawyers are urged to rely on their reputations to at-
tract business, they cannot recite the cases or statistics which gener-
ated that reputation. Nevertheless, may a lawyer directly state her
professional reputation in a particular field of law? Any attempt to
do so would meet a host of objections under every version of the
disciplinary code or rules. Under the ABA Model Code, claiming a
superior reputation would be prohibited as "self-laudatory." 60 The
ABA's Model Rules have omitted the "self-laudatory" language of
the Code, and the comment to Rule 7.1 speaks only of the require-
ment that lawyer communications be "truthful" and not create un-
justified expectations about future results.6 1  The Rules'
requirement that a statement be capable of being "factually sub-
stantiated," an obvious pitfall for claims of high repute, applies
only to comparisons of lawyers' services. 62 Theoretically, then,
reputational claims are permissible under the Model Rules if they
are true, do not create unjustified expectations, and are not other-
wise inherently misleading.
It is difficult to understand how a claim of "national recogni-
tion as one of the top plaintiffs' personal injury lawyers in the coun-
try," for example, would create expectations other than that the
(lawyer cannot describe selected cases she has handled and the amounts recovered in each
because prior results are potentially misleading).
58 TEXAs CODE, supra note 51, DR 2-101(A)(4).
59 Id. at DR 2-101(A)(8).
60 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(A). Disciplinary Rule 2-101(C)(6) of Proposal
B also prohibited "self-laudation." A state prohibition on self-laudatory statements by law-
yers was upheld as not unconstitutionally vague in Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985). A Connecticut
ethics committee held that a law firm may not advertise in a pamphlet circulated by a realtor
the statement that the firm was a "well-respected business in [the] community." The com-
mittee labeled the statement self-laudatory and unfair because it was subjective and incapa-
ble of confirmation by any objective standard. Conn. Informal Op. 81-6 (1980), supra note
14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2052. A Michigan ethics panel
disallowed the use of the phrase "nationally recognized" in conjunction with advertising an
area of practice because it might mislead the public into believing that the firm had been
designated an expert by a national certifying authority. Mich. Op. CI-553 (1981), supra note
57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4809.
61 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.1(b).
62 "A communication is false or misleading if it: ... (c) compares the lawyer's services
with other lawyers' services, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated." Id. at
Rule 7.1 (c).
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best that can be done will be done for that attorney's clients. A
claim of high esteem among one's peers is not so much a prediction
of future success as a claim of recognized competence. But as such,
it may be objected to as being misleading because its truth is not
objectively or factually verifiable. While the Model Rules do not
define unverifiable claims as misleading, this notion pervades the
restrictions of the Model Rules and, even more so, many state regu-
lations on advertising. 63 Verifying whether an attorney possesses a
particular reputation depends upon whom you ask. It is easy to
claim an exceptional reputation and difficult to disprove. By the
same token, the claimant would have equal difficulty proving the
truth of the claim. How many lawyers must agree that the claim is
valid, and from which communities must they come? The lack of
verifiability of reputations might make them misleading even under
the Model Rules.
But, it is a non sequitur to say that something is potentially
misleading because it is difficult to verify. At one time it was difficult
to confirm the claim that the world is round, not flat, but this did
not render the claim misleading. The gist of the complaint against
claims about the quality of services seems to be that they are merely
subjective (unverifiable) opinions masquerading as objective facts.
But there is little reason to believe that the public does not recog-
nize the difference between products and services. 64 It is equally
doubtful that the adult public is unable to perceive the difference
between claims concerning subjective and objective qualities. 65
Statements which essentially claim, "We are good!" are obviously
different from the statement, "We have offices in ten major cities."
No one expects the former claim to be verifiable. Thus, the lack of
verifiability misleads no one. In fact, it may make consumers more
skeptical of the claim. 66
63 A major impetus for this restrictive criterion can be found in Bates. See text accompa-
nying note 35 supra.
64 There is evidence that consumers rely on different sources of information about pro-
spective purchases of goods as opposed to services before acting. See Hazard, supra note 8,
at 1098 n.44.
65 See id. at 1097 ("[T]he obviously biased source of the message encourages [the pub-
lic] to seek corroboration through other available reputation information.") (footnote omit-
ted); Murdock & Linenberger, Legal Advertising and Solicitation, 16 LAND AND WATER L. REv.
654, 666, 671-73 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Murdock].
66 Murdock, supra note 65, at 676 ("Puffing is an accepted part of advertising and con-
sumers are not predisposed to interpret statements of quality as being anything but opin-
ion."); Hazard, supra note 8, at 1097. It is instructive to note that "[i]t has been traditional
in advertising regulation to permit a 'puffing' defense, which applies to claims not capable
of measurement ("Bayer Works Wonders"...)." Pitofsky, supra note 41, at 677. Pitofsky
elaborates on this point: "It is hard to imagine that a significant number of sensible con-
sumers would be deceived by such claims .... Perhaps more to the point, it is [unlikely]
that it could be established that many consumers believe that the examples of 'puffing'
listed above contain any product claim at all." Id. See Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 46 F.T.C.
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On the other hand, touting one's good reputation is making
two claims: that one is good, and that others think likewise. The
latter seems closer to a statement of fact than the former. And be-
cause any attempt to verify reputation is unresolvable, it can be ar-
gued that a general prohibition of reputational claims is
appropriate.67
Because an advertised claim of reputation is most like a claim
of recognized competence, it would be banned in those states
which explicitly prohibit "statement[s] of opinion as to the quality
of legal services." 68 Some states do allow statements concerning
the quality of legal services, but require that they be reasonably ver-
ifiable by the public. 69 The underlying rationale is that claims re-
garding the quality of services are inherently misleading because,
unlike products, services cannot be objectively sampled or tested by
the consumer before purchase.7 0 For the same reason, the con-
sumer is disadvantaged by the absence of testing and comparison
information from neutral persons. Consequently, the consumer
has no means of judging the accuracy of the claims unless she
knows and consults with persons who have received services from
the claimants.7 1
162, 175-77 (1949), aff'd, 185 F.2d 58 (4th Cir. 1950) (the claim that a toothpaste will
"beautify the smile" held to be within the scope of the puffing defense). See also Note, The
Need for a Statutory Definition of "Deceptive" Advertising, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 127, 136 (1983)
(opinions are not deceptive because they are not capable of measurement).
67 But this argument has troubling aspects. First, why are other providers of services
such as insurance companies, real estate agencies, and investment counselors allowed to
make quality claims about their services and their reputations ("We are recognized nation-
ally as a name you can trust."), while lawyers cannot? Second, it has been forcefully argued
that in evaluating services, consumers need and search for reputational information to sup-
plement advertising claims. Murdock, supra note 65, at 672, 674, 676-77. In simpler times,
lawyers' reputations were known, or could be ascertained easily. If lawyers are not allowed
in their advertising to point out where in the community their reputation might be found,
they should be allowed to tender a "character witness," so to speak. Though widely pro-
hibited in lawyer advertising, testimonials or endorsements are the obvious solution to the
modem phenomenon of anonymity. The only regulation necessary from the public's point
of view is that which is necessary to ensure the testimonials are genuine. See text accompa-
nying notes 91-106 infra.
68 See, e.g., TEXAS CODE, supra note 51, DR 2-101(A)(2); text accompanying notes 107-
34 infra (discussing quality claims).
69 See, for example, the ethics rules recently adopted in Missouri, effective January 1,
1986, summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 924.
70 See text accompanying note 35 supra. See also N.Y. Op. 540 (1982), supra note 57,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6106; Conn. Informal Op. 81-6
(1980), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2052; Legal
Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar Op. 117 (1982) [hereinafter cited as D.C. Op.], summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2306.
71 But see note 67 supra. A similar argument was advanced by the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio in Zauderer. Counsel argued that a ban on lawyer
ads which offered advice to persons with a specific legal problem was necessary because
"the indeterminacy of statements about law" made it impossible for the bar to distinguish
deceptive from nondeceptive ads. 105 S. Ct. at 2278. The Supreme Court rejected this
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Claims of reputation, like claims of competence, face another
objection of being misleading when they relate to particular areas
of practice. The objection is that such claims amount to holding
oneself out as an expert or specialist.72 This is one of the most
heavily restricted areas of lawyer advertising. 73 In most states a
lawyer cannot claim to be recognized in a particular field of practice
unless that area of practice is one in which the state certifies special-
ists and the lawyer has been so certified.
74
In sum, statements by lawyers in materials which will be re-
ceived by the public cannot contain facts about past accomplish-
ments in specific cases because they may create unjustified
expectations, nor may they claim to possess a worthy reputation be-
cause such claims are unverifiable and potentially misleading.
However, this does not mean that all references to experience are
forbidden.
3. Biographical Information
After the Bates decision, most of the states followed the ABA
and adopted its Proposal "A" which permitted attorneys to include
twenty-five categories of information in their advertisements. Much
of the information was biographical and included date and place of
birth,75 admissions to the bar,76 schools attended, degrees and
scholastic distinctions, 77 public offices held, 78 military service, 79
legal teaching positions,8 0 memberships and offices held in bar as-
argument stating that it could not see any distinction between attorney advertising and
advertising of other goods or services. It noted that determining deception in attorney
advertising could be either "simple and straightforward" or "exceedingly complex, just as
with other forms of advertising." Id. at 2279. "The qualitative distinction the State has
attempted to draw eludes us." Id. This is a striking departure from the Court's comments
in earlier cases about the uniqueness of lawyer ad claims. See text accompanying notes 30-
38 supra. It could mark the end to many restrictions currently placed on lawyer advertising
which are premised on this rejected assumption. For example, in Zauderer, the Court also
struck down Ohio's blanket ban on the use of illustrations in attorney advertising. The
State sought to justify the proscription for similar reasons, that is, that skillfully used illus-
trations operate on the subconscious level of the reader, and that it is too difficult for the
State to prove them to be manipulative or misleading. Thus, to protect the public from
possible harm, a total ban on illustrations is necessary. The Court was unconvinced. 105 S.
Ct. at 2280-81. See text accompanying notes 181-85 infra.
72 See Mich. Op. CI-553 (1981), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:4809.
73 See text accompanying notes 135-57 infra.
74 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-105; MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.4. See text
accompanying note 142 infra.
75 MODEL CODE, supra note 48, DR 2-101(B)(3) (Proposal A).
76 Id. at DR 2-I01(B)(4).
77 Id. at DR 2-101(B)(5).
78 Id. at DR 2-101(B)(6).
79 Id. at DR 2-101(B)(7).
80 Id. at DR 2-101(B)(9).
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sociations and legal fraternities,8 ' and foreign language ability.8 2
Some states were more restrictive. For example, the provision of
the Missouri Code successfully challenged in R.M.J.83 permitted
only ten categories of information.8 4 The R.M.J. case, however,
should sound the death knell for this type of "laundry list" restric-
tion on the content of legal advertising.
8 5
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain no list
of the kinds of information which lawyers may include in promo-
tional communications. In fact, the comment to Model Rule 7.2,
after listing several examples of information which is permitted,
states that the Rule allows lawyers to publish "information that
might invite the attention of those seeking legal assistance."8 6 Of
course, the prohibitions against false and misleading communica-
tions apply to biographical information. For example, the Ethics
Committee of the Mississippi State Bar ruled that a lawyer cannot
list his honorary positions in law school because the public may be
81 Id. at DR 2-101(B)(10), (11).
82 Id. at DR 2-101(B)(14).
83 455 U.S. at 194 n.3.
84 Whereas the ABA Model Code permitted the advertising of twenty-five kinds of in-
formation, Kentucky allowed only nine, and Oklahoma allowed only seven (name, address,
telephone numbers, foreign language ability, whether credit cards or other credit arrange-
ments were accepted, office hours, and four specifics about fee information). STATE CODES,
supra note 52, at 84L, 123L.
85 The lawyer in R.M.J. advertised in the newspaper and yellow pages that he was li-
censed in Missouri and Illinois and that he was admitted before the United States Supreme
Court. This information was not included in the ten categories of information permitted to
be advertised under the state code. The Supreme Court dealt quickly with the arguments
in support of the restrictions. Justice Powell noted: "Such information is not misleading
on its face." R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205. The attorney was in fact licensed in the states adver-
tised, and Justice Powell acknowledged that this information would be highly relevant to
consumers in light of the fact that the lawyer's office was within easy reach of citizens living
in those two states. Therefore, because the information was not misleading, it could not be
prohibited altogether. Under the Central Hudson Gas test, the prohibition on advertising this
information could have been upheld only if it were potentially misleading, the state could
demonstrate that an absolute ban was the only way to avoid this harmful effect, and the
state could assert a substantial interest that was directly advanced by the ban. 447 U.S. at
561-66. In R.M.J., the state failed to identify any substantial interest which was advanced
only by a complete ban on the listing ofjurisdictions where a lawyer is licensed to practice.
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 205. Following its Zauderer decision, the Supreme Court vacated Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d 565, 571 (Iowa
1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985), which had held the "laundry list" approach to be
constitutional because the Iowa ethics code contained a provision permitting the addition
of other information to the list. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(C).
86 The perspective of the Model Rules is critically different from that of the Model
Code and many state codes. The Model Code's laundry list of permitted information repre-
sented the information which some in the legal profession assumed consumers needed.
This was as arrogant as it was fallacious. Absent prolonged study of the matter, the bar is
not qualified to say what the public needs in the way of consumer information. It has been
strongly argued that the bar has consistently failed to permit lawyers to advertise the kind
of information that is useful to the public. L. ANDREWS, supra note 21, at 43; Murdock, supra
note 65, at 673; Hazard, supra note 8, at 1108.
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misled into believing that the lawyer is more qualified than others
who do not list those positions.87 Two state bar ethics committees
have ruled that a lawyer should not list presently held public offices
in her advertisements. 88 They reasoned that to do so may imply to
the public that the attorney is able to improperly influence a public
body or official as a result of her position. This would encourage
lay persons to choose counsel for improper reasons. Disciplinary
Rule 2-101 (B)(5) of the ABA's Proposal B specifically prohibited
any statement or claim which "is likely to convey the impression
that the lawyer is in a position to influence improperly any court,
tribunal, or other public body or official." 89 It is likely that an ad-
vertisement which lists a currently held public office would be simi-
larly dealt with under the ABA Model Rules. Rule 7.1 includes
within its definitions of "false or misleading" communications
those which are "likely to create an unjustified expectation about
results the lawyer can achieve, or states or implies that the lawyer
can achieve results by means that violate the rules of professional
conduct or other law." 90 Otherwise, it is clear after R.M.J. that a
lawyer's communications with the public are not restricted to any
list of approved information and may include any biographical in-
formation which is accurate and not misleading.
4. Endorsements and Testimonials
The ABA Model Code permitted the advertisement of names
of regularly represented clients when the clients gave written con-
sent. 91 This consent would have to have been given gratis, because
DR 2-103(B) forbad an attorney from giving anything of value to
anyone in return for being recommended for employment. And
"anything of value" included reciprocal referrals of business cli-
ents. 92 The Code did not include explicit client endorsements or
87 Ethics Comm. of the Miss. State Bar Op. 71 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Miss. Op.],
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5103.
88 Committee on Professional Ethics, State Bar of Wis. Op. E-83-22 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Wis. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:9111; Ethics Advi-
sory Comm. of the S.C. Bar Op. 80-5 (1980) [hereinafter cited as S.C. Op.], summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:7901.
89 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(B)(5).
90 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.1(b). More to the point, perhaps, is Rule 8.4(e)
which states: "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to... state or imply an ability to
influence improperly a government agency or official."
91 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(B)(16).
92 Committee on Professional Responsibility, Chicago Bar Ass'n Op. 82-3 (1982) [here-
inafter cited as Chi. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3202; Conn.
Informal Op. 82-19 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:2057; Mich. Op. CI-512 (1980), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:4803; Mich. Op. CI-801 (1982), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:4847.
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testimonials in its list of information fit for public consumption. 93
In fact, under DR 2-103(C), a lawyer was not permitted even to "re-
quest a person or organization to recommend or promote" the law-
yer's services regardless of whether something of value was offered
in exchange for the recommendation. 94
A testimonial or endorsement would also violate the Model
Code's ban on self-laudatory statements.95 Obviously, if a lawyer
cannot say anything laudatory about herself, she cannot have some-
one else do it for her.96 Finally, testimonials and endorsements
would necessarily contain references to the quality of the endorsed
lawyer's or firm's services. Statements regarding quality are often
banned altogether, or banned when not capable of objective
verification.
97
The ABA Model Rule 7.1(b) prohibits, as false or misleading,
any communication about the lawyer or her services which "is likely
to create an unjustified expectation about results the lawyer can
achieve." 98 The commentary to this rule flatly states that this para-
graph "would ordinarily preclude advertisements.., containing cli-
ent endorsements" 99 on the ground that they would create the
unjustified expectation that similar results could be obtained for
others regardless of specific factual and legal circumstances. How-
ever, the commentary to Rule 7.2 states that the Rule permits,
"with their consent, names of clients regularly represented" 100 to
be publicly disseminated by lawyers.
It is clear that the Model Rules continue to draw a distinction
between listing regularly represented clients on one hand, and en-
dorsements on the other, although the reason for the distinction
may be difficult to perceive in some instances. Why would lawyers
93 Proposal B specifically forbad endorsements or testimonials in DR 2-101(C)(3).
94 Excepted from this ban were lawyer referral services sponsored or approved by a bar
association and legal services organizations listed in DR 2-103(D), which included law
schools, governmental or nonprofit legal aid or defender offices, and organizations that
recommended, furnished, or paid for legal services for its members, such as unions and the
NAACP. A lawyer could request these organizations to recommend her services to pro-
spective clients. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
95 The Model Code prohibited "any form of public communication containing a false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim." MODEL
CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(A). The Model Rules have omitted the explicit ban on self-
laudatory statements, see MODEL RuLEs, supra note 17, Rule 7.1, but many statements of self
praise could be interpreted as violating the ban on statements that "create an unjustified
expectation about results the lawyer can achieve." MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule
7.1 (b). See text accompanying notes 112-27 infra.
96 DR 1-102(A)(2).
97 See note 62 supra and text accompanying notes 107-34 infra.
98 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.1(b).
99 Id. at Rule 7.1 comment.
100 Id. at Rule 7.2 comment.
19861
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
advertise their "regularly represented" clients unless it were to
convey the message that these particular clients are satisfied with
the professional services they receive? 101 The listing of a regular
client is a tacit endorsement and an implicit claim of competence, if
not of expertise, where the client is the kind who obviously could
command the highest quality legal assistance in a specialized area
of the law.10 2 Despite the fact that genuine endorsements and testi-
monials, as well as the listing of present and past clients not regu-
larly represented, greatly help consumers,10 3 the Rules and the
Code prohibit them.1 04 Thus, Lawyer X may not publicly commu-
101 Cf. note 55 supra (Model Code is biased in favor of lawyers who represent institutions
or persons on a continuing basis).
102 The listing of all the largest banks in town as clients, for example, could say much
about the nature and quality of a firm's practice. This might possibly contravene DR 2-
105's ban on holding oneself out as a specialist absent some form of disclaimer of expertise
or certification. See text accompanying notes 135-57 infra. However, in Zauderer, 105 S. Ct.
at 2276 n.9, the Supreme Court commented that a state could not discipline an attorney for
making accurate statements of fact regarding the nature of her practice merely because it
was possible that some readers of the advertisement would infer that the lawyer has some
expertise in those areas.
103 Murdock, supra note 65, at 676-77.
104 For example, a lawyer was prohibited from including in a monthly flier from a credit
union to its members promotional statements to the effect that he represented the credit
union and that his services were available to individual members also. The ethics panel
warned that the members may believe that the credit union was endorsing the attorney's
services or otherwise recommending him. The committee noted that the credit union was
not qualified to act as an attorney referral service. Mich. Op. CI-591 (1980), supra note 57,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4815. An Oregon opinion held that a
lawyer cannot be listed in material distributed by a financial and estate planning company
as the company's "recommended lawyer." Legal Ethics Comm. of the Ore. State Bar Op.
447 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Ore. Op.], summarized in LAwYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:7104. The District of Columbia Bar's ethics committee disapproved a television com-
mercial in which Redskins fullback John Riggins endorsed a local personal injury law firm.
Riggins said, "[I]f you have been hurt on the job or by someone's carelessness, call the law
firm of [name]. It could be the most important call you'll ever make. I'd rather you hear it
from me than from some stranger." The D.C. Code explicitly banned all testimonials and
endorsements. The committee upheld the provision on the ground that it was designed to
ensure that advertisements contain information that would assist the public in making an
informed decision when selecting an attorney. The commercial's obvious purpose was to
convince the viewer that this paid speaker believed in the worth of the sponsoring firm
based upon personal experience when this was not true. D.C. Op. 142 (1984), supra note
70, summarized in I CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 703. Unfortunately, the ethics opin-
ion in the Riggins committee decision refused to draw a distinction between genuine and
simulated endorsements. Theoretically, simulated endorsements, in which persons are
paid to say that they believe in the worth of a particular firm when they have never been
represented by that firm, are prohibitable on the ground that they are false or misleading.
But there seems to be no similar justification for banning genuine endorsements. As noted
earlier, these kinds of commercials are widely used in other advertising and could be of
great assistance to the public in selecting counsel now that the reputations of firms and
lawyers are generally unknown to the public. If the genuine endorser has been paid to
endorse a firm, the firm could be required to disclose this information. This appears to be
the position of the new Missouri rules on advertising which permit testimonials. However,
if the endorsement is simulated or paid, this fact must be disclosed in the advertisement. 1
CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 924. This is a courageous first step.
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nicate statements from past or present clients, or business associ-
ates familiar with the quality of her work, regarding Lawyer X or
her professional services.
Again, the bar's fear of endorsements seems to stem from its
view that the public possesses a remarkable degree of naivet6 with
regard to advertising.10 5 The core concern underlying the Model
Rules' prohibition of endorsements and testimonials is that a state-
ment of satisfaction with a lawyer's services by a present or former
client will mislead the public into believing, without justification,
that similar results can be achieved for them. There seems to be no
proof justifying this assumption. If the public were that easily se-
duced and manipulated, then we would look with similar concern at
the commonplace television advertising of insurance companies
whose clients, standing amid the wreckage of homes recently blown
away by tornadoes, tell us how happy they are to have been insured
by the advertiser. We do not fear for the public in these cases. And
it is neither self-evident nor proved that such concern is justified
when the testimonial pertains to any other professional service. 0
5. Statements About or Comparisons of the Quality of Legal
Services: "Puffery" and Self-Laudation
Ethical Consideration 2-9 of the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility states: "Examples of information in lawyer
advertising that would be deceptive include . . . representations
concerning the quality of service, which cannot be measured or ver-
ified."' 0 7 The ABA's 1977 Proposal B forbad even an "implica-
tion" regarding the quality of legal services "which is not
susceptible of reasonable verification by the public." 108 This prohi-
bition has been carried over in Model Rule 7.1 (c) but only with re-
gard to comparisons of legal services of other lawyers which cannot
be "factually substantiated."'10 9 The absence of a specific prohibi-
105 "The lack of sophistication on the part of many members of the public concerning
legal services ... require[s] that special care be taken by lawyers to avoid misleading the
public and to assure that the information set forth in any advertising is relevant to the
selection of a lawyer." MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-9. A prime example of this pater-
nalistic attitude is displayed in a Florida ethics opinion which forbad a lawyer from using
the phrase "Jesus is Lord" and a dove-peace graphic in his advertising on the grounds that
they were potentially misleading, that they represented a prohibited testimonial, and that
they were an unverifiable, self-laudatory opinion about the quality of the services offered.
Professional Ethics Comm. of the Fla. Bar Op. 82-1 (undated), summarized in LAwYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:2502.
106 In a similar vein, the Supreme Court in Zauderer rejected the notion that lawyer ad-
vertising aimed at persons with a particular kind of legal problem, and which utilized an
illustration, was inherently deceptive. The asserted deceptiveness was neither proved nor
self-evident. See note 102 supra.
107 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-9.
108 MODEL CODE, supra note 48, DR 2-101(C)(4).
109 See note 62 supra.
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tion of statements regarding the quality of legal services such as
were contained in the Code indicates that the ABA has relaxed its
standards in this area. Indeed, the ABA makes a significant break
with its past views on the purposes of advertising when it acknowl-
edges, in the comment to Rule 7.2, that "[a]dvertising involves an
active quest for clients." 1' 0 Tacit in this admission seems to be a
recognition that in order for advertising of legal services to be use-
ful to the public, it must refer to quality. It requires little common
sense to understand that restricting advertising to the availability
and costs of legal services alone does not permit the dissemination
of enough information to motivate the lawyer to pay the cost of
advertising or for the public to discriminate between advertisers."'
However, statements concerning the quality of an attorney's
work run into a commonplace restriction on lawyer advertising-
the prohibition against self-laudatory remarks. The Model Code
specifically forbad them, 1 2 but the Model Rules and their commen-
tary contain no explicit mention of self-laudatory claims or state-
ments. This lends further credence to the view that the Rules
permit statements regarding the quality of legal services. Perhaps
the comment to Rule 7.1 of the recently adopted New Jersey Rules
of Professional Conduct 13 puts it as candidly as possible when it
acknowledges that "the very nature and function of advertising may
make self-laudation unavoidable."' '
14
Nevertheless, the ban on statements regarding the quality of
110 The first paragraph of the comment to Rule 7.2 states:
To assist the public in obtaining legal services, lawyers should be allowed to make
known their services not only through reputation but also through organized in-
formation campaigns in the form of advertising. Advertising involves an active
quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer should not seek clientele.
However, the public's need to know about legal services can be fulfilled in part
through advertising. This need is particularly acute in the case of persons of mod-
erate means who have not made extensive use of legal services. The interest in
expanding public information about legal services ought to prevail over considera-
tions of tradition. Nevertheless, advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices
that are misleading or overreaching.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.2 comment. Cf. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-2
("Preparation of advertisements... should be motivated by a desire to educate the public
to an awareness of legal needs and to provide information relevant to the selection of the
most appropriate counsel rather than to obtain publicity for particular lawyers.").
111 Murdock, supra note 65, at 674-75, points out that studies show that consumers of
legal services need evaluative information, not the useless, objective facts permitted by
codes modeled after the ABA's Model Code. The studies showed that consumers were
most interested in receiving information about lawyers' competency and interest in and
ability to explain problems, as well as their reputation and truthfulness. The authors noted
that presently this kind of information is not allowed in lawyer advertising because of its
quality implications.
112 See note 48 supra.
113 N.J. RULES, supra note 57.
114 N.J. RULES, supra note 57, Rule 7.1 comment. However, the New Jersey Rules abso-
lutely prohibit comparisons of lawyers' services. Id. at Rule 7.1(3).
[Vol. 61:601
LAW PRACTICE MARKETING
legal services and otherwise self-laudatory claims by lawyers contin-
ues in many states. 115 And in jurisdictions which do not expressly
prohibit self-laudatory claims, lawyer communications must avoid
creating unjustified expectations or being otherwise misleading.
Recent opinions by state ethics panels illustrate the difficulty law-
yers will have in determining what they are permitted to say about
the quality of their work.
For example, the District of Columbia Bar's ethics panel has
ruled that a law firm may not advertise that it provides "quality
legal services." 1 6 This claim was found to have two vices. First, it
made a factually unverifiable statement about the quality of legal
services, that is, that the advertiser's services are above the required
minimum level of competence. Second, the panel believed it im-
plied that some other lawyers' services are not "quality" and that
the advertiser's services are better. 1 7 Under this latter view, the
ABA's Model Rules would also prohibit a claim of quality legal
services. The Rules forbid comparisons of lawyers' services which
cannot be factually verified." x8 But even conceding that the claim,
"We provide quality legal services," is not factually verifiable, it
stretches the meaning of the statement beyond acceptable limits to
say that it also makes invidious comparisons. It is equally plausible
that the statement, "We provide quality legal services," is simply a
request for trust; it is another way of saying, "We won't let you
down," or, "We do competent legal work." 1 9 To claim compe-
115 For example, the amendments to the Florida Code of Professional Responsibility,
effectiveJanuary 1, 1984, prohibit "any ... communication which... is intended or is likely
to attract clients by use of... puffery, self-laudation or hucksterism." The Florida Bar, 438
So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1983) (DR 2-101(C)(6)).
116 D.C. Op. 117 (1982), supra note 70, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:2306.
117 See also Professional Ethics Comm. of the Kan. Bar Ass'n Op. 83-29 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Kan. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3816.
118 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.1(c).
119 An Illinois opinion held that it was appropriate for a lawyer to describe her services
as "competent." Committee on Professional Ethics, Ill. State Bar Ass'n Op. 689 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Ill. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3003-
04. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in In re Marcus & Tepper, 107 Wis. 2d 560, 320
N.W.2d 806 (1982), held that the state had failed to present clear and convincing evidence
that the lawyers' advertising claims of "[c]ompetent work at competitive prices" and "a
high standard of work" were misleading. However, the District Court in Spencer v. Honor-
ablejustices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880, 887 (E.D. Pa. 1984),
aff'd mem., 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985), characterized the use of the term "competent" as
similar to claiming that one is "experienced" or an "expert," and thus it was prohibitable
by the state as an unverifiable, subjective claim as to the quality of a lawyer's legal services.
Alabama requires that all published attorney advertising except professional notices con-
tain the following disclaimer: "No representation is made about the quality of the legal
services to be performed or the expertise of the lawyer performing such services."
Mezrano v. Alabama State Bar, 434 So. 2d 732, 734 (Ala. 1983).
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tency is not also to claim incompetency on the part of others in the
same market.
The D.C. Bar Opinion rests upon a view of the public as partic-
ularly gullible vis-t-vis lawyer advertising. Even if it were conceded
that a claim of quality is an assertion that other lawyers are merely
competent or worse, who can deny that such an assertion is true?
But more importantly, what difference does it make whether it is
"true" or only a matter of the advertiser's opinion? Is the public
somehow misled by this opinion? Is not the bar being overly pater-
nalistic, if not patronizing, toward the lay public?
For decades the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been
scrutinizing advertising with a eye trained for deception. However,
it is clear that the FTC would not even furrow its institutional brow
at an advertised claim of "quality" or "competence." Such claims
are considered mere "puffs," and, far from being questionable,
"puffs" are a recognized defense to an FTC action. 20 Opinions
regarding quality are judged not to be deceptive, regardless of their
verifiability, because the FTC recognizes that the public under-
stands that such statements are self-serving opinions by merchants,
and as such, are not to be accepted at face value, if at all.
121
Other kinds of statements made in attorney advertising which
have run afoul of the bar's concerns about self-laudation and unver-
ifiable quality claims are illustrated by the following ethics panel
opinions. The Connecticut Bar ruled that the statement, "My office
will handle all the details of your real estate transaction ... to as-
sure your ease of mind," was self-laudatory and, thus, prohib-
ited. 122 The same state ethics committee likewise objected to a
claim of "guaranteed satisfaction" as self-laudatory and "subjec-
tive," that is, incapable of confirmation by any objective
standard. 12
3
On the other hand, the Chicago Bar panel permitted a firm to
say, "Our firm usually finds solutions for people with foreclosure
problems that enable them to remain in their homes."' 124 New York
City's Bar ethics committee would not allow law firms to advertise
that their "track record over these years has been very good,"' 125 or
120 See Pitofsky, supra note 41, at 677 nn.64-66 (citing cases discussing the FTC and the
"puffery" defense).
121 See Hazard, supra note 8, at 1097 n.44 (the authors observe that when the thing to be
purchased is a service rather than a product, consumers tend to rely more on reputational
information and less on advertising).
122 Conn. Informal Op. 82-22 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:2058.
123 Conn. Informal Op. 81-6 (1980),supra note 14,summarizedin LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:2052.
124 Chi. Op. 81-1 (1981),supra note 92,summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3202.
125 Committee on Professional Ethics of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Op. 81-
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that they have "the experience and know how to make sick compa-
nies well again."' 26 In the latter two cases, the Bar panel felt that
the statements promised too much with regard to future results.
And yet, Maine's ethics overseers found the following lawyer ad
neither misleading nor creative of unjustified expectations:
INJURED? Who's on your side when the insurance company
decides how much to pay you for your injury? . .. WE WILL
FIGHT FOR YOU.
1 2 7
Perhaps the key to some understanding of what should be per-
mitted may be gleaned from Oklahoma Bar v. Schaffer. 12s In that
case, Schaffer's advertisement for his legal clinic stated that within
five working days after a client had provided all the necessary infor-
mation regarding one of five listed routine services, "We will file
the necessary court documents, or ... begin providing ... serv-
ices-or our services are free."' 29 The trial court which upheld
Schaffer's discipline based upon this ad, held that Shaffer had made
an inherently deceptive guarantee of quality.' 30 The Oklahoma
Supreme Court, however, disagreed. It ruled that a promise is de-
ceptive if its fulfillment is clearly beyond the control of the prom-
isor. That was not the case here. Fulfillment of Schaffer's pledge
was well within his control, and therefore not deceptive. In any
event, the court noted, even if this was a promise of quality, the
state has no substantial interest in discouraging the expeditious
performance of legal services.131
Certainly Schaffer's proposition, that a lawyer may make any
promise of performance which does not depend upon matters be-
yond her control in the ordinary course of affairs, is a helpful com-
mon-sense rule. However, if this were the extent of what is
permitted, this would be "spartan fare"' 3 2 at best. The final com-
ment of the Schaffer court harkens back to the more flexible ap-
proach taken by the United States Supreme Court. 3 3 Only by
continually focusing upon the alleged state interest being asserted
to justify prohibiting or restricting lawyers' commercial speech will
91 (undated) [hereinafter cited as N.Y.C. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:6330.
126 N.Y.C. Op. 81-64 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6326.
127 Professional Ethics Comm'n of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Op. 46 (Me. 1984),
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4208.
128 648 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1982).
129 Id. at 356.
130 Id. at 359.
131 Id.
132 Bates, 433 U.S. at 367.
133 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980).
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the questionable assumptions underlying those restrictions be ex-
amined. In balancing competing interests, it must be remembered
that the first amendment has placed its finger on the scale in favor
of more disclosure, not less.
1 3 4
6. Claims of Expertise or Specialization
In its efforts to ensure that the public is not misled by lawyer
advertising, the bar has striven to prevent lawyers from claiming to
be experts in specialized areas of law unless such claims are true
and verifiable. This has led to the widely adopted approach of
prohibiting all claims of expertise or specialization unless that juris-
diction has adopted standards and methods of certifying legal spe-
cialists. Disciplinary Rule 2-105(A)(2) of the superseded ABA
Model Code prohibited a lawyer from holding herself out "as a spe-
cialist, as practicing in certain areas of law or as limiting [her] prac-
tice," except in two traditionally recognized areas, 3 5 and otherwise
only to the extent permitted by the state bar agency created to cer-
tify specialists. If a state has not set up such an agency, then law-
yers in that state may not claim to be specialists.13 6
Of course, one of the primary public benefits of lawyer adver-
tising is that it provides the public with information about the avail-
ability and costs of legal services. Bates made clear that the public's
strong interest in receiving such information overrides the bar's in-
terest in banning lawyer advertising altogether. But information
concerning legal costs must be attached to specific legal services in
order to allow the public to compare them. Indeed, Bates upheld
the advertisement of certain named legal services. Herein lies the
134 "Although... the bar retains the power to correct omissions that have the effect of
presenting an inaccurate picture, the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than
less." Bates, 433 U.S. at 375. See also Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 562 ("Even when
advertising communicates only an incomplete version of the relevant facts, the First
Amendment presumes that some accurate information is better than no information at
all."). But cf Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276 n.9 (noting that divisions have "left open the
possibility" that nonverifiable claims regarding the quality of legal services can be banned
by the states).
135 Those areas are patent and trademark practice. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-
105(A)(1).
136 See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883
(1984), aff'd in part, rev'd inpart, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985) (The Ohio Supreme Court held that
an attorney who advertised that his firm was representing some women who had used the
Dalkon Shield had held himself out to be an expert in those kinds of cases. Given that the
state had no standards or criteria for certifying experts, the attorney had acted improp-
erly.). See also In re Petition for Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d
638 (Tenn. 1978); N.Y.C. Op. 80-15 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6304. But see In re Johnson, 341 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1983)
(court held that where the state had failed to establish procedures for certifying specialists,
it was unconstitutional to prohibit an attorney licensed and practicing in that state to adver-
tise his certification by the National Board of Trial Advocacy as an expert in "Personal
Injury Wrongful Death" litigation).
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seeds of a dilemma for the bar. If a lawyer offers her services to the
public in three areas of law, is she not claiming thereby to be a
specialist in those three areas?1 37 What if she claims to "limit" her
practice to, or to "concentrate" in, those three areas? In other
words, when does an attorney cross the line between legitimately
listing the particular services which she offers, and implicitly claim-
ing to be an expert in the listed areas?
The dilemma has been partially resolved by means of a device
suggested by the Supreme Court in Bates and reinforced in Central
Hudson Gas.138 The device is the mandatory disclaimer.13 9 The
state ethics code involved in the R.M.J. case illustrates its use. The
Missouri Ethics Rules provided a list of twenty-three specific areas
of legal practice which an advertising attorney could list if she did
not use any of three other more general listings authorized by the
Rule.140 However, if the lawyer advertised any of the specific areas
of practice, she had to attach the following disclaimer: "Listing of
the above areas of practice does not indicate any certification of
expertise therein."' 14 If jurisdictions have a system for certifying
specialists in certain fields of practice, then a lawyer so certified may
advertise that fact only in the manner prescribed by the ethics
rules. 142
137 In Lovett & Linder, Ltd. v. Carter, 523 F. Supp. 903, 910-11 (D.R.I. 1981), the law-
yers' advertisement contained a list of sixteen areas of practice without further explanation.
The court agreed with the bar disciplinary committee that this was not only misleading
"huckstering," but also tantamount to an unfounded claim of expertise in the listed areas of
practice even though the ad explicitly disclaimed any expertise or specialization.
A plan to place a "Lawyers Directory" in the Yellow Pages listing lawyers under any of
thirty-three areas of practice which they chose and paid for, was disapproved by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court. In re Mountain Bell Advertising, 185 Mont. 68, 604 P.2d 760 (1979).
The court felt that lawyers would be holding themselves out as specialists in any of the
areas they chose when the state had not adopted any certification procedures, and the pub-
lic would thereby be misled. See also N.Y. Op. 539 (1982), supra note 57, summarized in LAw-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6106; N.Y.C. Op. 80-15 (undated), supra note 125,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6304; Durham v. Brock, 498 F. Supp.
213, 225 (M.D. Tenn.), aff'dmem., 698 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1980) (the listing of a few areas
of practice implies expertise therein) (dictum); Eaton v. Supreme Court, 270 Ark. 573, 607
S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981) (lack of any limitations on the areas of
law in which a firm was willing to consult was equal to a claim of universal competence).
138 In Bates, the Court suggested that while the state may not totally prohibit advertising
in certain cases, it may nevertheless require supplemental information such as warnings or
disclaimers to accompany it. 433 U.S. at 384. See note 134 supra. In Central Hudson Gas, the
Court indicated that if less restrictive regulations of commercial speech were possible, such
as requiring supplemental information, then complete prohibitions could not withstand
constitutional scrutiny. 447 U.S. at 570. See note 85 supra.
139 See, e.g., Mezrano, 434 So. 2d at 734; Durham, 498 F. Supp. at 225.
140 An attorney could list one of three general descriptive terms, "General Civil Prac-
tice," "General Criminal Practice," or "General Civil and Criminal Practice," if the attorney
did not choose to list any of the twenty-three more specific areas permitted by the rule.
R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 195.
141 R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 195, 196 n.6.
142 See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-105(A)(3). The questions that can arise regard-
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The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct continue this
approach to the problem in Rule 7.4. It permits a lawyer to com-
municate to the public that she "does or does not practice in partic-
ular fields of law," but prohibits a lawyer from stating or implying
that she is "a specialist." 143 There is, however, a further refinement
in the comment.
If a lawyer practices only in certain fields, or will not accept mat-
ters except in such fields, the lawyer is permitted so to indicate.
However, stating that the lawyer is a "specialist" or that the law-
yer's practice "is limited to" or "concentrated in" particular
fields is not permitted. These terms have acquired a secondary
meaning implying formal recognition as a specialist. Hence, use
of these terms may be misleading unless the lawyer is certified
or recognized in accordance with procedures in the state where
the lawyer is licensed to practice.
144
Thus, according to the Model Rules, a lawyer may advertise
that she accepts only "white collar crime" cases, or that she prac-
tices only criminal law, but she may not use the talismatic words
that she "limits" her practice to or "concentrates" in this kind of
case. One is tempted to remark that only lawyers could produce a
rule with such gossamer fine distinctions. The justification for the
distinctions, that these two terms have acquired a secondary mean-
ing, seems to assume too much. Does the lay public attach such an
ing the proper use of disclaimers are not always addressed adequately in the rules. For
example, the Texas Board of Legal Specialization can certify lawyers as specialists in certain
areas of practice, such as Personal Injury Trial Law. If an attorney lists one of these certifia-
ble areas of practice in her advertisement, and she has been certified, she must state
therein, "Board Certified, (area of practice), Texas Board of Specialization." If she lists a
certifiable area of practice in which she has not been certified, she must state, "Not certified
by the Texas Board of Legal Specialization." If she lists an area of practice in which one
cannot be certified, she must state, "No designation has been made by the Texas Board of
Legal Specialization." However, the question arose concerning the proper disclaimer to be
used when an attorney wished to list an area of practice that was not certifiable but was
clearly included within a certifiable specialty, such as "Workers' Compensation--Silicosis,
Lead Poisoning, and Other Occupational Diseases." This is a subspecialty of personal in-
jury trial law. The Texas ethics committee decided that if the lawyer is certified in the
subsuming area, she must so state, but should also include the following caveat: "Workers'
Compensation is included in Personal Injury Trial Law. However, no designation has been
made in Workers' Compensation law as such." If the lawyer is not board certified in the
subsuming area, she must state, "Not certified in Personal Injury Trial law, which would
include Workers' Compensation." Professional Ethics Comm., State Bar of Tex. Op. 418
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Tex. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:8304.
It is questionable whether the public understands what is meant when a lawyer indi-
cates that she is "Certified by the Board of Specialization," or by the notation that a certain
area of practice has been "designated" by that board. If there is any doubt about the pub-
lic's understanding, then it is open to question whether these disclaimer rules are designed
to protect the public or are merely an attempt by the bar to protect itself from what it
perceives to be forms of unfair competition. See Murdock, supra note 65, at 672-73.
143 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.4.
144 Id. at Rule 7.4 comment.
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extravagant meaning to the words? 145 Since lawyers have never
been allowed to use those words in the short time they have been
permitted to advertise, where would the public have learned this
"secondary meaning"? It is true that physicians do use the terms to
indicate a specialization, but they have been allowed to advertise
for even a shorter time than lawyers.
Even conceding that the terms may connote specialization to
some of the public, do not the words permitted by the Rule imply
the very same meaning as those which are prohibited? In short, the
Rules' attempted resolution of the dilemma, as construed by the
comment, seems a triumph of formalism over common sense.
The position of the Model Rules and of many states may have
been thrown into doubt by the Supreme Court's decision in
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.146 There the disciplined law-
yer placed an ad in a newspaper which asked whether the reader
had used the Dalkon Shield intrauterine birth control device. 147
The ad went on to state: "Our law firm is presently representing
women on such cases," and offered free information to users of the
device. 148 Although attorney Zauderer was not found by the state
bar's grievance commission to have held himself out as an expert in
Dalkon Shield cases, 149 the Supreme Court of Ohio thought other-
wise. After the court noted that Bates and R.M.J. did not totally
prohibit the states from restricting lawyer advertising, it said, "It is
our view that... [a] lawyer should not be permitted to hold himself
out as an expert in certain designated areas unless there are in
existence certain standards or criteria . . . in the Disciplinary
Rules."150
145 Obviously the meaning lawyers attach to such words as "concentrates" or "limited
to" is irrelevant; lawyers should not assume consumers look at legal advertising with the
same intensity and emotion as they do. As Murdock, supra note 65, at 660, points out,
consumers do not have the same philosophical opposition to lawyer advertising as some
lawyers do.
146 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
147 Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d 883, 884
n.1 (1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
148 10 Ohio St. 3d at 45 n.1, 461 N.E.2d at 884 n.1.
149 The Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline recommended that
Zauderer be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law based upon the following find-
ings: (1) use of the Dalkon Shield diagram violated the disciplinary rule against the use of
illustrations; (2) the ad gave unsolicited legal advice to those from whom he later accepted
employment; (3) the advertisement failed to state specific fee rates as required; (4) the ad-
vertisement misleadingly failed to include information about potential litigation costs; and
(5) Zauderer recommended employment of himself to a nonlawyer who had not sought his
advice. Id. at 45-46, 461 N.E.2d at 885.
150 Id. at 48, 461 N.E.2d at 886. The court misstated itself here. It meant to say that
lawyers should not be allowed to hold themselves out as experts in any areas of practice
unless the state had created "certain standards or criteria." The Minnesota Supreme Court
reached the opposite conclusion concerning the propriety of this kind of advertisement in
In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981).
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On review by the United States Supreme Court, the Justices
brushed aside the view that the advertisement suggested any special
expertise in handling Dalkon Shield suits. Writing for the Court,
Justice White said that a state may not prevent an attorney from
making accurate statements of fact concerning her practice merely
because of the possibility that some of the public might infer exper-
tise in the areas of law mentioned.' 5 1 Two weeks after deciding
Zauderer, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for further con-
sideration Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics.' 52 The attor-
neys disciplined in Humphrey advertised their firm on television.
The commercials consisted of three different dramatizations of two
persons talking about someone who had been injured through the
negligence of another. One person would comment that it was im-
portant for that injured person to talk to a lawyer. The commer-
cials ended with a voice-over which announced that the firm
handled cases involving auto accidents, work comp, serious per-
sonal injury and wrongful death on a percentage basis. The disci-
plinary committee argued that the ads were self-laudatory
comments about the advertisers' expertise. 53 It also contended
that they misrepresented the firm's experience because the lawyers
had little actual trial experience when the commercials were broad-
cast.154 The Iowa Supreme Court, while not finding that the com-
mercials were "deceitful," agreed with the committee that "the
public could well be misled by them."' 55
The foregoing illustrates the labyrinth of overlapping restric-
151 Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2276 n.9.
152 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985).
153 Self-laudatory claims are prohibited by the Iowa Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 2-101(A) (1980). See Humphrey v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 355 N.W.2d 565,
568 (Iowa 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985).
154 The lawyers' advertisements did not explicitly claim any expertise. They said, "If
you are injured through the negligence of others, call the law firm of.... Cases involving
auto accidents, work comp, serious personal injury and wrongful death handled on a per-
centage basis." 355 N.W.2d at 566. The state argued that the firm thereby represented
itself as experienced, and that the actual trial experience of the firm members did not match
the representation. Attorney Humphrey "had tried six cases, the nature of which are un-
known, all while under the supervision of another.., law firm." Id. at 570. Another attor-
ney of the three in the firm had tried only one case with Humphrey. Id.
155 Id. at 570. The court did not specifically say how the public could be misled and
exactly what in the advertisements was "inherently likely to deceive." Id. The decision was
based entirely upon the untested assumption that there are "special problems" relating to
lawyer electronic media advertising. Id. However, the court never identified these special
problems, nor did it say how they were relevant to some of the questions before it, such as
whether the firm members held themselves out as specialists and whether they misled the
public into believing that litigation is a cost-free venture. Ultimately, the court seemed to
rest its conclusion that the television commercials were misleading on the ground that their
content was "promotional" and not informational. Id. at 570-71. However, it never ana-
lyzed the content of the ads in such a manner. Indeed, the view that the commercials were
not informational is most debatable. Clearly, they would help the public identify potential
legal problems and understand the importance of early consultation with a lawyer.
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tions which lawyer statements regarding areas of practice must
avoid. Cases like Humphrey also illustrate the fuzziness of the rules
and the ad hoc manner in which they are applied. Furthermore, it
is not yet clear what impact Zauderer will have on this area of regula-
tion. However, it is clear that a firm that desires to produce a firm
brochure or letter to be sent to prospective clients or business for-
warders must be cautious in describing its members' areas of prac-
tice and experience. There can be no doubt that this is important
information. 56 But local disciplinary rules may forbid the use of
the terms "limits practice to" and "concentrates practice in."'
157
Furthermore, any statement of fields of practice may require ac-
companying disclaimers of expertise. And if the lawyer is a bar-
certified specialist, any announcement of the fact will have to be
done in a prescribed manner. However, in jurisdictions whose
code is still modeled after the ABA's Model Code, where only lim-
ited biographical information is permitted by DR 2-101(B), there is
little doubt after R.M.J. that this provision is unconstitutional in its
restrictiveness.
Beyond these formalities, problems of interpretation arise re-
garding lawyers' public communications about themselves. Ques-
tions about the attorney's competence may arise if too many areas
of practice are advertised, whereas too few may imply specializa-
tion. A claim of a substantial practice in a given field may provoke a
demand that the claim be verified. Verifiability may limit all truth-
ful statements.
7. Statements Regarding Fees
Because Bates held that information about the fees charged for
routine legal services was constitutionally protected, most lawyer
advertising following Bates has tended to mimic the "tombstone"
advertisement approved there. As a result, statements concerning
fees have been the one aspect of lawyer advertising most heavily
scrutinized by state ethics panels and courts.
156 See Morgan, supra note 7, at 60-61 ("[A]void the mistake of preparing an impressive-
looking brochure.., that does nothing more than describe your firm's areas of practice.
These have little effect in differentiating your firm from its competitors.... Demonstrated
competence and expertise are essential."). See also Murdock, supra note 65, at 675; Durham
v. Brock, 498 F. Supp. 213 (M.D. Tenn. 1980) (listing areas of practice is valuable informa-
tion for the general public).
157 An example of how a firm brochure may inadvertently violate this prohibition can be
seen in the sample brochure contained in 23 LAW OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 64-72 (1982). At
one place in the brochure it states, "Our firm concentrates in five areas of practice" (emphasis
added), and then goes on to list and give detailed information about them. Id. at 68. In its
biographical sketches of the firms' associates, it lists each associate's "areas of concentra-
tion." Id. at 72. Other language which could be said to hold members of the firm out as
specialists can be found in the more detailed descriptions of the partners, where one is
described as having "special knowledge" in two fields of law. Id. at 71.
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Following the Bates case, the ABA's two proposed amendments
to the advertising rules both contained extensive provisions regu-
lating fee information.158 The ABA did not carry these provisions
forward in the Model Rules, satisfied, no doubt, that the general
proscription against misleading and false statements would suffice.
The states have varied in whether to adopt specific rules on fees.' 59
Despite the rules' specificity, advertising lawyers constantly ran
afoul of them.
This has been especially true with advertisements by personal
injury plaintiffs' firms concerning contingent fees. Most jurisdic-
tions require that statements of contingent fee rates must disclose
whether the percentages are computed before or after litigation
costs, which the client must pay, have been deducted from the
amount recovered through the lawyer's efforts. 1 6 0 The Model Code
158 MODEL CODE DR 2-101(B) Proposal A permitted the following fee information:
(20) Fee for an initial consultation; (21) Availability upon request of a written
schedule of fees and/or an estimate of the fee to be charged for specific services;
(22) Contingent fee rates ... provided that the statement discloses whether per-
centages are computed before or after deduction of costs; (23) Range of fees for
services, provided that the statement discloses that the specific fee within the
range which will be charged will vary depending upon the particular matter to be
handled for each client and the client is entitled without obligation to an estimate
of the fee within the range likely to be charged... ; (24) Hourly rate, provided that
the statement discloses that the total fee charged will depend upon the number of
hours which must be devoted to the particular matter to be handled for each client
... ; (25) Fixed fees for specific legal services, the description of which would not
be misunderstood or be deceptive, provided that the statement discloses that the
quoted fee will be available only to clients whose matters fall into the services
described and that the client is entitled without obligation to a specific estimate of
the fee likely to be charged. ...
MODEL CODE, supra note 48, DR 2-101(B) (Proposal A). Proposal B forbad all fee informa-
tion except as follows:
(a) A statement of the fee for initial consultation; (b) A statement of the fixed or
contingent fee charged for a specific legal service, the description of which would
not be misunderstood or be deceptive; (c) A statement of the range of fees for
specifically described legal service, provided there is a reasonable disclosure of all
relevant variables and considerations so that the statement would not be misun-
derstood or be deceptive; (d) A statement of specified hourly rates, provided the
statement makes clear that the total charge will vary according to the number of
hours devoted to the matter; (e) The availability of credit arrangements; and (f) A
statement of the fees charged by a qualified legal assistance organization in which
he participates for specific legal services the description of which would not be
misunderstood or be deceptive.
MODEL CODE, supra note 48, DR 2-101(B)(6) (Proposal B). The language of Proposal B has
been recently adopted by Florida and New Jersey.
159 States recently amending their advertising rules have varied in whether they have
retained specific rules regarding fee information. For example, Texas and Missouri omitted
these rules, whereas New Jersey and Florida did not.
160 See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, DR 2-101(B)(22). MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 5-
103(B) states: "While representing a client in connection with contemplated or pending
litigation, a lawyer shall not advance or guarantee financial assistance to his client, except
that a lawyer may advance or guarantee the expenses of litigation including court costs ....
provided the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses." Note, however, that the
[Vol. 61:601
LAW PRACTICE MARKETING
does not make clear, however, whether any advertisement of a con-
tingent fee must also include the actual percentage rate to be
charged, and if not, whether the disclosure regarding costs must be
included nevertheless. 161 Perhaps as a result, lawyers have pub-
lished, and have been disciplined for, ads announcing that the fee is
contingent but without giving the rates. 162 Other advertisements
have stated, "No fees unless successful,"' 6 3 and "You don't need
money to have a lawyer,"' 64 without noting the client's responsibil-
ity to pay costs. In not mentioning rates or that the client ulti-
mately will have to reimburse the attorney for expenses regardless
of the success of the case, these ads were held to be misleading.
1 65
The most common problem with fee information is lack of
specificity. Vagueness regarding the amount of the fee charged,
who is eligible for reduced fees, and how long special rates are
available is often found to be misleading. The advertised state-
ment, "Reduced fees available," was found to be misleading absent
a description of the variables which determine when fees would be
reduced. 66 The same was held true where a lawyer offered fees "as
low as" a certain rate. 16 7 Although the Supreme Court found no
problem with a claim of "very reasonable prices" in the Bates adver-
tisement, that advertisement listed the fees for each service men-
tioned. 168 The public was able to compare rates and test their
Model Rules, supra note 17, Rule 1.8(e)(1) allows repayment of court costs and litigation
expenses to be contingent upon the outcome of the case.
161 The Supreme Court, in Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2283 n.15, noted the ambiguity of DR
2-101(b)(22), which had been adopted by Ohio. This provision permits "contingent fee
rates... provided that the statement discloses whether percentages are computed before
or after deduction of court costs and expenses." Zauderer's ad stated that "if there is no
recovery, no legal fees are owed by our clients." Id. The State Bar found this claim to be
deceptive because it left the impression that if there was no recovery, the client would owe
nothing, not even litigation expenses. See note 160 supra. The Ohio Supreme Court sug-
gested that the actual contingent fee rate must also be disclosed. 105 S. Ct. at 2283. Given
the United States Supreme Court's acceptance as "self-evident" that the public would be
misled by Zauderer's failure to distinguish between "fees" and "costs," it would seem that
any mention of a contingent fee should include this information regardless of whether a
specific rate is also given. Whether rates must always be specified whenever the availability
of a contingent fee is advertised is unresolved.
162 Compare Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d at 48, 461 N.E.2d at 886 with In re Appert, 315
N.W.2d at 210.
163 N.Y.C. Op. 81-56 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6325.
164 Ill. Op. 689 (1980), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3003.
165 See notes 163-64 supra and accompanying text.
166 D.C. Op. 121 (1983), supra note 70, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:2307.
167 Ill. Op. 669 (1980), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3002.
168 Bates, 433 U.S. at 381.
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reasonableness.1 69 Advertisements which promise, for example,
only a "minimal consulting fee," 170 and "reasonable rates" for "se-
nior citizens,"' 71 can only leave the public guessing as to who quali-
fies as a "senior citizen," and exactly how much a "minimal" or
"reasonable" fee is.172
The bottom line on fee information is a simple one: the infor-
mation must be complete and accurate. 173 This one aspect of law-
yer advertising, above all others, is capable of being factual and
definitive, without the injection of opinion or puffery. If lawyers
wish to engage in price advertising, they cannot cut corners by re-
ducing the information to an eye-catching phrase or an unex-
plained possibility. Anything which smacks of hucksterism will
draw scrutiny. And the scrutiny will be made through the eyes of
the most ignorant, gullible, and vulnerable members of the public.
8. Logos, Illustrations, Pictures
In the 1977 Bates decision, the Supreme Court approved an at-
torney's advertisement which contained the logo of the scales of
justice. 174 Perhaps for that reason, the amendments to the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility following Bates did not
specifically address the use of illustrations, logos, and pictures in
lawyer advertising. But their absence among the twenty-five kinds
of information permitted by DR 2-101(B) implied disapproval. 75
Moreover, the Model Code required all forms of advertising to be
"presented in a dignified manner."' 76 Any use of logos and illus-
169 Id.
170 Mich. Op. CI-567 (1980), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4811.
171 See Ill. Op. 695 (1980), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,supra note 10,
at 801:3004.
172 See also Committee on Professional Ethics of the Bar Ass'n of Nassau County Op. 83-
2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Nassau County Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6205 (free consultation described as a "$35.00 value" is misleading as to
whether a consultation of undetermined length is free, or only a portion of the consultation
up to and including a "$35.00 value" is free); Mich. Op. CI-688 (1981), supra note 57,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4831.
173 See D.C. Op. 91 (1980), supra note 70, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:2301.
174 Bates, 433 U.S. at 392 app.
175 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(B). The Ethical Considerations were hostile to
any advertising that was not strictly factual. EC 2-8 said, in part: "Advertisements and
public communications [by lawyers] . . .should be formulated to convey only information
that is necessary to make an appropriate selection [of counsel]." EC 2-10 counseled law-
yers to "strive to communicate such information without undue emphasis upon style and
advertising stratagems which serve to hinder rather than to facilitate intelligent selection of
counsel." The ABA's Proposal B also made no explicit reference to drawings, logos, and
pictures, but did prohibit any "garish or sensational... format." MODEL CODE, supra note
48, DR 2-I01(C)(6).
176 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(B).
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trations was widely believed to be an undignified, unprofessional
form of hucksterism.1 77 Thus, despite the presence of the logo in
the Bates ad, several states adopted advertising restrictions which
explicitly prevented lawyers from using anything but the printed
word.178
The justifications for prohibiting logos, illustrations, and pic-
tures were that they were inherently undignified, potentially decep-
tive, and merely promotional in nature. That is, they were believed
to have no informational content and were designed only to "at-
tract clients."' 79 Because it was believed that the only legitimate
purpose of legal advertising was to dispense information to an in-
formation-starved public, and because this could be done ade-
quately with words alone, the purpose behind the use of drawings
and pictures could only be to manipulate the public into selecting a
lawyer for wrong reasons.180
Attacks upon this restriction met with little success until the
Supreme Court decided Zauderer in 1985.181 Zauderer's newspaper
advertisement included a drawing of the Dalkon Shield intrauterine
device. The Ohio version of DR 2-101(B) prohibited the use of all
drawings, illustrations, and pictures, except the scales ofjustice, in
attorney advertising. Zauderer's challenge to this restriction was
beaten back by the Ohio Supreme Court on the ground that illus-
trations and drawings in general "may be misleading" and there-
177 See e.g., Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct, 521 F. Supp.
1219, 1226 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982).
178 L. Andrews reported in BIRTH OF A SALESMAN, supra note 21, at 56, that as late as
1980 at least eight states prohibited logos. For example, Georgia's Standard 5(B) requires
lawyers' advertisements to be "displayed in a dignified manner, without photographic, pic-
torial or other graphic illustrations, and being limited to black upon white [and] ... in type
size not larger than one-half centimeter... in height." Oklahoma's version of DR 2-101
bans the use of "any signs, symbols or pictures, and limits the size of advertisements to a
maximum of ten square inches. OKLAHOMA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-
101(I), (G) (1978), reprinted in STATE CODES, supra note 52, at 125L.
179 Iowa and several other states retain the portion of the pre-Bates Model Code which
prohibited "any form of public communications, calculated to attract clients, which con-
tains any information not ... specifically permitted." STATE CODES, supra note 52, at 76L
(Iowa Code). See also In re Burgess, 279 S.C. 44, 302 S.E.2d 325 (1983); Eaton v. Supreme
Court, 270 Ark. 573, 607 S.W.2d 55 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981). In Bishop, 521
F. Supp. 1219, the court accepted the testimony of a state's expert witness insofar as he
postulated that most advertising content is divided into two kinds, informational and pro-
motional. The former was said to be factual and operates on the conscious level, while the
latter is persuasive and operates on the unconscious level. Id. at 1224. The court found
that logos, drawings, colors, sounds, and modifying words were promotional in nature and,
therefore, potentially misleading. Id. at 1226.
180 N.J. RULES, supra note 57, Rule 7.2, prohibit "drawing, animations, dramatizations,
music or lyrics." The comment to the rule says, "These devices would add little, if any,
consumer-useful information to a communication, and are more likely to attract clients for
reasons other than those that are relevant to the selection of appropriate counsel."
181 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
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fore may be banned altogether. 182 The United States Supreme
Court disagreed. Significantly, it held that illustrations and pictures
"serve important communicative functions" by attracting the audi-
ence's attention and by imparting information. 83 Zauderer's IUD
drawing was a perfect example. It caught the reader's eye and
graphically conveyed accurate information by depicting the device
to which the advertiser was referring. The Court held that illustra-
tions and pictures were not inherently misleading or deceptive and
were entitled to first amendment protection.' 8 4 This meant the
state had to demonstrate that the ban on these devices advanced a
substantial governmental interest and that a total prohibition was
the least restrictive means available.'
8 5
The Court then proceeded to dismantle the claim that draw-
ings are prohibited because they are undignified. It conceded that
the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining the dignity of at-
torneys, but expressed doubt that that interest extended to public
communications, as opposed to courtroom conduct, for exam-
ple. 186 Even if a state interest in dignified public communications
does exist, the Court did not believe that it was substantial enough
to justify a complete ban. 187 Additionally, the Court expressed
doubt that the use of undignified drawings and illustrations could
ever become so pervasive a problem that a total prohibition would
be justified. The mere possibility, said the Court, that some mem-
bers of the public or the bar might find some kinds of advertising
offensive or undignified does not justify suppressing it. 18
The State's second argument against the use of drawings paral-
leled its attack on advertising which offered advice to persons with a
specific legal problem. It met the same fate. The State contended
that because graphics could subconsciously confuse, mislead, and
manipulate, and because the subconscious effects of these devices
are so difficult to detect, only a total proscription could protect the
public.' 89 The Court was appropriately skeptical of these unsup-
ported assertions.' 90 It held that the mere possibility of deception
and manipulation under some hypothetical circumstances clearly
182 The Ohio court did not find Zauderer's illustration to be misleading. Nevertheless,
it said, "A potential client peering at a lawyer advertisement may be misled or confused by
the expressed words, by an illustration or drawing, or by a combination of both." Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 47-48, 461 N.E.2d 883, 886 (1984),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).






189 Id. at 2280-81.
190 Id. at 2281 ("We are not convinced.").
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not present in the case before it did not justify a broad prophylactic
rule. The states would have to police misleading graphics on a
case-by-case basis. 19'
Zauderer has undercut all of the justifications for prohibiting
drawings, logos, and pictures. Further, state ethics codes which
ban any advertising methods or devices on the grounds that they
are undignified or only calculated to attract clients must be rewrit-
ten.' 92 The Supreme Court has finally acknowledged the obvious:
a major purpose of all advertising is to attract customers. There-
fore, attention-getting devices are legitimate adjuncts of protected
commercial speech. The only ground remaining for objecting to a
graphic device in an advertisement is that it is misleading.
It is difficult to anticipate what kinds of illustrations, pictures,
and logos would be subject to sanction as misleading or false. As
the Supreme Court noted in Zauderer, advertisements for profes-
sional services are probably less amenable to misleading or false
illustrations than product advertisements.' 93 But certainly the
clearest example of a deceptive graphic would be the use of a logo
which bears a close resemblance to that of another organization. If
a reasonable member of the public could mistakenly believe that
the advertising lawyer was associated in some way with the other
organization, then use of the logo may be prohibited, or the bar
might require a disclaimer of affiliation in the ad.
Some other potential pitfalls for pictures, illustrations, and
logos may lie in the widespread prohibitions against quality claims,
creating unjustified expectations, and comparing lawyers' services.
These blanket prohibitions may be difficult to justify under the test
established by the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, until the Court
places professional service advertising on a par with product adver-
tising, the careful attorney should take these restrictions as warning
buoys marking the kinds of potential deception to which the bar is
uniquely sensitive.
9. Music, Lyrics, Dramatizations
The concerns which prompted the bar's ban on drawings, pic-
tures, and symbols in print ads are magnified many fold when the
bar considers the use of animations, music, jingles, and dramatiza-
tions in the electronic media. In fact, radio and television advertis-
ing alone have been seen by the bar as presenting "special
problems."' 94 The Proposal A version of the Model Code adopted
191 Id.
192 See, e.g., N.J. RULES, supra note 57, Rule 7.2.
193 Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2279 & n.12.
194 See, e.g., Bates, 433 U.S. at 384 ("the special problems of advertising on the electronic
broadcast media will warrant special consideration"); Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 569-70.
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in 1977 allowed radio but not television advertising. The following
year, television was added to the list of permitted advertising out-
lets, but several states continued to resist. 95 Some of the states
which relented on the use of radio and television restricted their
utilization so that only the equivalent of a print media advertise-
ment could be communicated.196
The special concerns surrounding the use of jingles and dra-
matizations in the broadcast media are recounted in Committee on
Professional Ethics and Conduct v. Humphrey.197 In this case, the court
beat back an attack upon Iowa's rule against the use of backround
sound, visual displays, and more than a single, nondramatic
voice.' 9 8 The court viewed the broadcast media as "uniquely perva-
sive or intrusive,"' 99 and these techniques as "potentially mislead-
ing." 200 The court stated that dramatizations and background
sounds are "tools which would manipulate the viewer's mind and
will." 20' As such, they do not inform the public and, according to
the court, are not within the protections of the first amendment rec-
ognized in Bates.20
2
As with illustrations, pictures, and symbols, the ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct do not ban the use of music and dra-
matizations in the broadcast media.20 3 In the short period between
the ABA's adoption of the Model Rules and Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Zauderer,2 04 only three states, Arizona, New Jersey, and Mis-
souri, had revamped their advertising rules. Significantly, they
differed sharply over the utilization of standard radio and television
195 L. Andrew's 1980 study in BIRTH OF A SALESMAN, supra note 21, lists ten states which
continued to prohibit both radio and television advertisements, and two which banned only
TV ads. Id. at 136-45. Following a number of successful attacks on such prohibitions, see
e.g., Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 27, 470 A.2d 228 (1984), and the amend-
ment of several state codes, few if any states now prohibit all electronic media advertising.
196 Iowa's version of DR 2-101 (B), reprinted in Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 568-69, restricts
broadcast media advertising to the following:
The same information [allowed in print advertising], in words and numbers only,
articulated by a single non-dramatic noise, not that of the lawyer, and with no
other background sound, may be communicated on television. In the case of tele-
vision, no visual display shall be allowed except that allowed in print as articulated
by the announcer. All such communications on radio and television, to the extent
possible, shall be made only in the geographical area in which the lawyer maintains
offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides. Any such
information shall be presented in a dignified manner ....
197 355 N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1984), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 2693 (1985).
198 IowA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) (1980), reprinted in
Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 568-69.
199 355 N.W.2d at 569.
200 Id. at 570.
201 Id. at 571.
202 Id.
203 See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.2.
204 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985).
[Vol. 61:601
1986] LAW PRACTICE MARKETING 639
advertising techniques. NewJersey prohibits "animations, dramati-
zation, music or lyrics" as being irrelevant to the purpose of lawyer
advertising, the education of the public. 20 5 On the other hand, the
Arizona and Missouri rules permit these devices, 20 6 including simu-
lations about the lawyer and her practice, as long as they are explic-
itly identified as simulations. 20 7
Although the use of music, jingles, or dramatizations was not
in issue in the Zauderer case,208 that decision has seriously undercut
state prohibitions in this area because the justifications for these
prophylactic rules are essentially the same as those offered to sup-
port bans on illustrations and pictures. After Zauderer, a state could
justify the total abolition of these devices only by a clear demonstra-
tion of one of the following propositions: (1) that the utilization of
these advertising techniques in the electronic media creates the
same degree of risks of overreaching and coercion that are created
by in-person solicitation; 209 (2) that there has been a history of re-
curring abuses of these techniques, which demonstrates a propen-
sity to mislead and deceive the public;210 or (3) that a blanket
prohibition is the least restrictive means available for advancing a
substantial state interest in regulating the use of these
techniques. 21
1
Given that the burden of proof is on the state,21 2 it seems
doubtful that a state could muster sufficient evidence to support
any one of these propositions. Although there may be some evi-
dence to support the contention that electronic media advertising
may overly influence children, it is hard to imagine that the Court
could be convinced that television jingles and animations could
overreach an adult viewer. A history of recurring abuses could not
exist yet with regard to use of these techniques by lawyers in the
electronic media. And the fact that we swim daily through a sea of
advertising jingles, music, animations, and dramatizations bespeaks
a society, and an FTC, inured to their use and largely unconcerned
about their effects.
205 NJ. RULES, supra note 57, Rule 7.2.
206 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 381, 445-46.
207 Id. at 381 (Mo. DR 2-101).
208 105 S. Ct. 2265.
209 Id. at 2277 ("in-person solicitation by a lawyer, we concluded [in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 477 (1978)] was a practice rife with possibilities for overreaching,
invasion of privacy, the exercise of undue influence, and outright fraud... [and] justified a
prophylactic rule ... but.. . 'does not stand on a par with truthful advertising about the
availability and terms of routine legal services.' ").
210 In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 203, 207 (1982) (state may ban use of trade names by
optometrists where experience demonstrated that the names were often used in a deceptive
manner) (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979)).
211 Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280.
212 Id.
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The Zauderer decision has cast grave doubt on the proposition
that the state has a substantial interest in preserving the dignity of
the legal profession's public communications. 213 The only remain-
ing potential state interest could be to protect the public from be-
ing deceived. But even granting that these advertising gimmicks
are capable of being deceptive, misleading, and false, this fact alone
does not justify a blanket prohibition. As with drawings in Zauderer,
there is no reason why the state could not police jingles, anima-
tions, and dramatizations on a case-by-case basis.214 Disclaimers
and disclosure statements could be required to correct some mis-
leading potential. In short, shibboleths founded on untested as-
sumptions will no longer suffice to justify these restrictions. The
test is clear, and it is highly doubtful that these prohibitions can
past muster.
B. Promotional vs. Informational Advertising
It has been noted that several courts and state ethics commit-
tees have distinguished between the informational content of law-
yer advertising and its promotional aspects. 215 The distinction has
been used to determine which parts of lawyer advertising are cov-
ered by the first amendment's protections. The key to the distinc-
tion lies in the language of the Bates case,216 which, if narrowly read,
can be construed as holding that only newspaper advertisements
containing factual statements about fees for routine legal services
are protected forms of commercial speech. 21 7 Indeed, some states
drafted advertising rules after Bates which permitted only this lim-
ited information, 218 prohibiting anything that was not a plain, verifi-
able, factual statement of fees for routine services. Illustrations,
music, pictures, endorsements, logos, slogans, and dramatizations
are seen as irrelevant to the single, constitutionally protected pur-
pose of lawyer advertising: the education of the lay public regard-
ing the availability and cost of legal services. In effect, these
advertising techniques are assumed to be not only devoid of infor-
mational content, but also misleading and undignified.
The list of advertising devices which have been called "promo-
tional" includes statements regarding the quality of legal serv-
213 Id. ("we are unsure that the State's desire that attorneys maintain their dignity in
their communications with the public is an interest substantial enough to justify the abridg-
ment of their First Amendment rights").
214 Id. at 2281.
215 See notes 179-80 supra and accompanying text.
216 Bates, 433 U.S. 350.
217 "The issue presently before us is a narrow one.... The heart of the dispute before
us today is whether lawyers also may constitutionally advertise the prices at which certain
routine services will be performed." Id. at 366-68 (emphasis in original).
218 L. ANDREWS, supra note 21, at 71.
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ices, 219  opinions in general, 220  appeals to emotions, 22 1
characterizations, 222  self-laudatory statements,223  "puffery," 224
statements calculated to attract lay clients, 225 as well as jingles, ani-
mations, dramatizations, pictures, and drawings. 226 At the heart of
the debate is the question of whether these courts and ethics com-
mittees are correct in their narrow reading of Bates. If they are,
then the rules restricting lawyer advertising rest upon the odd
premise that lawyers may disseminate information, but they cannot
also attempt to attract clients. This seems anomalous at least, and
much in the Supreme Court's decisions on commercial speech
would seem to refute the proposition that advertising, even by at-
torneys, must maintain this pristine and selfless purpose to retain
its first amendment protections. 227
The proponents of greater liberality in the rules need not con-
cede that the promotional aspects of attorney advertising have no
219 Bishop v. Committee on Professional Ethics, 521 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (S.D. Iowa
1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir. 1982).
220 521 F. Supp. at 1227.
221 Id. at 1225.
222 Id. at 1226.
223 Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 570.
224 Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1228-29.
225 In re Burgess, 279 S.C. 44, 46, 32 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1983); Eaton v. Supreme Court,
270 Ark. 573, 581, 607 S.W.2d 55, 59 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
226 Bishop, 521 F. Supp. at 1226; Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 571.
227 In the case that awarded first amendment protection to commercial speech, Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the
Court commented:
It is clear.., that speech does not lose its First Amendment protection because
money is spent to project it, as is a paid advertisement .... Our question is
whether speech which does "no more than propose a commercial transaction,"...
lacks all protection. Our answer is that it [does] not.... [W]e may assume that the
advertiser's interest is a purely economic one. That hardly disqualifies him from
protection under the First Amendment.... Moreover, ... no line between publicly
"interesting" or "important" commercial advertising and the opposite kind could
ever be drawn.
Id. at 761-65.
In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Serv. Corp., 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980), the
Court characterized protected commercial speech as no more than "expression[s] related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." It also made the point
that it is unlikely that businesses would pay the costs of promotional advertising that is of
no use or interest to consumers. Id. See notes 85 and 138 supra for a discussion of Central
Hudson Gas. The Court, in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), held that the lawyer's conduct
there could not be prohibited notwithstanding the fact that "[b]y describing his services
and qualifications, [his] sole purpose was to encourage members of the public to engage
him for personal profit." Id. at 204 n. 17. The Court also commented on R.M.J.'s use of the
"relatively uninformative fact" of his admittance before the bar of the United States
Supreme Court. Id. at 205. However, notwithstanding its "uniformativeness," its potential
deceptiveness, and its "bad taste," id., the Court held that banning this fact was improper
given that there was no evidence in the record establishing that it was misleading. Id. at
206. Finally, the Court noted in Zauderer, 105 S. Ct. at 2280, that advertising techniques
which serve to attract the public's attention serve an important communicative function.
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value beyond the attraction of clients to the advertising lawyer.
Good arguments can be made that these techniques are of value to
consumers. 228 It takes little expertise in media marketing of profes-
sional services to see that dramatizations of typical legal problems
of unsophisticated lay persons could be the best way of helping the
public to recognize them.229 And if the public is sorely in need of
recommendations of quality legal services to compensate for its
lack of familiarity with professional reputations in today's large cit-
ies, how can the bar prohibit genuine client endorsements? 230 How
is it that the lay public can be allowed to be exposed to competitive
advertising by, for example, large stock broker firms, banks, and
insurance companies without the FTC experiencing the same pater-
nalistic concerns? Do not these professionals offer services, as op-
posed to goods? Other than hunch and speculation driven by a
desire to deny that the legal profession is a business, what supports
the contention that the differences between goods and professional
services require different advertising rules? 231 Many jurisdictions
have recognized that these dichotomies cannot be maintained.
They, like the ABA, understand that the only restraints on lawyer
advertising necessary from the public's point of view are the
prohibitions on false and misleading statements. 23 2 It is probably
just a matter of time before this view will prevail, but how much
time and how many court rebukes it will take cannot be predicted.
C. Restrictions on Undignified, Garish Advertising
Several states still ban undignified or garish lawyer advertis-
ing.233 At the core of these restrictions is a desire by the organized
bar to maintain its concept of "professional standards." 234 The
ABA Model Rules take the position that the manner of advertising
228 See notes 64-67, 86, 103, 111, and 155 supra and accompanying text.
229 Cf. Humphrey, 355 N.W.2d at 572 (Larson, J., dissenting).
230 See text accompanying notes 91-97 supra.
231 Regarding the alleged need for disparate treatment of advertising of goods as op-
posed to services, see text accompanying notes 31-37 supra. As for the effects of the differ-
ence between goods and services upon the consumer's view toward their advertisement, the
studies cited in Hazard, supra note 8, indicate that when consumers seek services, they trust
and rely on advertising less than when they are seeking to purchase goods. This would lead
to the conclusion that in the case of services, the advertising audience is less susceptible to
being deceived.
232 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.1.
233 See, e.g., FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrrY DR 2-101(C)(6) (1984)
[hereinafter cited as FLA. CODE]; The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1983); SoUrH
CAROLINA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 2-101 (1980). See also In re Burgess,
279 S.C. 44, 46, 302 S.E.2d 325, 326 (1983).
234 See Spencer v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880, 892
(E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd mem., 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Burgess, 279 S.C. at 46, 302
S.E.2d at 326; In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991, 993 (Utah 1982); In re Petition for
Rule of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638, 641, 644 (Tenn. 1978).
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is essentially a question of individual taste, and therefore not a fit
subject for regulation, 235 even though the Supreme Court left the
door open to this kind of regulation when the Rules took effect.
The Court stated that lawyer advertising, like all protected speech,
was still subject to reasonable time, place, and manner regula-
tions.23 6 The Court indicated explicitly that the maintenance of
professional standards was a legitimate and substantial state inter-
est which could be weighed in the determination of the validity of a
restriction.23 7 Moreover, before Zauderer was decided in 1985, the
Supreme Court twice sustained total bans on a form of commercial
speech.23 8
Given this permissive atmosphere, state ethics committees and
courts pronounced certain legal advertisements to be impermissi-
bly garish and undignified under state ethics codes. The Illinois
Bar advised that advertising a legal seminar with door prizes and
refreshments was undignified.23 9 An attempt by a NewJersey attor-
ney to place an advertisement in a "supermarket throwaway" other-
wise devoted to discount coupons met the same fate.240 The South
Carolina Supreme Court held a print advertisement which began,
"STOP FORECLOSURE Reposession, Credit Harassment, Consol-
idate or Get Out of Debt," violative of the state's ban on advertise-
ments intended to attract clients through showmanship or a garish
or undignified format.241
A few methods of advertising have received inconsistent treat-
ment from the states. Distributing pens with the law firm's name
imprinted on them was dignified enough to be permitted in Illi-
nois, 242 but not in Iowa.2 43 Three courts upheld prohibitions
against billboards, fliers, handbills, and matchbook cover advertise-
235 MODEL RuLEs, supra note 17, Rule 7.2 comment.
236 Bates, 433 U.S. at 384.
237 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 766; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460; R.M.J., 455
U.S. at 199-200.
238 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1978) (trade names); Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447 (in-per-
son solicitation of accident victims).
239 Ill. Op. 796 (1983), supra note 1l9, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3013.
240 Advisory Comm. on Professional Ethics, Sup. Ct. of N.J. Op. 468 (1981) [hereinafter
cited as NJ. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5803.
241 In re Burgess, 279 S.C. at 45, 302 S.E.2d at 325. See also Ill. Op. 689 (1980), supra
note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3003 ("Out of money due
to the recession?" and "You don't need money to have a lawyer" are undignified and mis-
leading notwithstanding fact that a lawyer is allowed to barter his services.).
242 Ill. Op. 812 (1983), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3015.
243 Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct, Iowa State Bar Ass'n Op. 80-30
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Iowa Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3601.
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ments. 244 However, two large city bar ethics panels and the ABA's
Model Rules permit the use of billboards. 245 Finally, the state eth-
ics committee of Kentucky delphicly advised an inquiring lawyer
that he could sponsor a softball team and place his name and tele-
phone number on the uniforms, provided that it was done in good
taste and did not bring the bench and bar into disrepute.
246
It appears from the Supreme Court's decision in Zauderer
247
that the Court has adopted the ABA's position with regard to un-
dignified advertising. In Zauderer, Justice White noted that the true
gist of the bar's objections to the use of illustrations in lawyer ad-
vertising was probably that the bar felt them to be undignified.
248
Addressing directly the question of a standard of "dignity" in law-
yer advertising regulations, Justice White made several illuminating
statements. First, he noted that no one had claimed that Zauderer's
IUD drawing was undignified. This scotched the contention that all
such graphic devices are per se undignified in attorney advertis-
ing.249 Secondly, on the question whether the state's admitted in-
terest in maintaining the dignity of the legal profession would
justify a prophylactic rule to prevent even the possibility of undigni-
fied ads, Justice White doubted that this interest was strong enough
to justify a total suppression of protected speech.250 He referred to
a 1977 Supreme Court decision, not involving lawyer advertising,
which held that the mere possibility some of the public might find
an advertisement embarrassing or offensive would not justify sup-
pressing it.251 Finally, the Court's opinion in Zauderer concluded
244 Bishop, 521 F. Supp. 1219 (S.D. Iowa 1981), vacated as moot, 686 F.2d 1278 (8th Cir.
1982); In re Petition for Rules of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638
(Tenn. 1978); In re Utah State Bar Petition, 647 P.2d 991 (Utah 1982).
245 See Chi. Op. 83-3 (1983), supra note 92, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:3203; Philadelphia Bar Ass'n Professional Guidance Comm. Op. 80-48 (undated)
[hereinafter cited as Philadelphia Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:7506. It appears that Model Rule 7.2(a) permits billboard advertising: "[A] lawyer
may advertise services through public media, such as... outdoor ... communication not
involving solicitation as defined in Rule 7.3." As for handbills, Model Rule 7.2(a) permits
advertising "through written communication not involving solicitation as defined in Rule
7.3." MODEL RULES, supra note 17. Rule 7.3 excludes from the definition of solicitation
"advertising circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need legal services of
the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular matter." MODEL RULES, supra note 17. It
would seem, then, that circulars could be handed out to the public generally so long as
persons with specific legal needs are not targeted recipients. See Part VI in text for a dis-
cussion of solicitation.
246 Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Bar Ass'n Op. E-267 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Ky. Op.],
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3907.
247 105 S. Ct. 2265.
248 Id. at 2280.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptive devices). In fact,
in 1983, the Supreme Court held that the mailing to private residences of advertising
brochures promoting the use of condoms to prevent venereal disease could not be prohib-
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that the bar had no greater standing to complain about tasteless or
offensive advertising than the public. The fact that some members
of the bar find Zauderer's advertisement beneath their dignity was
not grounds for suppressing it.252
The position of the Supreme Court is now relatively clear. If
an advertisement is not misleading, it is protected by the first
amendment and presumptively permissible. The fact the an adver-
tisement is in poor taste will not rebut that presumption. There-
fore, good taste and dignity are no longer permissible requirements
for lawyer advertisements.
III. Promoting Referrals
We now pass from the marketing techniques which relate pri-
marily to advertising 25 3 to consider other strategies. One of the
most important business getting devices recommended by market-
ing experts is the promotion of referrals.2 54 Of course, this is not
news to lawyers. Much of the business attracting activity by attor-
neys always has been devotedto increasing their notariety among
businesspersons and other attorneys for the sole purpose of having
them steer clients in their direction.2 5 The traditional techniques
for increasing one's visibility have been entertaining, writing,
speaking publicly, participating in political, bar association, and
civic activities, and publishing client newsletters. Even more re-
cently, the use of advertising and the mailing of firm brochures and
solicitation letters directly to prospective client forwarders have be-
come possible. Beyond this lies participation in sophisticated
group advertising and referral businesses for lawyers. But even in
this age of lawyer advertising, many of the old rules against certain
types of referral activities and arrangements remain unchanged. In
fact, several restrictions may affect referral promoting schemes.
A client referral involves the conduct of a third party business
forwarder, such as another lawyer, a business associate, a social ac-
ited on the grounds of offensiveness. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60
(1983). See also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 477 U.S. 530 (1980).
252 105 S. Ct. at 2280. In a slightly different context, the Court noted that "[ajlthough
some sensitive souls may have found [Zauderer's] . . . advertisement in poor taste, it can
hardly be said to have invaded the privacy of those who read it." Id. at 2277. The point is
that those offended by the lawyer's newspaper advertisement can simply avert their eyes.
253 Direct mail advertising and solicitation is treated in the text accompanying notes
395-440 infra.
254 Smock, supra note 7, at 1434 ("Lawyers have long known that client referrals are
probably the most effective means of obtaining new work."); Winter, supra note 7.
255 See generally S. GILLERS, I'D RATHER Do IT MYSELF-HOW TO SET UP YOUR OWN LAW
FIRM (1980); V. MORIN, How TO MAKE MONEY PRACTICING LAW (1977); G. SINGER, How TO
Go DIRECTLY INTO SOLO PRACTICE WITHOUT MISSING A MEAL (1976); H. SELIGSON, BUILD-
ING A LAW PRACTICE (1964);J. TRACY, THE SUCCESSFUL PRACTICE OF LAW (1947).
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quaintance, a present or past client, or a relative.256 The lawyer
who receives client referrals from a third party is, of course, free to
accept or reject the referred potential client as she wishes. 257 The
ethical restrictions center on why the referral was made, not that
they were made at all. If the referring party recommended the at-
torney voluntarily and for disinterested reasons, either because the
referrer believed that the attorney is able and appropriate or simply
because the attorney is a friend or relative, the lawyer may properly
accept the new client. 258 However, if the referral is made because
the lawyer requested it, or because the referring agent has or will
receive something of value in return, then the referral may be im-
proper and the attorney may not be able to accept it under many
state ethics codes.
259
A. Paying For or Requesting Client Referrals
Traditionally, lawyers were not allowed to seek clients directly
through solicitation or advertising, and they were also prevented
from circumventing these rules by employing third persons to do
the prohibited acts. 260 The ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility proscribed even requests by a lawyer that other persons
or organizations recommend or promote the use of her services to
others.26' A lawyer was also prohibited from giving anything of
value to another to recommend or secure her employment for legal
services 262
An exception to these restrictions was necessary after the Bates
case approved attorney advertising. Obviously, a lawyer was now
free to compensate someone to publicize the advertising permitted
by Bates.263 However, the Model Code, even as late as the 1982
256 Lawyer referral services, both for profit and nonprofit, are treated in the text accom-
panying notes 275-79 infra.
257 EC 2-8: "[Regarding the selection of a lawyer by a layperson] [a]dvice and recom-
mendation of third parties-relatives, friends, acquaintances, business associates, or other
lawyers-... may be helpful." EC 2-26: "A lawyer is under no obligation to act as adviser
or advocate for every person who may wish to become his client." MODEL CODE, supra note
3.
258 In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Informal Op. 1459 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ABA Informal Op.], summa-
rized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:304; S.C. Op. 82-9 (1982), supra note 88,
summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 279.
259 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(B), (C), (E).
260 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 1-102(A)(2), 2-103(E); MODEL RULES, supra note 17,
Rule 8.4(a).
261 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(C); ABA Informal Op. 1459 (1980), supra note
258 (proper for a law firm to accept referrals of clients where the firm does not represent
the referrers, there is no arrangement for reciprocal referrals, and the firm has not re-
quested the referrals).
262 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(B).
263 The post-Bates Model Code never explicitly said this, but it was necessarily inferred
by the Model Rules. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.2(c).
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final version, continued to prohibit lawyers from requesting or pay-
ing others to recommend their professional employment in a non-
advertising context. 264 Most states follow this version of the ABA
Code. Therefore, under many state ethics rules, a lawyer may not
in person, by mail, or otherwise request another to forward busi-
ness to the lawyer. 265 However, the ABA's Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct do not contain an analogous provision. Thus, in
states that adopt the Model Rules, lawyers will be free to request
referrals, subject to restrictions relating to the potential conflicts of
interest which could inhere in third party referral arrangements. 266
Under almost every state ethics code, a lawyer cannot give or
promise something of value to another in return for forwarding
business. 267 This prohibition has been continued in the Model
Rules.268 "Something of value" has been interpreted to include re-
ciprocal referrals.269 Therefore, an attorney may not agree with a
business acquaintance to refer clients to her in return for referrals
from the acquaintance. 270 "Something of value" would also in-
clude the performance of legal services for a reduced rate in ex-
change for referrals. Therefore, a lawyer cannot agree to draft wills
at no charge for a bank's client in exchange for referrals from the
264 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(B), (C).
265 See, e.g., Mich. Op. CI-512 (1980), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:4803 (clerics); Mich. Op. CI-642 (1981), supra note 57, summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4824 (insurance agents); Mich. Op. CI-801 (1982),
supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4847 (doctors); Mich.
Op. CI-570 (1980), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:4812 (marriage counselors). See also ABA Informal Op. 1456 (1980), supra note 258
(lawyer cannot request other lawyers to send unwanted clients to her).
266 See text accompanying notes 280-88 infra for a discussion of the conflict of interest
inherent in the solicitation of third party referrals.
267 See Chicago Op. 82-3 (1982), supra note 92, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:3202; Conn. Informal Op. 82-19 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAw-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2057; Advisory Comm. of the Neb. State Bar Ass'n Op.
81-12 (undated) [hereinafter cited as Neb. Op.], summarized in LAWYER's MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:5503; Ethics Comm. of the Los Angeles City Bar Ass'n Formal Op. 413 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as L.A. Formal Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:1709; Ethics Comm., N.C. State Bar Ass'n Op. 289 (1981) [hereinafter cited as N.C.
Op.), summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6604; ABA Informal Op. 1459
(1980), supra note 258; ABA Informal Op. 1456 (1980), supra note 258. An exception to
this prohibition is found in DR 2-103(B) and (D), where the lawyer may pay the usual and
reasonable fees or dues charged by any organization from whom a lawyer is permitted to
accept a referral, such as lawyer referral services sponsored by the bar. MODEL CODE, supra
note 3. Another exception exists in those few states, such as Texas and Massachusetts,
which, contrary to the Model Code, permit referral fees between lawyers. See TEXAS CODE,
supra note 51, DR 2-107(A)(3).
268 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.2(c).
269 ABA Informal Op. 1459 (1980), supra note 258; ABA Informal Op. 1456 (1980),
supra note 258; Conn. Informal Op. 82-19 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAwYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2057.
270 Ore. Op. 439 (1980), supra note 104, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:7102.
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bank.27 1
Several concerns undergird the ban on requesting or compen-
sating a third party to recommend a lawyer's employment. The first
is simply that a lawyer should not be allowed to have another do
what she cannot do herself. Lawyers cannot, in most states, directly
solicit potential clients. The dangers of overreaching inherent in
direct solicitation by attorneys 272 are not ameliorated by the inter-
vention of a third party where the third party is beholden to the
lawyer or has something to gain from the referral. Hence the ban
on "cappers" who earn their living referring accident victims to
lawyers. 273 The second concern with compensated referrals is that
the self-interested reason for the referral may not be disclosed to
the potential client. The prospective client may be misled into
thinking that the lawyer's services are being recommended because
the referrer believes that the lawyer is competent to handle the cli-
ent's problem, rather than because the referrer will receive a quid
pro quo. 2 7 4
B. Lay Intermediaries
There are, however, potential referrers of legal business who
are not beholden to any particular lawyer and may act as a neutral
buffer between the lawyer and the potential client who is in need of
legal services and a referral. 275 Or, the compensatory arrangement
between the referring agency and the lawyer may be disclosed, such
as in the case of a for-profit lawyer referral service which makes no
claims of expertise on behalf of the lawyers to whom the clients are
referred. What concerns does the bar have in such situations?
They revolve around the use of what the bar has called "lay in-
271 Neb. Op. 81-12 (undated), supra note 267, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:5503; Chicago Op. 82-3 (1982), supra note 92, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:3202. See also Standing Comm. on Professional Responsibility, State
Bar of California Formal Op. 1983-75 [hereinafter cited as Cal. Op.], summarized in LAw-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1606 (lawyer may not offer discounted legal fees to
clients referred to lawyer by solicited real estate brokers).
272 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447.
273 See, e.g., Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Beard, 374 So. 2d 1179 (La. 1979); In re Arnoff,
22 Cal. 3d 740, 586 P.2d 960, 150 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1978); cases cited in Annot., 5 A.L.R.4th
866, 901-07 (1981).
274 Mich. Op. CI-570 (1980), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4812; Ore. Op. 439 (1980), supra note 104, summarized in LAWYERS' MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 810:7102.
275 In State Bar Grievance Adm'r v. Jaques, 407 Mich. 26, 38, 281 N.W.2d 469, 470
(1979), a lawyer asked a union representative to recommend his services to the victims of a
tunnel explosion. The court held that this action was not improper because the union offi-
cial "served as a buffer between the attorney and prospective clients thus alleviating the
potential for overreaching and undue influence." Id.
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termediaries." 276 The potential problems stemming from the inter-
jection of a lay person or organization between a lawyer and her
client involve the compromising of the lawyer's independent pro-
fessional judgment, the assisting in the unauthorized practice of
law, the splitting of legal fees with a nonlawyer, the disclosure of
confidential information, and diluting the lawyer's loyalty to the cli-
ent by introducing a possibly conflicting concern for the lay inter-
mediary's interests.2 77
Largely because of these perceived problems, the Model Code
did not allow lay organizations, with exceptions for legal aid offices
and associations such as labor unions, to refer the public to lawyers
unless they were nonprofit, and bar sponsored or approved referral
services.2 78 Thus, state ethics panels routinely disapprove of refer-
ral arrangements where the referrer is not approved by a bar
association.2 79
1. Independent Professional Judgment
The Disciplinary Rule which permits certain organizations to
refer lawyers to the public specifically requires that the participat-
ing lawyers remain free to exercise their "independent professional
judgment" on behalf of their client.280 This, of course, is merely a
restatement of the lawyer's primary duty of loyalty expressed in
Ethical Consideration 5-1:
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised...
solely for the benefit of his client and free of compromising in-
fluences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the inter-
ests of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be
permitted to dilute his loyalty.281
Disciplinary Rule 5-107(B) prohibits a lawyer from allowing "a
person who recommends, employs, or pays him to render legal
services for another to direct or regulate his professional judgment
in rendering such legal services." 28 2 Therefore, in any situation in
276 See generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY 85-88 (1979) [hereinafter cited as ANNOTATED CODE].
277 See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-33, 5-21, 5-23, 5-24; ABA Informal Op. 1463
(1981), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:308; L.A.
Formal Op. 413 (1983), supra note 267, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:1709.
278 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(C), (D).
279 See, e.g., Mich. Op. CI-811 (1983), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:4858; NJ. Op. 481 (1981), supra note 240, summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:7905; State Bar of New Mexico Advisory Comm. Op. 1983-1,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6001; see text accompanying notes
295-306 infra.
280 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(C)(2)(b), 2-103(D).
281 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 5-1.
282 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 5-107(B).
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which a client comes to a lawyer for professional services by way of
a referral from a third party, the third party cannot dictate how that
client will be represented.
283
2. Who is the Client?
Another concern arising from the use of lay intermediaries has
to do with identifying the client to whom the lawyer's undivided
loyalty is owed. When lay intermediaries are introduced, the cli-
ent's identity may become unclear. ABA Informal Opinion 1463
provides a good example of a sophisticated referral arrangement in
which the true client was not properly identified. 28 4 A law firm was
hired to do research and analysis for a consulting organization
which provided information and advice to governmental entities on
labor-management relations matters. The organization rendered
assistance to any governmental employer, but at a reduced cost to
those who joined the organization. The organization was non-
profit. The consulting organization and the inquiring law firm pro-
posed to enter into the following arrangement:
a. The organization would make known to its members that it
had hired the law firm to assist it, and that the law firm's services
were available generally to the members.
b. At its discretion, the organization would request the firm
to assist it in rendering aid to the organization's members by doing
research and giving legal advice. The organization would not con-
trol the manner in which the firm conducted its research and analy-
sis. The firm's legal work would be transmitted directly to the
organization.
c. The organization would then relay the law firm's research
to the requesting member after adding to it any further information
gained through the work of its own staff.
d. Any information transmitted to the member from the law
firm via the organization would be clearly identified as such, and
kept separate from information provided by the organization's
staff.285 The organization would instruct the member that the in-
formation provided is not necessarily comprehensive, but only sup-
plementary to the member's own efforts.
e. Unless independently hired by a member, the law firm
would never communicate directly with the member, and the law
283 Id.; Conn. Informal Op. 82-19 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:2057. However, organizations which utilize the legal process to
further activities protected by the first amendment, such as the NAACP, are an exception to
this rule. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
284 ABA Informal Op. 1463 (1981), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:308.
285 This was done, no doubt, in order to keep the consulting organization from being
open to the charge of the unauthorized practice of law.
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firm would consider the organization, not the member, to be its
client.
f. The organization will not otherwise refer clients to the law
firm.
g. For its services, the organization would charge its members
an amount which included the costs of the law firm's efforts. Only
the organization would pay the law firm, and the organization alone
would have control over how much the members would be charged.
h. A member would be able to request that the law firm un-
dertake additional services for it alone. If the firm accepted, the
lawyer-client relationship thus created would not involve the
organization.
The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility approved of all but one aspect of this arrangement
under DR 2-103(D) and DR 5-107. These rules cover the require-
ments that must be met before a lawyer may represent members of
a nonprofit organization where the organization recommends, em-
ploys, or pays the lawyer to provide legal services. The arrange-
ment between the inquiring law firm and the consulting
organization stipulated that when assisting the organization in ren-
dering aid to its members, the organization, not the member, was
the client. Thus, the law firm could argue that DR 2-103(D) did not
apply because it was not representing the members of the nonprofit
organization. However, the ABA Committee took exception to this
stipulation. It read DR 2-103(D)(4)(d) 286 to say that if the lawyer's
legal services are ultimately furnished to the organization's mem-
ber, then the lawyer's client is the member, and not the organiza-
tion. Therefore, the proposed arrangement was defective in this
regard unless amended to provide that the law firm's client was the
member being assisted by the consultant with the law firm's aid.28 7
286 The relevant parts of this DR read as follows:
A lawyer... or his firm may be recommended .... paid by, or may cooperate with,
one of the following offices or organizations that promote the use of his services
... or his firm .... (4) Any bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or
pays for legal services to its members .. provided the following conditions are
satisfied: ... (d) The member.., to whom the legal services are furnished, and not
the organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the matter.
MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(D)(4)(d).
287 This is a questionable finding unless it is compelled by the fact that otherwise the
organization would be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. See ABA Informal Op.
1264 (1973), supra note 258. It seems to be an application of the union open panel or
NAACP lawyer model to an inapposite situation. The members of the consulting organiza-
tion's group do not come to it seeking representation, but only legal and other advice.
There also seems to be little danger of a conflict of interests between the organization and a
member. Certainly all that should have been required by the ABA ethics panel was that the
organization clearly inform those who sought its consulting service that the law firm repre-
sents the organization only and that the members should look to other counsel for repre-
sentation. If the member wished to retain the organization's lawyers, then the organization
1986]
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Informal Opinion 1463 went on to note that if the law firm
simultaneously represented several members of the organization
and the organization itself, it would have to be wary of DR 5-105
regarding potential conflicts of interests arising from the represen-
tation of multiple clients. If the law firm represented conflicting,
inconsistent, diverse, or other differing client interests which af-
fected its independent professional judgment or loyalty to any
other client, the firm must withdraw unless it is obvious that it can
adequately represent the interests of each client who must consent
to the continued representation after full disclosure of the
conflict. 2
88
3. Unauthorized Practice of Law
The other way in which the law firm-consulting organization
arrangement reviewed in Informal Opinion 1463 might be defi-
cient, the Committee noted, was that it might violate state laws
against the unauthorized practice of law. The Model Code does not
define what the unauthorized practice of law is. Generally, it is a
matter of state law and, therefore, the Committee is not capable of
rendering an opinion on the question. However, because DR 3-
101 (A) prohibits a lawyer from aiding in the unauthorized practice
of law, the Committee reminded the inquiring law firm to check the
pertinent state law before entering into the arrangement.
28 9
Finally, the Committee found that the arrangement considered
in Informal Opinion 1463 did comply with the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility in some ways. The organization was not
created or promoted primarily to provide financial or other benefits
for the law firm,29 0 nor did the organization derive a profit from the
rendition of legal services. 29' Further, the organization did not in-
terfere with the exercise of the law firm's independent professional
judgment.
292
4. Splitting Legal Fees With Nonlawyers
Lastly, the arrangement did not violate the prohibition against
could cease to be the client and the firm would deal only with the member in connection
with the specific matter.
288 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 5-105(A)-(C).
289 See, e.g., Thompson v. Chemical Bank, 84 Misc. 2d 721, 375 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Civ. Ct.
1975) (bank engaged in unauthorized practice of law where it offers its customers legal
services for which it charged a fee that was greater than the amount it paid its salaried in-
house counsel); ABA Informal Op. 1264 (1973), supra note 258 (lawyer may not participate
in the work of a for-profit corporation owned by lay persons which supplies legal research
services to lawyers when the corporation acts as the consultant).
290 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(D)(4)(b)-(c).
291 Id. at DR 2-103(D)(4).
292 Id. at DR 2-103(D); DR 5-107(B).
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splitting lawyer's fees with a nonlawyer.2 93 The Committee noted
that the organization charged its members for its services, including
those provided in the particular case by the law firm. However, the
organization was nonprofit, and charged only to the extent neces-
sary to cover the administrative costs of the program. This is per-
mitted without violating the fee splitting ban.
2 94
5. For-Profit Referral Services
The question arises whether a lawyer may operate or partici-
pate in a for-profit lawyer referral business. The high cost of adver-
tising has prompted some lawyers to engage in collective
advertising arrangements designed to spread the cost among sev-
eral lawyers.2 95 Often collective advertising arrangements look like
traditionally bar-sponsored lawyer referral services. The advertis-
ing may not identify any one lawyer by name. Thus, whoever re-
sponds to the joint advertisement must be put in touch with one of
the sponsoring lawyers. In other cases, private commercial entities
sell these services to lawyers. In exchange for advertising and re-
ferral of potential clients by the referral service, the lawyers may be
charged either a flat fee based upon the cost of the group advertis-
293 Id. at DR 3-102(A).
294 See ABA Informal Op. 544 (1962), supra note 258 (where the attorney is a salaried in-
house counsel for a lay institution, the institution may not charge its customers attorney
fees "not related" to the attorney's salary); ABA Informal Op. 1451 (1980), supra note 258
(salaried in-house counsel for bank); ABA Informal Op. 1409 (1978), supra note 258 (reten-
tion of 25% of premiums for a prepaid legal services plan by the lay corporate administra-
tor); Committee on Rules of Professional Conduct, State Bar of Arizona Op. 85-3 (1985)
[hereinafter cited as Ariz. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1324
(lawyer may not pay to a for-profit corporation a portion of fees generated from clients
referred to lawyer by the corporation); L.A. Formal Op. 431 (1984), supra note 267, summa-
rized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1713 (law firm may not be retained by a
business to represent entertainers managed by the business where the business charges the
entertainers 20% over the law firm's hourly rate); Wis. Op. E-84-17 (1984), supra note 88,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:9114 (lawyer may not arrange for
referrals from an insurance company in exchange for a percent of the fees generated
thereby); Kan. Op. 82-41 (1983), supra note 117, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:3812 (lawyer who is an executive of a management consulting firm may not rep-
resent the firm's clients in negotiations because it would constitute the practice of law by,
and the division of legal fees with, nonlawyers); Legal Ethics Comm., Indiana State Bar Op.
4 (1980), supra note 198, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3301 (lawyer
cannot share with advertising firm the fees generated by the firm's advertisements); Va.
State Bar Council Op. 503 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Va. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:8815 (lawyer may not participate in a corporation comprised
of nonlawyers where the corporation requests the lawyer to render legal assistance to
others and charges for the services).
295 See King, What Works, What Doesn't, in Advertising, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1985, at 54; N.C. Op.
359 (1984), supra note 267, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6615 (a
group of lawyers may collectively finance and operate a private referral service which adver-
tises the availability of legal services and refers persons to the participating lawyers pro-
vided it is nonprofit, its ads indicate that it is privately operated, and a list of participating
lawyers is available on request).
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ing or a percentage of the fees generated by the referred clients.296
Some of these commercial referral services publish what may be
called generic legal advertisements designed to alert the public to
pervasive legal problems.2 97 Or they may simply advertise free re-
ferral services, the way bar associations traditionally have done,
without advertising specific services or individually named attor-
neys. 298 This latter practice may violate some bar advertising rules
which require that legal advertisements contain the name of a law-
yer who is licensed to practice in the state where the advertisement
appears and who will be responsible for the performance of the
legal services. 29
9
Apart from this advertising problem, the ABA Model Code has
no provision permitting lawyers to operate or utilize commercial
referral services. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(B) states that a lawyer
may not compensate another to recommend or secure the lawyer's
employment except "that he may pay the usual and reasonable fees
or dues charged by any of the organizations listed in DR 2-
103(D)." 30 0 That subsection lists legal aid and public defender of-
fices, military legal assistance offices, and "lawyer referral service[s]
operated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association." 30 ' Refer-
ral services not approved or sponsored by a qualified bar associa-
tion must meet the requirements of DR 2-103(D)(1)-(4). The only
reference to "for-profit" organizations which recommend or pro-
mote the use of a lawyer's services is found in DR 2-103(D)(4)(a).
However, this section of the Model Code addresses organizations
296 Frank, An Eye On Ads, A.B.A.J.,June 1984, at 30, describes a legal advertising "coop-
erative" run by a lawyer in Massachusetts. The lawyer's firm places the ads, screens the
calls which come in on the advertised toll-free number, and refers most of them to one of
the twenty-five law firms in the region who contribute to an advertising fund. The advertis-
ing lawyer keeps about one-third of the cases and splits the fees of forwarded cases. It
should be noted that Massachusetts is one of the few states which permits client forwarding
fees. The article reports that ABA "staffpersons" said that the ethical status of this kind of
for-profit referral service "remains in question under the Model Rules." Id. at 31.
297 For example, one law marketing service proposes to run a series of magazine adver-
tisements entitled, "Know Your Legal Rights," relating to various types of personal injury
claims. (Material on file with the author.)
298 For example, Lawyer Data, Inc. promises to underwrite broadcast and print adver-
tisements on legal topics and to advertise its free lawyer referral service to the public. For
the opportunity to be one of the ten lawyers referred to every inquiring consumer, a lawyer
must pay Lawyer Data $3500 a year. The consumer receives ten lawyers' resumes which
indicate the qualifications, experience, and credit arrangements of each. Each lawyer may
designate five areas of practice in which she desires referrals. (Materials on file with the
author.)
299 See, e.g., TExAs CODE, supra note 51, DR 2-101(B): "A lawyer who publishes, or
broadcasts with regard to any area of the law in which he practices must, with respect to
each area of the law so advertised, publish or broadcast the name of the lawyer, licensed to
practice law in Texas, who shall be responsible for the performance of the legal service in
the area of law so advertised."
300 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(B).
301 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(D)(3).
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and businesses which recommend, furnish, or pay for legal services
for their members, employees, or beneficiaries. Commercial lawyer
referral services are not among these kinds of organizations be-
cause the referred potential clients are not members, employees, or
beneficiaries of the referring entity. Therefore, unless they are ap-
proved by a bar association per DR 2-103 (D) (3), operating or using
such for-profit referral businesses are forbidden by implication.30 2
While the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct aban-
don the requirement of bar approval for private referral services,
the Code's implicit ban on for-profit referral services was not made
much more explicit. Rule 7.2(c) states that a lawyer may not give
anything of value to anyone for recommending the lawyer's services
except the costs of advertising permitted by the Model Rules, and
the "usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or
other legal service organization." 30 3 The comment to this Rule, en-
titled "Paying Others to Recommend a Lawyer," elaborates slightly
on the phrase "other legal service organization." It states, "This
restriction does not prevent an organization or person other than
the lawyer from advertising or recommending the lawyer's services.
Thus, a legal aid agency or prepaid legal services plan may pay to
advertise legal services provided under its auspices."30 4
The comment seems to sanction lawyer cooperation with only
two kinds of recommending entities, either nonprofit legal aid
agencies, or legal assistance plans which are provided as an inciden-
tal benefit of membership in or employment with an organization
not founded primarily for the purpose of providing legal services.
If this interpretation is correct, then the Model Rules continue to
302 See Lee, Lawyer Referral Services: A Regulatory Wasteland, 37 Sw. L.J. 1099, 1118-20
(1984); ABA Informal Op. 1510 (1985), supra note 258, summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS,
supra note 14, at 662; Ariz. Op. 85-3 (1985), supra note 294, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:1324 (Code requires referral services to operate on a not-for-profit
basis); Idaho State Bar Comm. on Ethics Formal Op. 114 (1983), summarized in LAwvR'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2903 (same); Committee on Ethics of the Md. State Bar Ass'n
Op. 83-29 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Md. Op.], summarized in LA wYR'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4326 (whether a lawyer may accept referrals for a credit counseling company
which charges its customers $250 for referring them to a lawyer depends upon whether the
organization meets the requirements for a qualified lawyer referral service in DR 2-103);
Mich. Op. CI-862 (1983), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:4855 (a lawyer may not operate in a referral service where subscribing lawyers pay a fee
to the service unless it is sponsored, operated, or approved by a bar association); N.J. Op.
481 (1981), supra note 240, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5805
(lawyers cannot participate in a referral service sponsored by a for-profit corporation en-
gaged in an advertising program for in-state attorneys who pay a fee initially and an addi-
tional monthly fee based upon the volume of referrals); S.C. Op. 84-6 (1984), supra note 88,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:7905 (unless approved by the bar, a
lawyer may not participate in a free referral service offered by a for-profit magazine
publisher).
303 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.2(c).
304 Id. at Rule 7.2(c) comment.
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prohibit for-profit referral services. 305
In summary, the involvement of "lay intermediaries" in the
procurement and representation of clients brings to bear several
considerations. Identification of the client and of potential conflicts
of interests is crucial where more than one client is represented.
The intermediary must not infringe on the lawyer's exercise of in-
dependent judgment on behalf of the client. The client-seeking or-
ganization must have been created for purposes other than to
funnel clients to the lawyer. The organization must be nonprofit,
30 6
and under the Model Code it must be bar approved. The lawyer
must not aid a nonlawyer in the practice of law contrary to state law.
And the lawyer or law firm may not share its legal fees with
nonlawyers.
IV. Promoting Media Exposure
Law firm marketing essentially is an attempt to increase a firm's
visibility among all or certain targeted legal services consumers.
The public relations experts advise firms to select the areas of law
in which they wish to practice, develop an image of competence in
those fields, and then expose that image to the relevant law users
and business forwarders in a target community. 30 7 One way of
placing that image of competence before the public is to get the
firm's name constantly into the media in connection with news
items relating to the firm's area of expertise. The goal, of course, is
to have the public automatically associate the firm's name with a
particular type of legal problem and vice versa. The major methods
of obtaining media exposure are press releases, writing for newspa-
pers and magazines, and appearing on radio and television. A re-
lated technique is offering or participating in seminars designed to
educate the public or other attorneys.30 8
305 Lee, supra note 302, at 1120-21; ABA Informal Op. 85-1510, supra note 302, held
that under the Model Rules a corporation could offer a free private lawyer referral service
to those who pay $75 for a "membership" card. See also N.C. Op. 359, supra note 295.
306 The exceptions to the requirement that the organization be nonprofit relate to group
legal service plans and insurance companies. See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103
(D)(4)(a). A lawyer may be recommended to the members or beneficiaries of an organiza-
tion, provided that it:
is so organized and operated that no profit is derived by it for the rendition of
legal services by lawyers, and that, if the organization is organized for profit, the
legal services are not rendered by lawyers employed, directed, supervised or se-
lected by it except in connection with matters where such organization bears ulti-
mate liability of its member or beneficiary.
Id. See generally ANNOTATED CODE, supra note 276, at 70-77.
307 See C. GILSON, L. CAWLET & W. SCHMIDT, How TO MARKET YOUR LAW PRACTICE 218
(1979) [hereinafter cited as C. GILSON]; Smock, supra note 7.
308 This latter form of publicity will be treated in a later section of this article. See text
accompanying notes 353-73 infra.
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A. Being in the News
Lawyers sometimes find themselves in the middle of topical, if
not controversial, matters in which news organizations have an in-
terest. Attorneys who represent clients involved in newsworthy liti-
gation such as celebrity divorces, notorious murder cases,
important and hostile corporate takeover attempts, and defamation
cases between famous persons and national news organizations, to
name only a few, are constantly sought out by news reporters for
interviews. Of course, the Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain important
restrictions on what lawyers involved in civil and criminal litigation
may say publicly about ongoing cases.3 09 And, of course, any attor-
ney must respect the confidentiality of client information at all
times.310 However, these topics are not within the scope of this ar-
ticle. It is sufficient to'note that within those limitations, a lawyer is
free to identify herself as an attorney and her relationship to the




The more pertinent question in the context of law practice
marketing is whether the lawyer must wait for the news media to
come to her, or whether the attorney may initiate media contact. In
other words, may the lawyer draw media attention to matters she is
handling? A lawyer-generated news release is a public communica-
tion. Therefore, it is governed by the same standards which control
lawyer advertising, and cannot be false, fraudulent, misleading, de-
ceptive, self-laudatory, or unfair.3 12 In short, it must be factual.
Beyond this, there are no explicit restrictions on the issuance of
news releases.313 The rule prohibiting a lawyer from compensating
representatives of the news media for providing publicity may be
relevant at this point.3 1 4 The rationale for this prohibition is not
309 See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 7-107; MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 3.6.
310 See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 4-101; MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 1.6.
311 Iowa Op. 80-37 (1980), supra note 243, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:3602 (lawyer may consent to the use of her name in a television program based
upon litigation she handled).
312 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(A).
313 Ill. Op. 763 (1982), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3010-11 (code does not prohibit news releases by lawyers of their attendance at legal
seminars). While it could be argued in states that retain the "permissible statements" of
the Model Code, supra note 3, that news releases are improper if they contain any informa-
tion not permitted by DR 2-101(B), the constitutionality of this has been undermined by In
re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1983). Nevertheless, news releases still may be prohibitable as self-
laudatory in some states. See, e.g., Neb. Op. 80-2 (undated), supra note 267, summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5501.
314 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(I): "A lawyer shall not compensate or give any
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difficult to see. Regular commercial advertising is understood by
all to have been purchased by the advertiser. However, a "news
item" is not so understood, and the public is deceived if the "news
item" has been purchased. The deception is that the public will
think that the news organization made an independent judgment
that the matter was newsworthy when in fact it did not.
3 15
Unlike the Model Code, the Model Rules do not explicitly pro-
hibit giving anything of value to a news media representative in re-
turn for publicity. Model Rule 7.2(c) prohibits a lawyer from giving
anything of value in return for being recommended for employ-
ment. Publishing a news release containing information about a
law firm or one of its cases or clients is not literally "recommending
the lawyer's services" contrary to Rule 7.2. However, the mislead-
ing aspects of a paid-for news item, mentioned above, would result
in the prohibition of the practice under the Model Rules' ban on
misleading communications.
31 6
The traditional anti-advertising philosophy of the legal profes-
sion influences its view of the legitimacy of news releases. The Eth-
ical Considerations of the ABA Model Code clearly evince the
sentiment that the single legitimating purpose of lawyer advertising
is to educate and inform the public. All activity likely to bring a
lawyer incidental publicity must not be motivated by the desire for
publicity or other personal benefit. 317 This, however, is the primary
reason why public relations experts advise the use of attention-get-
ting devices such as news releases. 318 Some authorities have ac-
cepted the obvious and held that as long as the news release meets
the advertising standards of the jurisdiction, this form of publicity
seeking is permissible.3 19 It is difficult to argue that even self-serv-
ing news releases would not be valuable to the public in helping to
identify and select appropriate counsel. The catalog of fears prof-
fered to justify the prohibition of news releases are the same well
worn arguments against all lawyer advertising that the Supreme
Court rejected in Bates. 320 Eventually, the profession will have to
thing of value to representatives of the press, radio, television, or other communication
medium in anticipation of or in return for professional publicity in a news item."
315 N.Y.C. Op. 80-34 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6309.
316 It also could be argued that a paid-for news item which failed to disclose that fact
omits a material fact necessary to make the communication not misleading. It would thus
violate Rule 7.1(a).
317 See text accompanying notes 179-80 supra regarding the rather prevalent belief in
the legal profession that lawyer advertising should not be designed or motivated to "attract
clients."
318 See, e.g., C. GILSON, supra note 307, at 223-25.
319 N.Y.C. Op. 80-34 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6309.
320 The justifications for prohibiting lawyer advertising considered in Bates were as fol-
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accept the fact that lawyers advertise primarily to attract clients, and
only coincidentally to inform the public. It is simply unrealistic to
expect that attorneys will spend their hard-earned money to adver-
tise for purely altruistic purposes. Attorneys advertise primarily to
benefit themselves professionally, and official bar rhetoric which
demands that the primary motivations of advertising attorneys be
perfectly aligned with the benefits that the public receives from that
advertising is pure window dressing, if not delusional in nature.
Any publicity-seeking activity by lawyers, if not harmful to the pub-
lic, should be allowed.3
2'
C. Creating Publicity
The question of the permissibility of news releases can be fur-
ther refined by asking whether it is proper for an attorney to create
the incident or information which is transmitted to news organiza-
tions for publication. Certainly lawyers have never just waited for
something to occur in their practice before seeking news coverage.
Lawyers have always engaged in publicly visible activities, whether
civic, charitable, political, or social, on their own initiative.
Although this kind of activity may be viewed cynically by some as a
form of indirect advertising, it is not impermissible. Nor should
there be anything wrong with other methods of creating publicity
for one's law practice. As long as there is no impropriety in the
production or publicizing of the incident, and as long as it is not
harmful to the public, it should not be prohibited.3 22
A good example of how a law firm might create a "media"
event is to hold a firm-sponsored seminar.323 A firm may decide to
underwrite, advertise, administer, and participate in a legal seminar
designed for the chief executive officers or in-house counsel of po-
tential business clients or client forwarders. The primary purpose
of the seminar may be to impress the attendees with the firm's com-
petence in a particular field of law and to obtain their business.
3 24
It would seem to make little difference whether the law firm sought
lows: (1) the adverse effect on professionalism; (2) the inherently misleading nature of
attorney advertising; (3) the adverse effect on the administration ofjustice; (4) the undesir-
able economic effects; (5) the adverse effect on the quality of service; and (6) the difficulties
of enforcement. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368-79.
321 The legal profession is rather short-sighted in this regard. Citations are unnecessary
for the proposition that the profession is not held in high esteem by the public. Press
releases which announce the participation of local lawyers in civic and charitable activities
could help overcome the image that lawyers do not share enough of the civic responsibili-
ties in their communities.
322 N.Y.C. Op. 80-34 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6309.
323 See text accompanying notes 353-73 infra for a further discussion of seminars.
324 See C. GILSON, supra note 307, at 229; Smock, supra note 7, at 1436. See also ABA
Informal Op. 1489 (1982), note 325 infra.
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to publicize its seminar through newspaper ads, mailed invitations,
news releases, or all three methods. And yet, the event would not
have occurred unless it was created by the firm. It would be hypo-
critical for the profession to allow this seminar only when the spon-
soring firm denied its motivation to attract clients and claimed that
its primary purpose was to educate the business community.325
D. Writing and Broadcast Media Appearances
As a general principle, the profession urges its members to
help educate the public regarding legal problems and the legal sys-
tem. 326 Participation in civic programs, seminars, and lectures
designed to assist the public in recognizing legal problems, as well
as the preparation of professional articles for lay publications, is
encouraged as being among the highest duties of an attorney.
However, the profession has at least officially frowned upon these
activities when engaged in "to obtain publicity for particular law-
yers."3 27 Nevertheless, these same activities are recommended by
public relations advisers as favored techniques for increasing a law-
yer's exposure to potential clients and client forwarders. 328 These
activities traditionally have included speaking publicly and writing
on legal matters in newspapers and magazines. There is now the
analogous activity of appearing on television and radio shows as a
regular or occasional guest "legal expert" to discuss law-related
topics.3 29 Likewise, columns written for newspapers or periodicals
may be occasional or regular.33 0 Finally, there is the publication of
325 In ABA Informal Op. 1489 (1982), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:336, the ethics committee approved a proposed law firm seminar on
"qualified" retirement plans offered to accounting and insurance professionals who also
served the firm's clients. The inquiring law firm felt constrained to claim that its "primary
purpose... would be to provide information which will enable the best overall representa-
tion of its current client." However, in a refreshing fit of candor, the firm acknowledged
that "referrals of new clients to the firm may be generated when other professions also
recognize the benefits of the new procedures which will be discussed at the seminar." Does
anyone really believe that the former rather than the latter purpose motivated the firm to
expend so much of its time and energy? It should not make any difference which is the
firm's "primary" purpose. See text accompanying notes 353-70 infra.
326 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-1, 2-2.
327 Id. at EC 2-2. Cf. Belli v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527
(1974).
328 Davidson, Writing and Using Articles, 26 LAw OFF. ECON. & MGMT. 201 (1985). See also
articles cited in note 324 supra.
329 See text accompanying notes 342-49 infra.
330 For example, an advertisement for a law practice marketing seminar entitled "Mar-
keting Secrets Revealed," offered by attorney Lawrence Korn, appeared in TRIAL, Oct.
1984, at 25. In his ad, Mr. Korn claims that "you will learn how to obtain thousands of
dollars worth of free publicity. [The seminar] will show you how to create your own news-
paper column that can generate community awareness and enhance your image as an ex-
perienced attorney." Id. According to Mr. Korn, his "Ask the Lawyer" newspaper column
has appeared in sixty-five newspapers in southeastern Michigan. Id.
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what looks like a feature article or public interest column on the
law, but is really a paid legal advertisement. These articles may be
authored by the named attorney or by a lawyer who produces
"canned" columns on legal topics and sells them nationally. 331
There are, no doubt, many lawyers who engage in these speak-
ing and writing activities out of a desire to educate the public or the
profession. However, there are also many attorneys who do these
things to further their own professional reputations and thereby at-
tract clients either directly or through referrals.3 32 Recognizing
perhaps the difficulty of proving a lawyer's motivations when speak-
ing or writing publicly, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct do
not contain provisions relating to these activities other than the
rules relating to advertising. Therefore, only the rules against false
and misleading information apply, unless ajurisdiction has retained
the proscriptions on "undignified" and "self-laudatory" state-
ments.33 3 However, it is likely that the word "misleading" will be
broadly interpreted when the public comments of lawyers, either
written or spoken, are scrutinized under the Model Rules. No
doubt, the guidelines that were worked out under the Model Code
will remain intact. A description of some of those guidelines
follows.
1. Feature Articles
Disciplinary Rule 2-104(A)(4) stated that a lawyer may speak or
write on legal topics "so long as he does not emphasize his own
professional experience or reputation and does not undertake to
give individual advice." 334 The first caveat was based upon the
Model Code's disallowance of solicitation and self-laudatory state-
331 ABA Informal Op. 1464 (1980), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:311, approved the advertising of a lawyer's "canned" law column
subscription service after determining that it would be proper for attorneys to subscribe to
the service. The committee's only objection to the use of "canned" newspaper columns on
law-related topics purchased from the service was that it would be false and misleading and
in contravention of DR 2-101 (A) if the purchasing attorney represented that she wrote the
article. Otherwise, the committee found no fault with the purchasing attorney's placement
of the article together with information identifying the attorney and her practice, as long as
the advertisement was dignified and not false, misleading, self-laudatory, deceptive, or
unfair.
332 Speaking and writing for the profession and the public is always mentioned as a
valuable "public relations" strategy for lawyers. S. GILLERS, supra note 255, at 61; H. SELIG-
SON, supra note 255, at 19; Santangelo, supra note 7, at 44; Smock, supra note 7, at 1436;
Winter, supra note 7, at 56.
333 See ABA Informal Op. 1464 (1980), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:311 (lawyer advertisement by means of "canned" law articles in news-
papers was approved even though it was assumed that the motivation of the advertising
attorney was the promotion of her professional employment by readers).
334 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A)(4).
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ments.33 5 Furthermore, personal publicity was to be strictly con-
fined to the modes and content permitted by DR 2-101(B). The
second caveat, regarding individual advice, arose from the concern
that individualized legal advice cannot be rendered adequately via
the print media or from a lecture podium. Competent legal assist-
ance is not possible until the person with the legal problem fully
discusses the peculiar circumstances of her case with the attor-
ney. 336 When a lawyer recommends a solution to a legal problem
to a general listening or reading audience, members of the audi-
ence may be misled into believing that the recommended solution
applies equally to their individual problems which may be similar in
appearance only.337 Thus, it is generally advised that speakers and
writers on legal problems must caution their audience not to at-
tempt to solve individual problems on the basis of the information
supplied.3
3 8
The ABA's DR 2-101 (H) (5) permitted a "limited and dignified
identification of a lawyer as a lawyer as well as by name ... on...
legal publications." This has been interpreted as permitting a law-
yer to identify both herself and her firm in a column on legal topics
written for a business magazine.3 39 However, it has been held im-
proper for an attorney to request the readers of her newspaper col-
umn to direct specific questions to her office.3 40 Absent this direct
solicitation of clients, it is perfectly proper for an attorney who
writes or speakes on legal matters to accept as a client someone
who came to her as a result of hearing the lawyer or reading her
work.3 41
335 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-2, 2-8.
336 See N.Y.C. Op. 80-8 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAwYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6303-04.
337 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 2-5: "[Sllight changes in the fact situations may re-
quire a material variance in the applicable advice; [thus] the public may be [misled] and
misadvised."
338 Id. Mich. Op. CI-797 (1982), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:4847, "suggests" that the attorney-author of a newspaper column on gen-
eral legal topics attach thereto a disclaimer stating that "the advice given is general and
readers should direct specific inquiries to their own attorneys." The same ethics opinion
held that the author of the column could not request readers to direct their questions to the
author's law office. See also Ethics Comm. of the State Bar of Montana Op. 14 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Mont. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5402; Va.
Informal Op. 410 (1983), supra note 294, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:8805.
339 NJ. Op. 477 (1981), supra note 240,summarizedin LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:5804. See also ABA Informal Op. 1464 (1980), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:311; Mont. Op. 14 (1980), supra note 338, summarized in LAw-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5402; Ill. Op. 763 (1982), supra note 119, summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3010.
340 Mich. Op. CI-797 (1982), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4847.
341 "Without affecting his right to accept employment, a lawyer may speak publicly or
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2. Broadcast Media Appearances
Many of the concerns and restrictions which pertain to writing
and lecturing on legal matters apply equally to radio and television
appearances by lawyers. Thus, a New Jersey ethics panel advised
that, while a lawyer may appear as a guest panelist on a television
program and answer legal questions from the audience, the lawyer
must advise the audience that the answers given are not a complete
analysis and that further legal advice should be sought.342 How-
ever, the ethics opinion went on to hold that the additional advice
could not be supplied by the appearing attorney. It reasoned that
because the only legitimate purpose of such an appearance would
be to promote the public's understanding of the law, the lawyer
may not benefit from it. Thus, the attorney could not be retained
by one member of the audience. 343
An Oregon ethics committee advised that a lawyer may appear
on a weekly television show and give five minute lectures on a gen-
eral legal topic.3 44 The committee went on to say that the attorney
may identify himself, but not his law firm, because to do so would
amount to impermissible solicitation and improper advertising.
The attorney was prohibited from emphasizing his own profes-
sional experience or reputation on the air. The panel concluded
that because a television appearance which met these guidelines
was permissible advertising, the lawyer could accept employment
generated by it. It should be noted that in this latter case, as dis-
tinct from the New Jersey case, the lawyer was not directly address-
ing problems raised by members of the audience. Therefore, there
was little danger of direct in-person solicitation by the attorney.345
Appearing on the broadcast media to discuss a legal topic of
current public interest, such as bankruptcy, could violate the re-
strictions on holding oneself out as a specialist.3 46 A lawyer who is
write for publication on legal topics so long as he does not emphasize his own professional
experience or reputation and does not undertake to give individual advice." MODEL CODE,
supra note 3, DR 2-104(A)(4).
342 NJ. Op. 4 8 1 (1981),supra note 240,summarizedin LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:5805.
343 Id. See also N.Y.C. Op. 80-8 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:6303 (radio); Legal Ethics Comm. of the Dallas Bar Ass'n Op.
1980-5, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:8402.
344 Ore. Op. 465 (1981), supra note 104, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:7108.
345 Conn. Informal Op. 82-13 (1981), supra note 14, summarized in LAwYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:2056, made the point that where a lawyer was the host of a radio talk
show pertaining to the law, any advertisements for the host's law firm should not include
the host's voice or laudatory statements or endorsements of the host-lawyer. Apparently,
the committee felt that it would be an unfair advantage for the host's law firm to be able to
"trade on" the host's popularity as a radio personality.
346 See Miss. Op. 74 (1982), supra note 87, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:5103; MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-105(A): "A lawyer shall not hold himself out
19861
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
to appear on a news program should take appropriate precautions
to avoid being introduced as a specialist, unless she is certified as
such by the bar. If she is certified, she should be introduced only in
terms of the mandatory certification language, if any, adopted in
that jurisdiction. If the attorney is not certified, or the jurisdiction
has no certification procedures, it would be prudent for the attor-
ney to be introduced only as one who "practices" in the field of law
under discussion.3
47
Finally, where a jurisdiction permits television and radio adver-
tising, it is often permissible for a lawyer to broadcast a short talk
on a general legal topic and identify herself and the location of her
office.348 These bear a strong resemblance to the "canned" legal
newspaper column, because they appear to be public service an-
nouncements when they are really paid advertisements. Of course,
the permissibility of these kinds of advertisements in any jurisdic-
tion depends on how strictly radio and television advertisements
are regulated. 349
3. Endorsement of Commercial Products
In 1974, attorney Melvin Belli was suspended from the practice
of law for sending out press releases announcing his annual tort
seminar and for endorsing a brand of scotch whiskey in a magazine
advertisement.350 Today, one can turn on the television and see
attorney Louis Nizer rhapsodizing about a nationwide courier ser-
vice. However, it should not be assumed that the Bates decision
caused a formerly prohibited practice to become permissible. In
1982, the Ethics Committee of the Mississippi State Bar ruled that a
law firm could not permit the use of its name in a business journal
ad placed by an office equipment supplier showing that the law firm
publicly as a specialist, as practicing in certain areas of law or as limiting his practice ... "
except as prescribed by the rules of the bar authority, if any, governing specialization.
347 But being introduced as a lawyer who "practices" in a certain area of the law appears
to violate DR 2-105(A) (2) if the lawyer is not officially certified as a specialist or if there is
no certification available in the given field. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-105(A)(2)
states: "A lawyer who publicly discloses fields of law in which the lawyer... practices ...
shall do so by using designations . . . authorized.., by [the agency having jurisdiction of
the subject under state law]." This rule is a ridiculous quibble. To say that one "practices"
in a field of law, if true, is not misleading and makes the least possible claim of specializa-
tion, if at all. Sensibly, the Model Rules jettison this restricition: "A lawyer may communi-
cate the fact that the lawyer does or does not practice in particular fields of law." MODEL
RULES, supra note 17, at Rule 7.4.
348 Iowa Op. 82-6 (1983), supra note 243, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:3609; Kan. Op. 83-14 (1983), supra note 117, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:3815.
349 See text accompanying notes 194-214 supra.
350 Belli v. State Bar, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal. Rptr. 527 (1974).
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was a customer.35' The Committee noted that this situation did not
fit within any of the exceptions to the general prohibition against
law firm publicity. On the other hand, in the same year, the Ethics
Committee of the Kentucky Bar held that a lawyer may publicly en-
dorse commercial products, provided that the advertisements are
professional, dignified, and contain no self-laudatory statements.
3 52
The difference of opinion between Kentucky and Mississippi
may turn on whether the specific code provision on lawyer advertis-
ing is couched in terms of prohibiting, except as permitted, a lawyer
from publicizing herself or her firm, or in terms of advertising her
services. Endorsing products may be seen as seeking publicity, but
not as advertising legal services. The permissibility of product en-
dorsements may also hinge on whether the state code in question
adopts a "safe harbor" laundry-list approach toward permitted ad-
vertising as opposed to the open-ended approach which permits all
but false and misleading advertising. Because the ABA Model
Rules adopt the latter position and omit the ban on self-laudation,
it would seem to allow product endorsements by lawyers.
E. Speaking at Seminars and Conferences
As previously mentioned, a recommended method of attaining
increased visibility in a chosen legal field is to speak at seminars and
conferences. On these occasions, speakers have a prime opportu-
nity to impress attending consumers of legal services and client-
referring lawyers with their erudition, if not just with their names
and faces. 353 The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, in its
zeal to encourage lawyers to assist in educating the public about the
law, fosters such activity by removing a large disincentive. The
Model Code permits an attorney to accept employment resulting
351 Miss. Op. 77 (1982), supra note 87, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:5104.
352 Ky. Op. E-260 (1982), supra note 246, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:3906.
353 [The marketing company's] strategic planning division helps law firms "target
new market segments"... [by identifying] companies in a geographical area that
do business in a lawyer's area of expertise. It then will contact a particular com-
pany to learn its needs, who its current counsel are and whether they would benefit
by attending a law firm seminar in a particular area of interest to the company.
Winter, supra note 7, at 57.
An example of an attempt by a law firm to establish itself as a nationally recognized
specialist in mass tort litigation by the use of seminars can be seen in the legal newspaper
advertisements by the Minneapolis firm of Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplin. The full page ad
in The National Law Journal of September 24, 1984, at page 59, entitled, "The Bomb In
The Boardroom," offered "an incredibly stimulating and invaluable experience" for law-
yers interested in learning how to handle litigation involving defective products, harmful
chemicals, and toxic wastes. Robins, Zelle modestly noted in this ad that, "[W]e've had
considerable experience in mass tort litigation, [b]ut we certainly don't have all the
answers."
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from public speaking engagements as long as the lawyer did not
"emphasize his own professional experience [or] ... give individual
advice." 354 Accepting employment under this circumstance does
not violate the ban on accepting employment from one to whom
the lawyer has given unsolicited, in-person legal advice.3 55
The ABA's Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility ruled in a 1982 informal opinion 356 that a law firm
could conduct a seminar for accountants and insurance profession-
als who also served the firm's current clients. Although the firm
candidly admitted that referrals of new clients to the firm might re-
sult from giving the seminar, the Committee said that the seminar
would be proper as long as the firm did not use it as an opportunity
to solicit employment directly, and the firm neither had nor con-
templated any financial or reciprocal referral arrangements with the
speakers or attendees. Several state ethics committees have
reached the same conclusion as the ABA Committee.3
57
Ohio, on the other hand, reached a contrary result regarding
the propriety of a law firm accepting employment from prospective
clients as a result of holding a seminar. Ohio's version of DR 2-
104(A)(2) closely resembles the ABA counterpart. This provision
prohibits a lawyer from accepting employment from a layperson to
whom he has given unsolicited legal advice except where that em-
ployment "results from his participation in activities designed to
educate laymen... if such activities are conducted or sponsored by
any of the offices or organizations enumerated in DR 2-103(D). ' '3 58
The offices and organizations enumerated in DR 2-103 do not in-
clude a private, for-profit law firm. Therefore, the Ohio Committee
on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct held that a law firm
354 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A)(4). See note 341 supra.
355 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A).
356 ABA Informal Op. 1489 (1982), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:336.
357 For example, a Massachusetts ethics opinion advised that a lawyer may provide a
seminar for local union members on Workers' Compensation Law even where the intent of
the seminar was to generate business for the lawyer. As long as neither the lawyer nor
anyone on his behalf recommended employment of the lawyer, and if the seminar and its
advertising contained no deception, the offering of and participating in the seminar by the
lawyer was not improper. Ethics Comm. of the Mass. Bar Ass'n Op. 83-4 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Mass. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4607. See also
Chicago Op. 82-1 (1982), supra note 92, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3202; Conn. Informal Op. 84-8 (1984), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:2064; Ill. Op. 727 (1981), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:3007; Advisory Comm., Mo. Bar Admin. Informal Op. 5 (1980),
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:5251; Md. Op. 81-36 (1981), supra
note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4309. But cf Ill. Op. 679
(1982), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:3003 (lawyer
attending union meetings to answer questions on any topic in anticipation of future em-
ployment therefrom is engaged in unlawful solicitation).
358 OHIO CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-104(A)(2) (1975).
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which participates in a legal education seminar may not accept em-
ployment from attendees who are not clients, former clients,
friends, or relatives.35
9
Given the nearly identical language of the Ohio and the ABA
Model Code provisions on this point, the question arises how the
ABA and Ohio Committees could have reached opposite conclu-
sions. In Informal Opinion 1489, the ABA Committee completely
ignored DR 2-104(A)(2). Indeed, that code provision was not even
cited in the opinion. The ABA Committee began by acknowledging
that, "A law firm could not properly have served as the, sole sponsor
of a seminar program for laymen under the original version of the
Model Code." This conclusion was reached, however, not by look-
ing at DR 2-104, but by examining the history of Ethical Considera-
tion 2-2. The original version of EC 2-2 urged participation in legal
education programs for the public by lawyers "acting under proper
auspices."3 60 The Committee then noted that in 1977, in response
to-the Bates decision, EC 2-2 was amended to delete the "under
proper auspices" phrase. However, the Committee failed to note
that the parallel Disciplinary Rule, DR 2-104(A)(2), had not been
amended, and continued to require that the educational activities
giving rise to the employment of the lawyer be "conducted or spon-
sored by a qualified legal assistance organization."36 1 Nevertheless,
the Committee concluded that the amendment to EC 2-2 meant
that since 1977, "a bona fide educational program may be con-
ducted by a lawyer or law firm without the requirement that an
outside sponsor be obtained for the program."3 6 2
It may be argued that the ABA Committee did not need to re-
fer to DR 2-104 because it was focusing only on whether a law firm
may be the sole sponsor of a legal seminar, rather than whether the
firm may accept employment offers resulting from it. The seminar
was not designed to attract an audience of prospective lay clients,
but of potential business forwarders.3 63 Therefore, since the firm
was not giving unsolicited legal advice to lay persons who might
359 Comm. on Legal Ethics and Professional Conduct, Ohio St. Bar Ass'n Op. 36 (1981),
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6801. Under the language of DR 2-
104(A)(1), a lawyer may offer in-person, unsolicited advice to, and accept employment from
"a close friend, relative, former client (if the advice is germane to the former employment),
or one whom the lawyer reasonably believes to be a client." MODEL CODE, supra note 3.
360 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC 2-2 (1969).
361 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A)(2). The phrase "qualified legal assistance
organization" is defined in the unnumbered "Definitions" section of the Model Code as
"one of the four types listed in DR 2-103(D)(1)-(4), inclusive, that meets all the require-
ments thereof." MODEL CODE, supra note 3. A private law firm would not qualify under DR
2-103(D).
362 ABA Informal Op. 1489 (1982), supra note 258.
363 The inquiring law firm acknowledged that "referrals of new clients to the firm may
be generated" by the seminar. Id.
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seek to employ it, it was not prohibited by DR 2-104(A) from ac-
cepting referrals. And because the law firm did not intend to di-
rectly solicit referrals at the seminar, it would not violate DR 2-
103(C) which prohibited lawyers from requesting others to recom-
mend their employment. While this argument may be logical, it is
not convincing given the plain language of DR 2-104(A)(2).
Nevertheless, Informal Opinion 1489 stands as the ABA's final
word on this subject under the Model Code, and it signals the ac-
ceptance of law-firm sponsored legal seminars for persons other
than clients and other lawyers. This position has been accepted in
some of the states.
364
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer may not engage in in-person
solicitation of anyone, except family members and former clients, if
a significant motive is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.3 65 The commen-
tary to Model Rule 7.3, which prohibits solicitation, implies that ad-
dressing a lay audience at a seminar is not solicitation. 366 The
comment is replete with descriptions of prohibited solicitation as
being "a direct interpersonal encounter," "direct private contact,"
and the "private importuning" of professional employment. How-
ever, this is not to say that a lawyer may directly and explicitly so-
licit clients from the podium at a conference. This could amount to
solicitation by in-person contact where the audience includes pro-
spective clients and a significant motive for the solicitation is the
lawyer's pecuniary gain. Although such a situation may not be, to
quote the comment again, "fraught with the possibility of undue
influence, intimidation, and over-reaching," any such blatant be-
havior would, no doubt, catch the interest of the local bar discipli-
nary committee.36
7
It should be noted at this point, however, that the Model Rules
have eliminated the Model Code's prohibition of lawyers "request-
ing" third parties, as opposed to compensating them, to recom-
mend their employment to others.368 And the Model Rule against
364 See note 357 supra.
365 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3.
366 Of course, the speaker may not make any false or misleading statements, or hold
herself out as a specialist, except as permitted. See MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.4.
367 Compare Mass. Op. 83-4 (1983), supra note 357, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:4607 with Ill. Op. 679 (1982), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:3003, where the Illinois committee advised that a lawyer could
not attend union meetings to answer member's questions on legal matters because the law-
yer would be initiating in-person contact with prospective clients motivated by his own pe-
cuniary interest. A later Connecticut ethics opinion stated that persons who voluntarily
attend a public seminar on legal topics given by lawyers are soliciting legal advice from the
seminar speakers. Therefore, the opinion concluded, the lawyers could offer a seminar on
bankruptcy for the general public and accept employment from anyone who attends. Conn.
Informal Op. 84-8 (1984), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:2064.
368 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(C).
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solicitation applies only to the direct solicitation of "prospective cli-
ents." 369 There does not appear to be any prohibition in the Rules
of direct, in-person solicitation of client referrals from potential
business forwarders such as other lawyers and business acquaint-
ances who have clients in need of legal services. Under the Model
Rules, therefore, lawyers holding seminars directed only to these
kinds of professionals may be quite explicit in their requests for
referrals.3 70
1. Advertising Legal Seminars
Bar committees have advised that a law firm interested in spon-
soring a seminar may solicit expressions of interest in the seminar
by mail.3 7 1 Presumably, the firm at a minimum may advertise the
seminar in the same ways in which a lawyer may advertise her own
services. All of the restrictions which apply to lawyer advertising in
general also apply to the advertising of a legal conference or semi-
nar. Therefore, if the rules on lawyer advertising preclude undigni-
fied formats or self-laudatory statements, seminar ads must hew to
those standards.3 72 Of course, the advertisements may not contain
false or deceptive claims. 373 Finally, seminar brochures containing
biographical sketches of the seminar faculty must conform with the
rules regarding the holding out of a lawyer as a specialist or expert.
V. Civic Activities
The traditional position of the legal profession toward its
members' participation in civic activities, and its response to those
who suggest that such activities are merely a form of indirect adver-
tising, is best stated by Henry Drinker in his famous book on legal
ethics.3 74
When a lawyer has the opportunity to perform a service to the
community which will place him in the public eye, he need not
hesitate to seek or accept it because if successful he will appear
frequently in the news papers, and will enlarge his circle of
friends and acquaintances and thus attract new clients ...
Where publicity is the normal by-product of able and effective
369 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3.
370 However, for a discussion of the potential conflict of interests problems which may
inhere in the solicitation of referrals, see text accompanying notes 458-80 infra.
371 Chicago Op. 82-1 (1982), supra note 92, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:3202; Ill. Op. 727 (1981), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:3007.
372 Ill. Op. 796 (1983), supra note 119, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:3013, advised that advertising door prizes and free refreshments to those who attended
a legal seminar was not dignified.
373 Mass. Op. 83-4 (1983), supra note 357, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4607.
374 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics (1953).
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service, whether of a professional or non-professional character,
this is a kind of "advertisement" which is entirely right and
proper. Clients naturally gravitate to a lawyer who has success-
fully represented their friends or who has obtained the confi-
dence of the community by effective public serviceA7 -5
This recognized, and sanctioned, potential of civic work to at-
tract new legal clients is, of course, one major reason why lawyers
do it,376 and the only reason why public relations experts advise
that lawyers spend time doing it.3 77 It is well known that law firms
often have partners who are socially prominent due to their civic,
charitable, or political activities. They may do little legal work;
their job is to bring in new clients. They are the "rainmakers," and
any law firm's credo includes the beatitude, "Blessed are the
rainmakers, for they shall bring prosperity."
The view expressed by Henry Drinker in 1954 has not
changed. Disciplinary Rule 2-101(H) of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility permits a lawyer who is a director or officer of
a "business, civic, professional, or political organization" to be
identified as a lawyer in public reports or announcements by the
organization. It was ruled in ABA Informal Opinion 1488378 that a
lawyer may use his law firm stationery in connection with charitable
work.379 For those looking for ways of increasing law firm visibility,
the question is how far a lawyer or firm may properly go to publi-
cize its pro bono civic work.380
Although the Ethical Considerations of Canon 2 do not di-
rectly address publicity in connection with noneducational civic
work, their tone implies that a lawyer should never seek personal
aggrandizement from such activity.381 However, ABA Informal
Opinion 1490382 overruled prior contrary opinions when it held
that a publication of general circulation could list the names of law-
375 Id. at 218.
376 In Saltman and Herman, A Client Development Checklist, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1985, at 80, the
following client development "ideas" are presented: join a civic organization; become ac-
tive in a charitable organization in your comunity; attend a PTA meeting and speak about
an issue being debated; attend a local board of health meeting to voice your praise and
support; and offer to be a member of a board or committee in your town. See also authori-
ties cited in note 7 supra.
377 See V. MORIN, How To MAKE MONEY PRACTICING LAw 24 (1977);J. TRACY, THE Suc-
CESSFUL PRACTICE OF LAW 5-7 (1947).
378 Issued on Jan. 25, 1982, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:335.
379 Accord Md. Op. 81-78 (1981), supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:4313.
380 See text accompanying notes 312-21 supra for a discussion of news releases.
381 "[P]articipation in... civic programs should be motivated by a desire to educate the
public.., rather than to obtain publicity for particular lawyers." MODEL CODE, supra note
3, EC 2-2. H. DRINKER, supra note 374, at 218: "What is wrong is for the lawyer to augment
by artificial stimulus the publicity normally resulting from what he does [in service to the
community], seeing to it that his successes are broadcast and magnified."
382 Issued on Jan. 25, 1982, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:338.
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yers and law firms which had contributed to a charity. Similarly, a
1981 Iowa ethics opinion permitted the identification of a law firm
as a sponsor of a public television broadcast.38 3 These opinions are
difficult to reconcile with Ethical Considerations 2-2 and 2-3.
The ABA's Model Rules have no provisions or commentary
which address indirect advertising resulting from civic and political
activity. It can be argued that the standards of Rule 7.2 governing
lawyer advertising do not apply to publicity arising from nonprofes-
sional activity. The Rule applies only to advertisements of the law-
yer's legal services. But Rule 7.1 applies more broadly, and under
it, a lawyer cannot permit a false or misleading "communication" to
be made about herself.3 8 4 With the Model Rules' omission of the
Model Code's ban on self-laudatory and undignified public state-
ments, however, there would seem to be no reason why a law firm
could not issue news releases about its members' civic activities. Of
course, while engaged in civic activities, an attorney must comply
with the ethical rules regarding direct solicitation.
VI. Direct Solicitation of Prospective Clients
As lawyers thrust themselves into situations inviting contact
with prospective clients, they are required to tread a fine line be-
tween "rainmaking" and impermissible solicitation. On one side of
that line is the long-standing and continuing ban on seeking profes-
sional employment directly and personally from potential clients.38 5
On the other side is the rainmaker's "art" of moving a new acquain-
tance from the introductory handshake, to setting up an appoint-
ment to discuss the acquaintance's nagging legal problem.38 6 A
lawyer is not required to conceal the fact that she is a lawyer as she
moves through her daily activities. Nor is a lawyer prohibited from
accepting as clients persons who, on learning that they have met a
lawyer, initiate queries about their legal problems. The Code does
prohibit the acceptance of employment from a layperson to whom
the lawyer has given "in-person unsolicited [legal] advice,"3 8 7 and
the lawyer's recommendation of self-employment to a layperson
383 Iowa Op. 81-36 (1981), supra note 243, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:3608.
384 Rule 7.1, in part, reads: "A lawyer shall not make false or misleading communica-
tions about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." MODEL RULES, supra note 17.
385 See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(A), 2-104(A); MODEL RULES, supra note 17,
Rule 7.3.
386 What rainmakers do so well is move a conversation with a prospective client
quickly to the next step: setting a date for a meeting with the other person. A
lawyer can request the person's business card and offer to make a follow-up call or
can suggest to "get together next Monday" without crossing the ethical line into
solicitation.
Smock, supra note 7, at 1434.
387 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A).
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"who has not sought his advice regarding employment of a law-
yer."3 88 Thus, if legal advice is solicited by the layperson, or the
layperson seeks the lawyer's advice about obtaining legal services,
even at a cocktail party, the lawyer may offer her services and accept
any resulting employment.
Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer may
not solicit employment "by mail, in-person or otherwise"3 8 9 from a
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family ties or who is
not a former client.390 The Rules have no provisions identical to
DR 2-103(A) and 2-104(A), but it may be assumed that the term
"solicit" as used in Model Rule 7.3 would not preclude what was
permitted under the Model Code. It would be proper under the
Rules for a lawyer to offer her professional services to a layperson
who had sought the lawyer's advice on a legal matter or on the se-
lection of a lawyer. But under both the new Rules and the
superceded Code, an attorney may not initiate discussion with a
layperson regarding whether the layperson should hire the attorney
to represent her.39 1
A. "Cold Calls"
The continued ban on solicitation of prospective clients by law-
yers, and the failure of the Code or the Rules to exempt businesses
from this ban, calls into question one of the marketing techniques
discussed in the recent literature. This is the "cold call." 392 It is
discussed, but not often recommended. However, the reason given
for this failure to recommend the cold call on prospective clients
has nothing to do with its ethical dubiousness. Rather, its effective-
ness is doubted.393 In any event, there can be little justification for
388 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(A).
389 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3.
390 This is one of the few areas where the Rules are stricter than the Code. The Code
permitted a lawyer to give unsolicited advice to, and accept resulting employment from, "a
close friend" also. MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-104(A)(1). Rule 7.3 omits "friends"
from the list of those who may be directly solicited by a lawyer. MODEL RULES, supra note
17.
391 When the lawyer-initiated contact and solicitation are in-person, it is clearly prohib-
ited by the Code and Rules. However, when the contact is by mail, the answer is a bit
troublesome. See text accompanying notes 397-440 infra. There should be a distinction
made between the in-person solicitation of laypersons who are vulnerable or naive about
the law and legal services and the personal solicitation of businesspersons experienced in
dealing with lawyers. This distinction is beginning to gain adherents in the context of di-
rect mail solicitation. See text accompanying notes 477-79 infra. There seems to be little
danger of attorney overreaching where the lawyer visits a business office and makes a sales
pitch to the executive in charge.
392 The author has never seen a definition of the "cold call," but it seems to refer to the
practice of calling on a prospective client with whom the lawyer has had no previous con-
tact. The call could be in person or by telephone. See note 393 infra.
393 Morgan, supra note 7, at 60: "Creating the opportunity to present the capabilities of
your firm to a potential client is probably the most difficult step in the process." The cold
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the cold call under the Code or the Rules. Whether the contact
with the previously unrepresented businessperson is made by tele-
phone or in-person, the contact is clearly improper where the law-
yer initiates the contact for the purpose of obtaining employment
which could result in the lawyer's pecuniary gain.3 94 However,
under the Model Rules and the developing law surrounding the use
of direct mail solicitation, lawyers may be able to inititate employ-
ment-seeking contacts with potential clients by mail where the em-
ployment sought does not relate to a specific occurrence which has
created an immediate need for services of the kind the lawyer offers
to provide.
B. Direct Mail Solicitation
Perhaps the fiercest battle on the professional ethics scene to-
day concerns whether lawyer advertisements and more direct forms
of solicitation may be mailed to targeted groups of individuals.
Many state ethics codes, based upon the ABA's Model Code, con-
tain no reference to advertising by mail. The version of DR 2-
101(B) in existence when the Code was superceded by the Model
Rules allowed a lawyer to "publish [the permitted information] ...
in print media" distributed in the geographical area where the law-
call is unlikely to interest a busy corporate counsel who receives many of these approaches.
The potential ethical problems associated with cold calls are mentioned in Winter, supra
note 7, at 58:
Using third-party referral sources can be a successful technique for making rain,
and it avoids the ethical problems that might arise were an attorney to make direct
contact with the potential client. "We don't do cold calls because of the ethical
problems related to it and because they're usually not received well," said Calkins,
Kramer's [John] Tipton.
394 The Code does not mention telephone contacts. However, the Model Rules equate
them with in-person contact. MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3. State ethics opinions
have reached the same result. See, e.g., Md. Op. 83-93 (1983), supra note 302, summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4333; N.Y.C. Op. 80-44 (undated), supra note 125,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6311; Philadelphia Op. 81-68 (un-
dated), supra note 245, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:7518; Wis. Op.
E-83-16 (1983), supra note 88, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:9110;
Woll v. Kelley, 116 Mich. App. 791, 323 N.W.2d 560 (1982). A Maryland lawyer inquired
of her bar's ethics committee whether it would be proper to use "tele-robotics," whereby a
computer would dial every telephone number within the vicinity of her office and deliver a
recorded twenty-second message informing the listeners of the location of the law office
and offering brochures on various legal topics. The computer would ask interested listen-
ers to leave their name, address, and telephone number. The committee concluded that
this was closer to direct mail advertising than to in-person solicitation and permitted it to
the extent that they permitted direct mail advertising, but noted that tele-robotics may be
more intrusive than mail. Md. Op. 85-17 (1984), supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4350. It should be noted that at least four jurisdictions now
allow direct solicitation of prospective clients under limited circumstances. They are the
District of Columbia, NewJersey, North Carolina, and Virginia. See, e.g., N.J. RULES, supra
note 57, Rule 7.3; VIRGINIA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103 (1983) [here-
inafter cited as VA. CODE]. Thus, in these jurisdictions, telephone contacts would be per-
mitted to the same extent.
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yer works or resides.3 95 "Print media" was obviously a reference to
newspapers and magazines. Disciplinary Rule 2-103(A) prohibited
a lawyer from recommending employment of herself to one who
had not sought her advice except as authorized by DR 2-101(B).
The only Code provision which mentioned distributing information
by mail was DR 2-102(A) (2). It limited those matters which could
be mailed to "brief professional announcement card[s] stating new
or changed associations or addresses, change of firm name, or simi-
lar matters."3 96 These cards could be mailed only to lawyers, cli-
ents, former clients, personal friends, and relatives. Therefore,
even after the Model Code of Professional Responsibility was
amended to comply with the Bates decision, lawyers were left in the
anomolous position of being able to publish the information per-
mitted by DR 2-101 (B) in a newspaper, but not being allowed to
mass mail that same advertisement to neighboring residences and
businesses.
It is clear that much of the opposition to direct mail advertising
was, and still remains, based on the view that contacting a prospec-
tive client by mail is the equivalent of in-person solicitation.3 97 In
1978, however, the United States Supreme Court decided Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Association,398 which articulated the dangers that justi-
fied the prohibition of in-person solicitation. This focusing on in-
person solicitation had the effect of bringing into sharp contrast the
fundamental differences between direct mail and in-person solicita-
tion. After Ohralik, it became clear to many states that mailing of
lawyer advertisements carried few of the dangers that accompanied
in-person contacts.
In the Ohralik case, an attorney was disciplined for visiting two
automobile accident victims shortly after the incident and success-
fully persuading them to hire him to represent them. One
eighteen-year-old woman victim was alone in the hospital when
Ohralik visited her. He approached the other woman at her home
although she had not invited him to speak to her.3 99 The Court
held that the states had a legitimate interest in protecting the public
from transactions where there is a danger of fraud, undue influ-
ence, intimidation, overreaching, or other vexatious conduct.400
The Court concluded that the in-person solicitation of laypersons
395 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-101(B).
396 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-102(A)(2).
397 Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978); Florida Bar v.
Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981), vacated, 420 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1982); Ariz. Op. 83-20
(1983),supra note 294, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1319; S.C. Op.
83-09 (1983), supra note 88, summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 279.
398 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
399 Id. at 449-51.
400 Id. at 462.
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by lawyers presented many of these dangers. It pitted a lawyer
trained in persuasion against a layperson in a situation which "may
exert pressure and often demands an immediate response, without
providing an opportunity for comparison or reflection." 40 In this
face-to-face encounter, the Court continued, "there is no opportu-
nity for intervention or counter-education by agencies of the Bar,
supervisory authorities, or persons close to the solicited individ-
ual." 40 2 In ruling that the state may properly institute a prophylac-
tic prohibition on in-person solicitation,403 the Court took
particular notice of the fact that the persons solicited by Ohralik
were "unsophisticated, injured, or distressed laypersons. "404
Ohralik can be read narrowly to mean that states may ban only
the in-person solicitation of unsophisticated, injured, or distressed
laypersons because they are particularly vulnerable to the blandish-
ments of trained advocates. This reading would permit, however,
the in-person solicitation of undistressed, sophisticated business-
persons, and perhaps all non-vulnerable laypersons. It is argued,
however, that the dangers arising from the lack of time to reflect
and seek other advice inheres in a face-to-face encounter, regard-
less of who is being solicited. Consequently, Ohralik is read more
broadly to mean that all in-person solicitations are prohibitable no
matter who the prospective client is or what her mental or physical
condition may be. This latter meaning is the most widely held and
reflects the position of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.4
05
But what if the solicitation does not involve a face-to-face en-
counter between the lawyer and the potential client? What if the
solicitation of employment is mailed to the layperson's home or
business? The pressure for an immediate response, the lack of time
to reflect and reconsider the offer after seeking other advice, the
potential for intimidation and overreaching, and the inabililty of
others to intervene are greatly reduced, if not absent. Thus, mailed
401 Id. at 457.
402 Id.
403 The Court held that no actual overreaching or injury need be shown to justify the
prohibition and the imposition of punishment for its violation. The state interests in elimi-
nating situations which are "inherently conducive to overreaching and other forms of mis-
conduct," 436 U.S. at 464, outweigh the public's interest in obtaining information about
legal rights in this manner. Id. at 464-68.
404 Id. at 465. Ohralik conceded in his brief that "solicitation that is superimposed upon
the physically or mentally ill patient, or upon an accident victim unable to manage his legal
affairs, obviously injures the best interests of such a client." Id. at 466 n.27.
405 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3, reads in part: "A lawyer may not solicit pro-
fessional employment from a prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or
prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person, or otherwise, when a significant motive
for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain." See text accompanying notes 389-
91 supra.
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solicitations should not be prohibited altogether as in-person con-
tacts may be. Or so it would seem. Nevertheless, several courts
have held that direct mail advertising is prohibitable by the states
on the same basis as in-person solicitation.406 This questionable
position seems to be the minority rule, however, and should wither
on the vine following the United States Supreme Court opinion in
In re R.M.J.40
7
The Missouri attorney in R.M.J. had just opened a solo practice
and mailed an announcement of that fact to persons in his commu-
nity. Some of the addressees were not among those to whom the
state code of ethics permitted professional announcements to be
sent. Like the ABA Model Code, Missouri's code permitted an-
nouncements to be sent only to "lawyers, clients, former clients,
personal friends, and relatives." 408 The Court reversed the Mis-
souri Supreme Court's finding that the lawyer was properly subject
to discipline for these mailings. In an opinion by Justice Powell, the
absolute prohibition of mailings to persons other than those listed
was held to be too restrictive toward constitutionally protected
commercial speech. The Court noted that there were several less
restrictive paths open to the state and that there was no indication
in the record that they had been tried and failed. 409 In particular,
the state could have attempted to ameliorate the dangers of direct
mail advertising by requiring, for example, the filing of a copy of all
mailings with the state ethics committee. In R.M.J., the state ar-
gued that a mailing from an attorney would be frightening to the
public unaccustomed to receiving letters from law offices. The
Court responded, "If indeed this is likely, the lawyer could be re-
quired to stamp 'This is an Advertisement' on the envelope." 410
In support of the position that residential mailings are not sub-
ject to the same prophylactic prohibitions as in-person contacts, the
Court cited Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission.411 In
that case, the utility had been prohibited from including with its
bills inserts which promoted the use of nuclear energy. The Com-
mission ruled that the public was a captive audience whose privacy
was violated by receiving inserts whose content may be objectiona-
ble to the recipients. The New York Court of Appeals upheld the
ban as a reasonable "time, place and manner" restriction on com-
406 See note 397 supra.
407 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
408 MISSOURI CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-102(A)(2) (1978).
409 455 U.S. at 206; see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (discussed in note 85 supra).
410 455 U.S. at 206 n.20. The 1985 Arizona, Arkansas, and Delaware disciplinary rules
have followed this suggestion and require all written solicitations of business to be labeled
as advertising. 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 446, 961, 1126.
411 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
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mercial speech.4 12 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that sub-
stantial privacy interests were not being invaded in an "essentially
intolerable manner" because the recipients could avoid the objec-
tionable speech "simply by transferring the bill insert from envel-
ope to wastebasket." 4 13 In a footnote, the Court pointed out that
although there are special privacy rights associated with a person's
home, "the arrival of a billing envelope is hardly as intrusive as the
visit of a door-to-door solicitor."
414
Finally, any state restriction on the mailing of lawyer advertise-
ments must be examined in light of the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp.415 There the
Court struck down a postal law which prohibited the mailing of un-
solicited advertisements for contraceptives. Against the argument
that the government may protect the public from potentially offen-
sive materials, the Court held that offensiveness could not validate
the suppression of speech protected by the first admendment.4
16
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, stated: "[T]he 'short,
though regular journey from the mail box to trash can . . .is an
acceptable burden [on postal patrons], at least so far as the Consti-
tution is concerned.' "417
The constitutional dubiousness of any ban on all lawyer adver-
tising by mail has forced the courts and drafters of ethics codes to
seek a better justified set of limitations. For many the source of
those limitations are found in the narrow reading of the Ohralik
case, and its focus upon "vulnerable" recipients. 418 The primary
differences between the most recently adopted advertising regula-
tions lay in their view of who falls within that vulnerable group
which may not be contacted by mail. The Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct adopted the narrowest and, perhaps, the least de-
fensible definition. Under Model Rule 7.3, prohibited solicitation is
defined as including "contact . . .by letter or other writing ...
directed to a specific recipient." 41 9
In an unnecessarily confusing extension of the same sentence,
the Rule proceeds to carve out an exception to the prohibition.
However, in doing so, it appears to further qualify the circum-
stances in which mailings are improper, rather than specify when
mailings are proper. The remainder of the sentence reads: "[Pro-
412 47 N.Y.2d 94, 107, 390 N.E.2d 749, 755-56, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30, 37 (1979).
413 447 U.S. at 541-42.
414 Id. at 542 n.11.
415 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
416 Id. at 71-72.
417 Id. at 72 (quoting Lamont v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 269 F. Supp. 880, 883
(S.D.N.Y.), summarily aff'd, 386 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 915 (1968)).
418 See text accompanying notes 398-405 supra.
419 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3.
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hibited solicitation] does not include letters addressed or advertis-
ing circulars distributed generally to persons not known to need
legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a particular mat-
ter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such
useful." 42
0
Model Rule 7.3 is not a model of clarity.421 It appears to pro-
hibit a mailed solicitation of employment "directed to a specific re-
cipient" regardless of whether the recipient is in any kind of
vulnerable condition. However, "letters addressed or advertising
circulars distributed generally" may be mailed to persons who, be-
cause of their situations, might "in general" find the lawyer's serv-
ices useful, but only if they are not known to be in particular need
of legal services. The first problem with the rule is that the word
"generally" is ambiguously placed. One cannot determine whether
it describes both "letters addressed" and "circulars distributed" or
only the latter phrase. Reading "generally" to modify both letters
and circulars makes little sense. What are "letters addressed ...
generally to persons"? How do they differ from prohibited "let-
ter[s] ... directed to a specific recipient"? What is proper surely
cannot turn on the distinction between mailings which are ad-
dressed to "occupant" and those which are addressed to specific
persons.
The official commentary to Rule 7.3 does not speak in terms of
the numbers of letters sent or the specificity of the addresses.
Rather, it differentiates mailings on the basis of their content. The
distinction between "general" mailings on one hand, and "specific"
or "targeted" mailings on the other, according to the comment, lies
in whether they "speak to a specific matter," that is, whether "the
representations made in [the] mailings are ... general rather than
tailored ... [to] a specific legal matter or incident." 422 Of course,
420 Id.
421 The entire second sentence of Rule 7.3 reads:
The term "solicit" includes contact in person, by telephone or telegraph, by letter
or other writing or by other communication directed to a specific recipient, but
does not include letters addressed or advertising circulars distributed generally to
persons not known to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer in a
particular matter, but who are so situated that they might in general find such
services useful.
422 The pertinent paragraph of the comment reads in full:
General mailings not speaking to a specific matter do not pose the same dan-
ger of abuse as targeted mailings, and therefore are not prohibited by this Rule.
The representations made in such mailings are necessarily general rather than tai-
lored, less importuning than informative. They are addressed to recipients un-
likely to be specially vulnerable at the time, hence who are likely to be more
skeptical about unsubstantiated claims. General mailings not addressed to recipi-
ents involved in a specific legal matter or incident, therefore, more closely resem-
ble permissible advertising rather than prohibited solicitation.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3 comment.
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the root of this distinction is found in the Ohralik rationale for
prohibiting in-person solicitation. Persons in immediate need of
specific legal services because of some incident in their personal or
business lives may be vulnerable and should be shielded from the
importunings of trained advocates who are motivated by a desire
for "a piece of the action." On the other hand, mailings addressed
to persons not involved in a specific legal matter "more closely re-
semble permissible advertising rather than prohibited solicita-
tion."4
23
Therefore, the Rule is easily misread. Apparently, it does not
mean that all written solicitations are improper unless they are
"generally" mailed or distributed. What is prohibited are mailings
to specific individuals, regardless of the number, where the content
of the material refers to a specific legal matter arising out of a par-
ticular incident. This restriction applies only where the recipient is
"known" to need legal services of the kind provided by the lawyer.
At this point the Rule refines the concept of who is "in need of legal
services." It excludes from this group those who are "so situated
that they might in general find such [services] useful." Of course, if
anyone of this latter group is "known" to be in immediate need of
the kind of services offered, then they are off limits.
Under this reading of the Rule, a lawyer could mail every fe-
male postal patron in her city a letter asking whether she had used
the Dalkon Shield IUD and suggesting that, if any had, she may
have a right to sue the manufacturer. The lawyer in this case could
argue that although the letter related to a specific legal matter, Rule
7.3 was not violated because she did not know that any of the recipi-
ents were in need of legal services of the kind she was offering.
424
This is not an unreasonable result given that an advertisement simi-
423 Id.
424 See Tex. Op. 414 (1984), supra note 142, summarized in LAwYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:8304, regarding the meaning of Texas DR 2-103(D)(1), which prohibits sending
a written communication to a prospective client if the lawyer "knows or reasonably should
know" that the recipient could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.
The committee interpreted this provision to mean that "a lawyer would in most circum-
stances violate this requirement by carrying out a personalized direct-mail campaign be-
cause the lawyer normally should know that some of the recipients would be persons not
capable of exercising reasonable judgment... even though the lawyer could not reason-
ably know which of the recipients would be in that category." Thus, the committee con-
cluded, solicitation by means of direct mail of personalized letters is permitted only if "the
lawyer takes all necessary steps to prevent the personalized direct-mail solicitation from
going to any person that could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer."
By "personalized letters," the committee meant letters personalized for each recipient and
not brochures and circulars which are mass produced for distribution to many persons.
Tex. Op. 420 (1984), supra note 142. This distinction appears to be the one that Model
Rule 7.3 tries to make.
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lar to the letter could be published in the newspaper. 425
Several of the states which have amended their advertising reg-
ulations to address the direct mail solicitation question have drawn
a larger and more realistic definition of the vulnerable class to
whom mailings may not be sent. Rather than confining that group
to those in need of specific legal services of the kind offered by the
lawyer, they have included potential clients who the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know are not able for any reason to exercise
reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer.426 This "ability to ex-
ercise reasonable judgment" standard would encompass vulnera-
bility caused by any physical, emotional, or mental condition.
427
Others have adopted the Model Rules' "particular need for legal
services" standard, 428 while NewJersey has incorporated both stan-
dards in its new rules.
429
Because many of these new anti-solicitation rules apply by their
425 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985); In re Appert, 315
N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 1981).
426 See, e.g., TEXAS CODE, supra note 51, DR 2-103(D)(1) (discussed at note 424 supra);
ILLINOIS RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2-103(c)(1), amended effective July 1, 1984
("In no event may a lawyer initiate a contact with a prospective client if the lawyer reason-
ably should know that the physical, emotional, or mental state of the person solicited is
such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer .... )
[hereinafter cited as ILL. RULES]; N.J. RULES, supra note 57, Rule 7.3(b)(1); ILL. RULES, supra,
Rule 2-103(c)(1) (1980); VA. CODE, supra note 394, DR 2-103 (A)(2); MISSOURI RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1986) [hereinafter cited as Mo. RULES], summarized in 1
CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 924.
427 See, e.g., TEXAS CODE, supra note 51, DR 2-103(D)(1); ILLINOIS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103(c)(1) (1980) [hereinafter cited as ILL. CODE]; Md. Op. 81-21
(1981), supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4307; Mo.
RULES, supra note 426, Rule 7.3; MONTANA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3
(1985), summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 855; NEw HAMPSHIRE RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1986), summarized in 2 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14,
at 14.
In the Proposed Final Draft of the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct (May
30, 1981), Rule 7.3(b) stated:
A lawyer shall not contact, or send a written communication to, a prospective cli-
ent for the purpose of obtaining professional employment if. (1) The lawyer
knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of
the person is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in em-
ploying a lawyer ....
This provision was deleted. A slightly different standard has been adopted by some states.
Couched in terms derived directly from Ohralik, it prohibits the solicitation of employment
by personal contact under circumstances which create the risk of "overreaching" or "undue
influence" by the lawyer. See Maine Rule 3.9(0; N.C. Op. 348 (1984), supra note 267, sum-
marized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:6613. This standard undoubtedly would
cover all those situations reached by the "reasonable judgment" standard.
428 See San Diego Co. Bar Ass'n Legal Ethics and Unlawful Practices Comm. Op. 1983-5,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1802; Mich. Op. CI-837 (1982), supra
note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4852; Cal. Op. 1980-54,
supra note 271, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1601.
429 See NJ. RULES, supra note 57, Rule 7.3(b)(1), (4); FLA. CODE, supra note 233, DR 2-
104(B)(2)(c), (e); ILL. CODE, supra note 427, DR 2-103(c)(1), (3); Md. Op. 84-12 (1984),
supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4334.
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terms only to mail contact with vulnerable "prospective clients,"
they do not prevent contact with the family members of an accident
victim who are not themselves "prospective clients." 430 For the
same reason, the narrow focus of the anti-solicitation rules makes
them inapplicable to both the direct mail and in-person solicitation
of referrals from third party business forwarders who are not "pro-
spective clients." Client forwarders are not usually in need of legal
services of the kind offered by the soliciting lawyer, or at least the
lawyer does not "know" of that fact. Therefore, under the Model
Rules, a lawyer may directly solicit referrals from third parties as
long as she does not offer anything of value in exchange for them.
A few states still prohibit all direct mail solicitation.431 How-
ever, a small number permit even accident victims to be contacted
by mail.43 2 The question with which courts and ethics panels have
been grappling is when certain recipients of mailed advertisements
are sufficiently "in need" of legal services to warrant them being
declared an off-limits vulnerable group. The ethics opinions are
hard to reconcile. For example, one ethics panel ruled that a lawyer
cannot offer his services by mail to home owners who are presently
engaged in selling their homes.433 Another panel in the same state
ruled that a lawyer may send a letter to the owners of property
430 A defender of the Model Rules could argue that the family of an accident victim
would be off-limits to direct mail solicitation under Rule 7.3 because it is couched in terms
of solicitations "directed to a specific recipient." See note 421 supra and accompanying text.
However, like the Illinois and New Jersey rules, Model Rule 7.3 also specifically refers to
solicitation of employment "from a prospective client." In fact, the Rule is captioned "Di-
rect Contact With Prospective Clients." Florida has adopted a provision which remedies
this shortcoming. Fla. DR 2-104(B)(2)(e) states: "A lawyer shall not send . . .a written
communication to a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining professional employ-
ment if... [t]he communication is prompted by a specific occurrence affecting the person
to whom the communication is directed, or a member of his family, in a manner distinct
from the effect on the general public." The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371, 373-74 (Fla.
1983).
431 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Schreiber, 407 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1981), vacated, 420 So. 2d 599
(Fla. 1982); Allison v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n, 362 So. 2d 489 (La. 1978); S.C. Op. 83-09
(1983), supra note 88, summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 279.
432 See Va. Op. 508 (1983), supra note 294, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:8815 (attorney may contact an automobile accident victim by mail as long as the
correspondence contains no false, fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement); In re
Von Wiegen, 63 N.Y.2d 163, 470 N.E.2d 838, 481 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 2701 (1985) (letters to hotel skywalk collapse victims may be "unseemly" and "offen-
sive" but not prohibitable except insofar as they are misleading); Mo. RULES, supra note
426, Rule 7.3, summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 924 (allowing mail solici-
tation relating to a specific event); MINNESOTA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3
(1985), summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 882 (same). But see Conn. Infor-
mal Op. 82-18 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at
801:2057; N.C. Op. 348 (1984), supra note 267, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:6613; Md. Op. 83-52 (1984), supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:4328.
433 See Nassau County Op. 82-4 (1982), supra note 172, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:6204. See also State v. Moses, 231 Kan. 243, 642 P.2d 1004 (1982).
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listed in a real estate guide.43 4 The committee charged with issuing
ethics opinions for the Chicago Bar Association held that a lawyer
may send mailgrams offering to assist persons against whom mort-
gage foreclosure proceedings had been instituted.435 Similarly, a
Connecticut informal opinion approved a mailing by a lawyer to
owners of property that had been attached by creditors, where the
lawyer mentioned the bankruptcy laws and suggested that the re-
cipients discuss their problems with an attorney.4 6 A Maryland
ethics opinion allowed a lawyer to mail a letter soliciting employ-
ment to the residents of a housing development which was being
converted into a condominium. 437 However, that same year the
same Maryland panel prohibited a lawyer, who practiced both in
Maryland and the District of Columbia, from sending a letter to
Maryland residents charged with minor offenses in the District. 438
Several state ethics panels have upheld mailings from lawyers
to potential clients who, in the words of Model Rule 7.3, "are so
situated that they might in general find such services useful."
43 9
The key finding in these cases has been that the solicitation of legal
employment did not relate to a particular incident which occa-
sioned the need for the legal services offered. In these states and
under the Model Rules, a lawyer may directly solicit employment
from a prospective lay client where the lawyer's services are the
kind that the potential client, because of the nature of its business,
for example, would naturally use from time to time.
440
C. Soliciting Persons Presently Represented by Counsel
Marketing consultants note that some corporate clients are
"fickle" in their relationships with outside counsel, and may be
434 N.Y.C. Op. 80-15 (undated), supra note 125, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:6304.
435 Chi. Informal Op. 81-1 (1981), supra note 92, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra
note 10, at 801:3202.
436 Conn. Informal Op. 83-15 (1983), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:2060. See also Conn. Informal Op. 83-9 (1983), supra note 14, summa-
rized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2059.
437 Md. Op. 81-27 (1981), supra note 302, summarizedin LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:4308.
438 Md. Op. 80-61 (1980), supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:4304. See also In re Frank, 440 N.E.2d 676 (Ind. 1982).
439 ABA Informal Op. 1504 (1984), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:354 (in-house counsel of targeted businesses); Conn. Informal Op. 83-
9 (1983), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:2059 (home
buyers); Mich. Op. CI-961 (1983), supra note 57, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4872 (targeted insurance and banking institutions); Wis. Op. E-83-2 (1983), supra
note 88, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:9108 (prospective commer-
cial clients).
440 See Md. Op. 83-93 (1983), supra note 302, summarizedin LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4333 (proper for lawyer to send letters to corporations setting forth the lawyer's
expertise in obtaining visas).
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good targets for attempts to dislodge them from their present
outside counsel.44 ' Should law practice marketers be concerned
whether targeted prospective clients are already regularly repre-
sented by counsel in the same legal field? Does this fact render the
potential client unapproachable? Although the subject is infre-
quently raised, there are reasons, some ethical and some legal, why
law practice builders should pause to consider the matter.
The ABA Model Code does not specifically prohibit interfer-
ence with an ongoing attorney client relationship.442 It was always
assumed, no doubt, that any attempt to lure a client away from an-
other lawyer would fall under the ban on solicitation. However,
given the relaxation of the rules against solicitation of lay clients,
the issue is no longer moot.
The major post-Bates case treating this issue is Adler, Barish,
Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein.443 The Adler law firm sought an
injunction to prevent several former associates of the firm from
contacting firm clients and informing them that the associates were
creating a separate partnership. The associates had initiated tele-
phone and in-person contacts with firm clients on whose cases they
had worked. These contacts were followed up by mailings which
contained form letters that the clients could use to discharge the
Adler firm and name Epstein as counsel.444 The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the associates strayed beyond the bounds
of permissible advertising under Bates into prohibited solicitation
under Ohralik. Epstein's conduct, according to the court, frustrated
rather than advanced the clients' informed and reliable decision-
making. 445 The court was heavily influenced by the fact that Ep-
stein's judgment was clouded by his own pecuniary interests. 446
The court failed to recognize, however, that all attempts to attract
clients, by whatever method, are permeated with the lawyer's self-
interest. This is unavoidable. Moreover, the decision failed to dis-
tinguish the traditional practice, permitted by DR 2-102(A)(2),
441 Winter, supra note 7, at 57.
442 Some lawyers may view client stealing as "morally reprehensible conduct" within the
meaning of EC 1-5, or as "conduct involving moral turpitude" under DR 1-102(A) (3), but
just as likely, other lawyers view it as simply playing "hardball" in the increasingly competi-
tive market for legal clients. See note 441 supra and accompanying text.
443 482 Pa. 416, 393 A.2d 1175 (1978).
444 Id. at 421, 393 A.2d at 1177-78.
445 Id. at 427, 393 A.2d at 1181 (citing Ohralik and EC 2-10 which states that attorney
advertising should "facilitate informed selection of lawyers").
446 The court stated:
Appellees' concern for their line of credit and the success of their new law firm
gave them an immediate, personally created financial interest in the clients' deci-
sions. In this atmosphere, appellees' contacts posed too great a risk that clients
would not have the opportunity to make a careful, informed decision.
Id. at 428, 393 A.2d at 1181.
1986]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
whereby departing associates mail notices to present and former
clients announcing new or changed professional associations. The
case would have been more cleanly decided if it rested upon the
prohibited nature of the in-person client contacts initiated by the
associates.
While the ethical propriety of the Adler associates' conduct
might be debated, 44 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's opinion
decided an equally important point of substantive law. The injunc-
tion sought by the firm against its former associates was predicated
upon a claim of tortious interference with the contractual relation-
ships between the firm and its clients. After holding that contacting
the firm's clients was not constitutionally protected commercial
speech under Bates, the court went on to hold that the associates
were intentionally and improperly interfering with the firm's con-
tractual agreements. The court analyzed the Restatement (Second)
of Torts Sections 766448 and 767449 and concluded that nothing in
either society's or the profession's "rules of game" sanctioned the
associates' conduct. 450 The injunction was upheld.
The ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain no
provision directly applicable to the question of whether a presently
represented person may be solicited by another lawyer. It could be
inferred from this that the possibility of interfering with an ongoing
attorney-client relationship need not concern the lawyer who adver-
tises by mail. Rule 7.3 permits an attorney, without qualification, to
mail letters or advertising circulars to those not known to have a
specific need for her services, but who are so situated that they
might in general find the lawyer's services useful. In other words,
the Rule places no obligation upon the advertising attorney to
447 The intermediate appellate court in Adler had held the associates' conduct was a le-
gitimate form of distributing information concerning the employment of a lawyer and dis-
solved the injunction. Adler, Barish, Daniels, Levin & Creskoff v. Epstein, 252 Pa. Super.
553, 382 A.2d 1226 (1977). See also Adler, 482 Pa. at 440, 393 A.2d at 1187 (Mandarino, J.,
dissenting).
448 "Intentional Interference with Performance of Contract by Third Person[:] One who inten-
tionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract ... between another
and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the
contract, is subject to liability to the other." Id. at 431, 393 A.2d at 1183 (citing § 766 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 23, 1977)) (emphasis in original).
449 In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with an
existing contract ... of another is improper or not, consideration is given to the
following factors: (a) the nature of the actor's conduct, (b) the actor's motive, (c)
the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes, (d) the interests
sought to be advanced by the actor, (e) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's
conduct to the interference, and (f) the relations between the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (Tent Draft No. 14, 1977).
450 The court quoted F. HARPER & F.JAMES, THE LAw OF TORTS §§ 6.12, .13 (1956), and
drew on DR 2-103(A), which prohibits recommending the employment of oneself as a law-
yer, for support for the notion that neither our society nor our profession has sanctioned
conduct like the associates' in that case. Adler, 482 Pa. at 432, 393 A.2d at 1184.
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avoid mailing such matters to those who may be presently repre-
sented by counsel. Note, however, that regardless of whether the
recipients of the mailing are known to be represented, all mailed
matters must comply with Rule 7.1. Rule 7.1 (c) prohibits a lawyer
from comparing the lawyer's services with another lawyer's serv-
ices, unless the comparison can be factually substantiated.
It appears that some states may address this issue directly when
they reconsider their advertising rules. At least Florida451 and Ari-
zona have done so. Arizona's new ethics rules, effective Feburary 1,
1985, modify ABA Model Rule 7.2 by prohibiting a written commu-
nication from a lawyer if it concerns a specific matter and the lawyer
should know that the person is represented by a lawyer in that mat-
ter.452 This narrow rule would not prohibit the interloping firm
from attempting to lure a corporation away from its current outside
counsel in order to represent it generally in a particular field of
practice, as opposed to a particular case. In this situation, it ap-
pears that the rules regarding solicitation circumscribe only the
methods by which a "fickle" corporate client may be seduced away
from its counsel, and the law of torts, not ethics, determines
whether it can be done at all.
D. Solicitation of Lawyers vs. Laypersons
Lawyers solicit employment from other lawyers in two ways.
The solicited attorney may be the prospective client, or a potential
client forwarder. The latter situation has been treated in this article
under the heading of soliciting referrals. 453 But if the situation is
the former, is there any greater allowance made for the fact that the
prospective client is not a naive layperson? The ABA Model Code
prohibits an attorney from recommending her services or sug-
gesting the need of legal services in person "to a layperson."
454
The limited mail contact with other lawyers permitted by DR 2-
102(A)(2) refers only to professional announcements and is only
pertinent to the situation where the lawyer is seeking to inform the
profession, clients, and friends of her new professional situation.
Thus, it can be argued that the Model Code does not prohibit the
in-person or mailed solicitation of lawyers as clients.
451 The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1983).
452 ARIZONA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2(f) (1985), summarized in 1 CUR-
RENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 445, 446. The amended Florida DR 2-104(B) (2) (a) is iden-
tical. See The Florida Bar, 438 So. 2d 371, 374 (Fla. 1983). The Minnesota Supreme Court
in In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204, 215 (Minn. 1981), while holding proper the mailing of
brochures concerning the Dalkon Shield IUD, noted, "Conduct that the advertising attor-
ney knows or should know is an interference with an existing professional relationship is
prohibited." Id. at 214. The court cited no authority for this proposition.
453 See text accompanying notes 458-80 infra.
454 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(A), 2-104(A).
19861
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
The Model Rules prohibit the in-person solicitation of employ-
ment for gain of "a prospective client." 455 This would apparently
include potential clients who are also lawyers. The same rule also
makes no distinction between lawyers and nonlawyers when the so-
licitation of employment is by mail. If the solicitee is in present
need of the kind of legal services offered, the solicitation is im-
proper regardless of whom the solicitee is. This is a questionable
position. The entire rationale for prohibiting direct solicitation is
to prevent the potential overreaching and undue influence that may
be exerted by a trained advocate upon an untutored and vulnerable
layperson. A solicited lawyer is ordinarily capable of analyzing the
representations and background of the soliciting lawyer as well as
the potential benefits of utilizing the lawyer's services. In fact, this
position has been espoused by the ABA's Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility in Informal Opinion 84-
1504.456 There, the Committee addressed whether a lawyer who
was returning to private practice after working for a government
regulatory commission could send letters to the in-house counsel of
companies subject to the commission's regulations. The lawyer's
letter would mention the many laws and regulations which affect
the recipients' companies, give some biographical data about the
lawyer, and offer his services as a consultant. In this case, the solic-
ited lawyers were the agents of the prospective clients, and may or
may not have had the final authority to hire consulting attorneys.
The Committee advised that regardless of whether the solicited in-
house counsel were viewed as prospective clients or only as repre-
sentatives of the prospective clients, the potential harms of direct
solicitation were absent where the person solicited was also an
attorney.45
7
State codes of ethics do not distinguish between the solicita-
tion of laypersons, lawyers as clients or client representatives, and
legally sophisticated businesspersons. While holding only that
455 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.3.
456 ABA Informal Op. 1504 (1984), supra note 258, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:354.
457 This same conclusion was reached by the California Standing Comm. on
Professsional Responsibility and Conduct. Cal. Op. 1981-61, supra note 271, summarized in
LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:1602. See also Professional Ethics and Grievance
Comm. of the Columbus (Ohio) Bar Ass'n Op. 5 (undated), summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:6902 (lawyer may contact corporate counsel in an effort to secure
employment in products liability cases if the communication is dignified, contains no repre-
sentation of expertise, and is not distributed more than once a year); Wis. Op. E-83-2
(1983), supra note 88, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:9100 (lawyer
may mail solicitations to businesses; concerns regarding targeted direct mail are reduced
when recipient is a sophisticated businessperson); Spencer v. Justices of the Supreme Court




legal employment may be solicited from in-house counsel by mail,
ABA Informal Opinion 84-1504 lends strong support to the propo-
sition that in-house counsel may be directly solicited for employ-
ment either in person or by telephone.
E. Soliciting Referrals by Mail
Most of the jurisdictions which permit direct mail advertising
do not distinguish between the recipients who are prospective cli-
ents and those who are potential business forwarders. However, a
few jurisdictions have perceived problems peculiar to the solicita-
tion of referrals from third parties by mail. In Koffler v. Joint Bar
Association,458 lawyers had sent letters to both individual property
owners and real estate brokers, announcing their availability to
handle real estate transactions. In focusing on the constitutional
question whether the bar could prohibit all direct mail advertising
by lawyers, the New York Court of Appeals put aside the issue of
soliciting referrals due to an inadequately developed record be-
low. 4 59 However, the court noted in passing that soliciting third
party referrals necessarily involves the eventual in-person solicita-
tion of prospective clients by the third party intermediary, and
therefore may promote the kind of conduct proscribed by
Ohralik.460
The propriety of soliciting third party referrals by mail was ad-
dressed directly by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Greene.461
There the disciplined lawyer mailed a thousand fliers to real estate
brokers offering to represent the brokers' clients in all real property
transactions for a flat fee. The court noted that state law banned
the solicitation of legal business by any person or one acting on his
behalf.462 In deciding whether this law could withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny, the court assessed the state interests involved in
prohibiting third party solicitation. It focused upon two aspects of
this conduct. First, the lawyer was attempting to cause the in-per-
son recommendation of his services by the broker. This implicated
the entire range of dangers recognized in Ohralik. Moreover, the
state had an interest in protecting the public from commercial
transactions involving hidden and potentially detrimental conflicts
of interests. The court perceived several ways in which a lawyer's
458 51 N.Y.2d 140, 412 N.E.2d 927, 432 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1026
(1981).
459 51 N.Y.2d at 144-45, 412 N.E.2d at 930, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874.
460 Id. at 144 n.2, 412 N.E.2d at 930 n.2, 432 N.Y.S.2d at 874 n.2.
461 54 N.Y.2d 118, 429 N.E.2d 390, 444 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1035
(1982). See note 464 infra.
462 54 N.Y.2d at 123, 429 N.E.2d at 392, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 885.
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loyalty to his client could be harmed by solicited recommendations
from brokers.
The possibility that the lawyer's view of marketability of title
may be colored by his knowledge that the referring broker nor-
mally will receive no commission unless title closes, the improb-
ability that the attorney will negotiate to the lowest possible
level the commission to be paid to the broker who is an impor-
tant source of business for him (or suggest to the client that he
do so), the probability that the lawyer will not examine with the
same independence that he otherwise would the puffery that the
broker has indulged in to bring about the sale are examples of
the conflict potential to be protected against.463
The New York Court of Appeals then examined whether any
restrictions on third party solicitation short of a total ban would be
ineffective. It pointed out that a requirement of filing all mailed
material with the bar's overseeing agency would afford no protec-
tion to prospective clients faced with in-person solicitation by
brokers. 4
64
Bar oversight of third party mailings was deemed feasible by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Kentucky Bar Association v.
Stuart,465 where the court held that letters to realtors were more
akin to Bates-style advertising than Ohralik-style solicitation. There-
fore, the court held that this form of advertising could not be pro-
hibited unless the state demonstrated that substantial interests
could not be protected by less stringent measures. Although the
court may have been correct that prescreening of referral solicita-
tion letters by the bar would provide adequate protection against
overreaching and deception by the lawyer, the court overlooked the
observation of the New York court that the lawyer was recruiting a
lay intermediary to do his in-person solicitation for him. Prescreen-
ing of the letters by the bar would provide no protection for the
public against the intermediary. As discussed earlier,466 many state
codes prohibit a lawyer from requesting that a third party recom-
463 54 N.Y.2d at 129, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444 N.Y.S.2d at 889.
464 Id. The Court of Appeals adhered to the Greene decision in In re Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d
229, 457 N.E.2d 682, 469 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1599 (1984). Greene
was followed in a Tennessee Ethics Committee opinion which prohibited a lawyer from
sending fliers to accountants requesting them to recommend the lawyer as a tax advisor to
the accountants' clients. Ethics Comm., Bd. of Professional Responsibility of the Sup. Ct.
of Tennessee Op. 84-F-78 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Tenn. Op.], summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:8114. See also Md. Op. 85-20 (1984), supra note 302, summa-
rized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4351 (attorney cannot send letters to physi-
cians requesting them to refer patients to him). Greene was denied certiorari by the
Supreme Court, although Justices Brennan, White, Blackmun, and Powell voted to grant
certiorari and vacate the judgment in light of the R.M.J. decision. 455 U.S. 1035 (1982).
465 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
466 See text accompanying notes 260-62 supra.
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mend the lawyer's services to prospective clients. 467 Under the
ABA's Model Rules, there is no longer a direct ban on "requesting"
another to recommend the lawyer's services, but it may be prohib-
ited nevertheless. Rule 7.3 prohibits direct in-person solicitation of
potential clients. Rule 8.4(a) makes it unprofessional conduct to
"violate or attempt to violate the rules of professional conduct,
knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the
acts of another."468 This would appear to prohibit the promotion
of in-person solicitation of clients by third parties. 469
Does Greene undermine the legitimacy of all requests to third
parties for uncompensated referrals? Probably not. At least three
courts470 and one state ethics committee471 have permitted mailings
designed to prompt third persons to refer clients to lawyers. The
key element in Greene was that the situation created the potential for
the lawyer to develop loyalties to both the client and the broker,
and that their interests might diverge at times. However, in some
solicitation of referral situations, potential conflicts of interest will
not arise. In re Jaques4 7 2 provides an example. Attorney Jaques
asked a union representative to recommend his services to the vic-
tims of a tunnel explosion. The lawyer was held not to have vio-
lated the ethics code. His conduct was not seen as fraudulent,
overreaching, intimidating, or otherwise vexatious because he ap-
proached the union business agent rather than a victim or a family
member. The union representative was not an agent or "runner"
for the lawyer but, ostensibly, a representative of union members
with potential claims. Said the court, "Under these circumstances,
the union agent served as a buffer between the attorney and pro-
spective clients thus alleviating the potential for overreaching and
undue influence." 4
73
The point of cases such asJaques and Stuart474 is that real estate
467 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(C).
468 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 8.4(a).
469 The analogue of Model Rule 8.4(a) in the Code is DR 1-102(a)(2). Thus, even with-
out DR 2-103(C), most codes of professional responsibility would not permit the solicita-
tion of referrals from third parties as long as in-person solicitation is prohibited.
470 Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 92 Conn. 27, 470 A.2d 235 (1984); In reJaques, 407
Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469 (1979); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky.
1978).
471 See Md. Op. 81-34 (1980), supra note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note
10, at 801:4309 (mailing letters to every realtor is permitted); Md. Op. 84-104 (1984), supra
note 302, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4347 (proper to send letters
to other attorneys soliciting appellate work); but see Md. Op. 85-20 (1984), supra note 302,
summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4351 (lawyer may not send letters to
neighborhood physicians informing them of the nature of his practice and requesting them
to give his name to patients).
472 407 Mich. 26, 281 N.W.2d 469 (1979).
473 Id. at 27, 281 N.W.2d at 470.
474 See note 470 supra.
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brokers, for example, could be made aware of the cost and availa-
bility of a lawyer's services through regular advertising channels
and recommend that lawyer's services to her client without any
questions being raised. There seems to be little difference if the
broker learned of the attorney's services by means of a letter, as
long as the attorney does not offer anything of value to the broker
other than the opportunity to please her clients with fast, compe-
tent, and economical legal work. Helping the broker to satisfy cli-
ents does not turn the broker into a runner for the lawyer.
Furthermore, the broker is going to recommend an attorney to her
client anyway. The lawyer's letter did not cause an in-person rec-
ommendation where one otherwise would have never occurred.
The New York Court of Appeals worried, however, about the
possibility of a long-term relationship developing between the law-
yer and the broker, a course of dealing which might put the lawyer
in the broker's debt. Would not the lawyer in such a case be overly
anxious to please the broker, even at the client's expense, in order
to continue the profitable arrangement? The answer could be
yes, 475 but only where the lawyer's actions in representing their
joint client could somehow harm the broker's interests. Absent this
possibility, the New York court's concerns lose substance. 476
Finally, other courts and ethics panels have largely ignored the
concerns expressed about third party solicitation by mail in Greene.
As of this writing, no new cases other than the same court's reitera-
tion of the Greene holding and rationale in Alessi v. Committee on
Professional Standards477 have been found which follow Greene.478
Whether by hobnobbing at the club, writing and lecturing, or, after
Bates, by general media advertising, lawyers have always sought re-
ferrals and always will. The danger to the potential client arises
only when the referrer has a pecuniary interest in securing the em-
ployment of a particular lawyer, or if the lawyer's loyalties are di-
vided between the referrer and the referree. But other jurisdictions
have not seen a significant danger of divided loyalties arising from
lawyers soliciting referrals from real estate brokers or other poten-
475 Judge Fuchsberg who dissented in Greene, 54 N.Y.2d at 129, 429 N.E.2d at 396, 444
N.Y.S.2d at 889, and Judges Cooke and Kaye who dissented in Alessi, 60 N.Y.2d at 237 and
242, 457 N.E.2d at 687 and 690, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 582 and 585 respectively, argued that the
majority's conflict of interest fears were pure speculation for which there was no factual
predicate.
476 See Spencer v. Justices of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 579 F. Supp. 880, 890
(E.D. Pa. 1984), aff'd mere., 760 F.2d 261 (3d Cir. 1985) (suggesting that direct mail adver-
tising by lawyers could not be banned absent a finding of overreaching, invasion of privacy,
and conflict of interests).
477 See note 464 supra.
478 The Trantolo decision, 192 Conn. 27, 470 A.2d 235, ignored Greene. However, Greene
was cited and followed in Tenn. Op. 84-F-78 (1984), supra note 464, summarized in LAWYER'S
MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:8114.
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tial business forwarders. It is probably sufficient that lawyers are
prohibited from offering anything of value in exchange for referral
and from accepting employment where they know that fraud, un-
due influence, overreaching, or deception was used by the referrer
in procuring the employment.
479
In summary, the solicitation of referrals, either in person or by
mail, still is prohibited in states retaining ethics rules modeled after
the ABA Model Code. Lawyers cannot solicit in person, nor can
they request intermediaries to do it for them. It can be argued that
the same dubious restriction holds true under the ABA Model
Rules for the same reasons. Even in states which now allow in-per-
son or mailed solicitation of nonvulnerable laypersons, the conflict
of interest rationale of the Greene case continues to throw a shadow
over the solicitation of referrals from third party business forward-
ers. Even in those states which reject or ignore the reasoning of
Greene, restrictions still remain on the solicitation of referrals. The
solicitee cannot be offered anything of value in exchange for refer-
rals, including reciprocal referrals. Moreover, given the concerns
regarding vulnerable potential clients expressed in Ohralik, lawyers
must avoid seeking referrals from persons who deal directly with
prospective clients when they are in a mental, physical, or emo-
tional condition which could render them unduly susceptible to
suggestions about securing the services of a lawyer.480
VII. Hiring Public Relations Firms
The American Bar Association Journal noted at least twice in
1984 that an increasing number of law firms were hiring marketing
and public relations consultants.48' Obviously, attorneys are be-
coming concerned about the increasing competition for legal serv-
ices and are seeking professional assistance in exploring ways to
either expand or focus their practices. However, there are certain
principles that must be kept in mind when lawyers consider what
marketing experts may do for them.
First, it should be obvious that a lawyer or law firm which hires
479 See MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 2-103(B), (E). The Model Rules also prohibit the
giving of anything of value to another in return for recommending the lawyer's services.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 7.2(c). However, the Rules do not contain a provision
like DR 2-103(E) which prohibits a lawyer from accepting employment when it is at least
obvious that the person has come to the lawyer as a result of prohibited conduct. Neverthe-
less, under Rule 7.3, a lawyer may not contact a prospective client in person to solicit em-
ployment, and Rule 8.4(a) prohibits the lawyer from doing so through the acts of another.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17.
480 See Grievance Comm. v. Trantolo, 192 Conn. 27, 35, 470 A.2d 235, 239 (1984),
where it was suggested that regulations could be developed to prohibit the solicitation of
referrals from such "sensitive areas" as funeral homes and hospitals.
481 Morgan, supra note 7; Reskin, supra note 6, at 48.
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a lay consultant remains responsible for any ethical violations which
result from the consultant's activities.482 It should also be clear that
a consultant may not do whatever the hiring lawyer cannot do.48
3
Therefore, a lawyer may not hire an advertising consultant to pre-
pare and distribute statements about the lawyer which are false,
misleading or, where prohibited, self-laudatory. 484
Second, there may be a problem where a lawyer hires a public
relations firm to do more than merely advise on various marketing
strategies. For example, the recently enacted New Jersey Rules of
Professional Conduct note in the commentary to Rule 7.2 on adver-
tising that the prohibition against giving anything of value to one
for recommending a lawyer's services would prohibit paying a pub-
lic relations firm to obtain publicity for a lawyer in news articles or
news broadcasts.48 5 This comment seems to envision the situation
where the PR firm is paid to draw media attention to the firm by
distributing news releases or by contacting media personnel di-
rectly. Whatever may be said about the correctness or wisdom of
this comment, it should raise a warning to employers of public rela-
tions consultants.
New York State Bar Opinion 565486 illustrates other ways in
which hiring a marketing firm to actively expand a law practice will
run afoul of ethical rules. An attorney proposed to employ a mar-
keting firm to solicit potential clients to whom the lawyer would
provide prepaid legal services. The marketing firm would contact
organizations which might be interested in such plans. The firm
would be paid either a commission or a percentage of the fees
482 Conn. Informal Op. 82-17 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MANUAL,
supra note 10, at 801:2057; MODEL CODE, supra note 3, EC 3-6; cf. MODEL CODE, supra note
3, DR 4-101(D) (lawyer must take reasonable care to prevent those "whose services are
utilized by him from discussing or using confidences or secrets of a client"); MODEL RULES,
supra note 17, Rule 5.3 ("With respect to a nonlawyer... retained by ... a lawyer: (a) A
partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect
measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is compatible with the pro-
fessional obligations of the lawyer.").
483 DR 1-102(A)(2) of the Model Code and Rule 8.4(a) of the Model Rules prohibit a
lawyer from violating any rule of professional conduct through the acts of another.
484 Md. Op. 81-70 (1981), supra note 302, summarizedin LAWYER'S MANUAL, supra note 10,
at 801:4312 (an ad company hired by a law firm must avoid the "puffing" typically found in
commercial ads); Belli v. State Bar of California, 10 Cal. 3d 824, 519 P.2d 575, 112 Cal.
Rptr. 527 (1974).
485 This is an extravagant and wholly unnecessary interpretation of the rule. First, in
directing the news media's attention to newsworthy people or events within the client law
firm, the public relations firm is not recommending the firm's services to anyone. What is
properly prohibited by Rule 7.2(c) of the Model Rules and DR 2-103(B) of the Model Code
is the giving of anything of value by the public relations firm to a news media representative
in order to obtain media coverage. Thus, a member of a public relations firm could not
take a newspaper reporter to dinner in an attempt to garner an article about the client law
firm.
486 Issued October 1, 1984, summarized in 1 CURRENT REPORTS, supra note 14, at 510.
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billed to the clients which it recruited. The bar committee disap-
proved of the proposal on two grounds. First, under DR 2-103(B)
and (C) the lawyer is forbidden from either requesting or compen-
sating another to recommend his services. The committee was dis-
turbed that the compensation arrangement created a pecuniary
incentive for the marketing firm to engage in high pressure or
otherwise ethically dubious methods to obtain clients. It also ex-
pressed concern over the fact that persons not trained in the ethical
traditions of the profession or the legal restrictions surrounding the
solicitation of clients were acting for the lawyer. It held that the
lawyer could not hire a marketing firm to solicit business for him.
The second ground on which the New York ethics committee
found the proposed arrangement deficient was that it involved the
sharing of legal fees with nonlawyers in violation of DR 3-
102(A). 4 87 An arrangement such as that proposed in New York
State Opinion 565 would also be prohibited under the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
488
May a law firm hire a nonlawyer to handle its public relations
and advertising work where that person is a full-time employee of
the firm rather than an independent contractor? This would be no
different than hiring a paralegal assistant, and no doubt perfectly
proper. There would be no fee sharing problems if the employee is
compensated on a salaried basis.489 For the reasons expressed in
New York State Opinion 565, the employee could not be paid on a
commission or percentage of fees collected basis. However, the as-
sistant would always act for the lawyer and the employing attorney
would be responsible for any actions of the assistant which violated
the professional rules of ethics or statutes of the state. This respon-
sibility includes the duty to train and supervise the assistant.
The responsibilities of the lawyer who employs an assistant or
independent contractor have been stated in Model Rule 5.3. 49o
487 See also Conn. Informal Op. 82-17 (1982), supra note 14, summarized in LAWYER'S MAN-
UAL, supra note 10, at 801:2057; Mass. Op. 80-11 (1980), supra note 357, summarized in LAw-
YER'S MANUAL, supra note 10, at 801:4602 (A business corporation hired to market the
services of a law firm and compensated on the basis of its performance may not be paid by a
division of fees between its nonlawyer owners and the law firm.). See text accompanying
notes 293-94 supra.
488 MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 5.4(a).
489 In fact, the Model Code, as of 1980, permitted nonlawyer employees of the law firm
to be included in "a compensation.., plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in
part on a profit-sharing agreement." MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 3-102(A)(3). See ABA
Informal Op. 1440 (1979), supra note 258 (Compensation of a lay office administrator by
means of a fixed salary plus a percentage of net profits to provide an incentive and reward
for services held to be not violative of the fee sharing prohibition as long as the compensa-
tion relates to net profits of the firm and not to particular fees involved.).
490 With respect to a nonlawyer employed or retained by or associated with a law-
yer: (a) a partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm
has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the person's conduct is
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The Model Code contained a few scattered references to the law-
yer's responsibilities for the actions of her employees and assist-
ants, but they were specifically confined to the maintaining of client
confidences and the making of extrajudicial statements concerning
an ongoing trial or investigation.49 1 Model Rule 5.3 is, therefore, a
great improvement on the Model Code.
4 92
VIII. Conclusion
The legal profession and American society now stand on the
brink of a new era in law practice marketing. Many of the advertis-
ing techniques available to the producers of other products and
services are becoming available to lawyers. Soon the public will be
bombarded with "come-ons" not conceived of ten years ago, as ele-
ments of the bar push the advertising standards toward those now
applied to nonlegal advertising by the Federal Trade Commission.
Under the banner of free commercial speech, forces within the bar
have engaged the traditions of the profession in a fierce battle on
several fronts. Limitations upon the media through which legal
messages may be distributed have been soundly defeated. Restric-
tions upon the content of lawyers' public communications beyond
the false and misleading have been all but surrendered. Prohibi-
tions based upon good taste face certain defeat. The impermissibil-
ity of direct mail solicitation has come under heavy attack. Even the
age-old ban on in-person solicitation has suffered defections. All
across the front, traditional restrictions are, where possible, falling
back to new positions from which to defend whatever ground
remains.
compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer; (b) a lawyer having
direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the person's conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of
the lawyer; and (c) a lawyer shall be responsible for the conduct of such a person
that would be a violation of the rules of professional conduct if engaged in by a
lawyer if: (1) the lawyer orders or, with the knowledge of the specific conduct,
ratifies the conduct involved; or (2) the lawyer is a partner in the law firm in which
the person is employed, or has direct supervisory authority over the person, and
knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or mitigated
but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
MODEL RULES, supra note 17, Rule 5.2. The Rule specifically applies to "a nonlawyer...
retained by ... a lawyer." This would include consultants who are viewed as independent
contractors.
491 MODEL CODE, supra note 3, DR 4-101(D), 7-107(J).
492 MODEL RULES, supra note 17. Rule 5.3 does not make the lawyer strictly liable for
unethical conduct of the nonlawyer. The lawyer must have either ordered or ratified it, or,
knowing of the unethical conduct, failed to mitigate or avoid its consequences. However,
any lawyer supervising a nonlawyer who acts contrary to the Rules may be found to have
violated Rule 5.3's duty to make reasonable efforts to ensure that the nonlawyer's conduct
is proper. Although not strictly liable, negligence by the lawyer will suffice. This negligent
failure to take measures to prevent unethical conduct by employed or retained nonlawyers
will extend to all the partners of the employing law firm. Id. at Rule 5.3(a).
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Putting aside whether this inexorable flow is to be lauded, la-
mented, or seen as nothing more than a matter of professional aes-
thetics, the nature and extent of the change seems fairly clear.
Inevitably, the standards which will govern all of lawyer business-
getting activity will be those of honesty and fairness. Misleading
and false statements, and overreaching conduct will characterize
prohibited marketing behavior. But the advertising standards are
not yet there in many jurisdictions. Lawyers not wishing to fight
restrictions on marketing behavior must pay heed to their local eth-
ics codes.
Because of the uniqueness of the legal profession, other limita-
tions will also apply. Considerations of conflict of interests, the
utilization of lay intermediaries, prohibitions against aiding the un-
authorized practice of law, and sharing legal fees with nonlawyers
may come into play. Nonlawyer marketing experts know little
about the profession's restrictions in these areas. The responsibil-
ity for ensuring that law practice marketing plans comply with these
ethical proscriptions rests squarely with the lawyers. It is encum-
bent, therefore, upon lawyers who hire marketing advisers to know
the problem areas and to keep abreast of the changes that will
sweep the profession in the next few years. Lawyers who accept any
marketing advice without scrutinizing its ethical propriety, risk
wasting money on strategies which must be abandoned for ethical
reasons. More importantly, they risk censure from the bar. This
article has attempted to familiarize the bar with the ethical aspects
of various marketing strategies so that it will be sensitive to its du-
ties when entering this new dimension of law practice.
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